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ABSTRACT 
 
APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF COUNTERPART THEORY 
 
SEPTEMBER 2017 
 
BRIDGETTE BAILIE PETERSON 
 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Maya Eddon 
 
 
An exploration of the details of counterpart theory, and some applications 
of the view.  In Chapter 1, I set out the view and clarify the most important features: 
that the counterpart relation is a context dependent similarity relation, and that 
individuals are world-bound entities.  I then set out what I take to be the most 
promising methods of filling in important details.  Chapter 2 is a discussion of an 
alternative view, lump theory.  I attempt to distinguish lump theory from 
counterpart theory, and argue that several attempt to do so fail.  Chapter 3 is an 
attempt to apply counterpart theory for individuals to properties.  I attempt to stay 
as close to the standard view as possible, but find it necessary to modify the world-
bound condition.  I suggest a version of property counterpart theory that overcomes 
the obstacles I have identified.  The final chapter is a discussion of a recent attempt 
to apply counterpart theory to the comparativist view of quantitative properties.  I 
argue that an attempt to rely on counterpart theory to overcome an objection is 
unsuccessful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its introduction in 1968, Counterpart theory has sparked interest and 
discussion. In part, this is due to the challenges of accommodating de re modal 
statements, as described below.  In particular, it appears to be a result of the flexibility of 
the similarity-based counterpart relation, especially in comparison to the identity-based 
alternative.  This dissertation is in many ways an attempt to push this flexible theory a bit 
further, and explore further applications.   
In what follows, I will discuss a potential alternative to transworld identity and 
counterpart theory, and argue that it relies upon the resources of counterpart theory 
without adequately distinguishing itself from the view.  I will then discuss two ways that 
counterpart theory can be extended.  In particular, I will provide a thorough exploration 
of the potential for counterpart theory to be applied to properties.   In the end, I will argue 
that certain concepts (‘world-bound’ and ‘transworld’) do not apply cleanly to properties, 
but that a property counterpart theory can neatly capture our intuitions about de re 
modality given that we include a notion of higher order naturalness, and understand that 
properties can be both transworld and world-bound entities.  I conclude by exploring a 
specific application of counterpart theory to defend a relational (or ‘compartivist’) view 
of quantities against an objection based on trans-world mass comparisons.  I argue that, 
as it is presented, the mass-counterpart relation cannot avoid the problem.   
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CHAPTER 1 
COUNTERPART THEORY 
 
 
David Lewis developed counterpart theory in the late 1960s as an alternative to 
Kripke’s possible worlds semantics for quantified modal logic.  His view has been 
discussed extensively and continues to be a source of investigation and potential 
application today.  This is in part because of the challenges associated with analyses of de 
re modal claims (see below), and additionally because the ingenuity and flexibility of 
counterpart theory, which allow one to sidestep various metaphysical puzzles and 
intuitive challenges.   
In general, possible world semantics allows one to make sense of sentences that 
involve modal claims (claims involving possibility and necessity)1 by quantifying over 
possible worlds.  Possible worlds semantics, which became popular after Saul Kripke’s 
innovations in the late nineteen fifties2, is now well-established.   Before moving in to the 
discussion of counterpart theory, I will provide some background on Kripke’s 
contribution. 
 
1.1 Kripke’s Possible Worlds Semantics 
 
Modal logic in its most basic form is just sentential logic with the addition of 
modal operators.  However, unlike operators like ‘&’ and ‘’, the additional operators, 
                                                          
1
 Necessity and possibility can be understood in various ways; e.g., nomological, causal, deontic, analytical 
etc.  Here I mean to refer to logical (or metaphysical) necessity broadly understood.  This notion of 
necessity can be explained by reference to possible worlds: a statement is necessary if it holds in all 
possible worlds, possible if it holds in at least one, and impossible if it holds in none.      
2 e.g., Kripke: 1959 “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic.”  Other philosophers, such as Rudolf 
Carnap developed similar systems previously, which can be seen as precursors to Kripke’s possible worlds 
semantics.  See, for example, Carnap, “Modalities and Quantification”(1946).  This history is discussed in 
Ballarin, “Modern Origins of Modal Logic.”   
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‘’ and ‘’, are not “truth functional.” A connective is truth-functional when the truth 
value of any compound statement is completely determined by the individual truth values 
of the parts of the compound statement.   For example, the truth value of the compound 
statement (A & B) can be discovered by seeking the truth values of each of the 
components; A, B, and the rules governing the connective ‘&’.  The rules governing ‘&’ 
tell us that the entire statement is true if and only if each of the conjuncts is true.   
Unfortunately, this simple method cannot yield the truth values for compound modal 
statements.  From the fact that ‘A’ is true, and the meaning of ‘,’ we cannot simply 
infer that ‘A’ is true.3  
Kripke developed models that rely on a domain, often understood to be a domain 
of all of the possible worlds, or of all possible “states of the world.” In these models,  
and  function as quantifiers over these worlds.  Each model has a set of worlds, and a 
particular world that is picked out as the actual world.  In addition, there is an 
accessibility relation over the worlds.  This is meant to capture the intuitive notion that 
what is possible “according to” one world might not be possible according to another, 
and to account for iterated modalities.4  “ P” means “In all accessible possible worlds, 
P,” and “P” means “In some accessible possible world, P.”       
                                                          
3 Any modal logic satisfying the characteristic axiom (A  A) is not truth functional.  For these logics, if 
A is false, we can be sure that A is false as well.  However, the truth of A does not say anything about 
whether or not A is true.  The case of  is similar: from the fact that A is true, we can infer that A is 
true, but the falsity of A does not yield the falsity of A.  (This issue becomes more pronounced when 
dealing with iterated modalities such as A). 
4
 For example, a normal model structure is an ordered triple (G,K,R), where K is a non-empty set, GK, 
and R  is a relation defined on K.  Intuitively, K is the set of possible worlds, G is the actual world, and R 
captures the notion of accessibility between worlds, or is the notion of possible “relative to” a world.  The 
accessibility relation can be understood as capturing which worlds can be “seen” by other worlds, or which 
worlds another world has access to (Kripke, “Semantical Considerations,” 64).  Kripke expands this simple 
structure to include quantificational model structures.  This is a normal model structure (G,K,R) together 
with a function ‘ψ’ which assigns to each world ‘H’ that is a member of K a set ψ(H), called the domain of 
H.  Intuitively, ψ(H) is the set of all individuals existing in H.  Kripke notes that “ψ(H) need not be the 
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1.2 Possible Worlds and Modal Realism 
 
Utilizing possible worlds semantics means interpreting the modal operators as 
quantifiers over possible worlds.  Naturally, this leads to questions about the nature of 
possible worlds.    Are they just a useful tool for evaluating modal statements, or are they 
entities in their own right?  Although there are a variety of views, the main distinction is 
between views that take possible worlds to be abstract entities of some variety, and views 
that take possible worlds to be concrete entities, not ontologically different from the 
actual world.   
One version of the view that worlds are concrete is Lewis’s Modal Realism.5  
According to Modal Realism, the actual world is just one of an infinite number of 
possible worlds, which are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from each other.  All of 
the worlds are equally real, and the term ‘actual’ functions as an indexical, like ‘here’ or 
‘now.’ 6   The actual world is therefore not ontologically special on this view; instead, it 
just happens to be the world that we inhabit.7    
There are many potential benefits to this view, and it has proven to be quite useful 
in analyzing modal statements, as well as providing definitions of counterfactuals, etc. 
Modal realism is able to provide conceptual underpinnings for our modal operators, and 
provides reductive accounts of a wide range of useful entities and concepts, from 
propositions and properties to counterfactuals, causation, and verisimilitude.  The 
                                                          
same set for different arguments H, just as, intuitively, in worlds other than the real one, some actually 
existing individuals may be absent, while new individuals, like Pegasus, may appear (Ibid, 65).”  
5
 See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. See also: Loux, The Possible and the Actual and Stalnaker, Ways 
a World Might Be.  
6 The terminology is a source of some challenges here; although it is often couched in terms of ‘concrete’ 
and ‘abstract’ worlds, it is not clear that this is the best terminology.   
7 Another option is to adopt a version of modal realism while maintaining the notion that the actual world is 
privileged, and denying that ‘actual’ functions as an indexical.  See Bricker, “Absolute Actuality and the 
Plurality of Worlds.”   
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concreteness or mind independence of modal realism is often taken to be its most 
unattractive feature of the view.8  Lewis has much to say in support of the view despite 
this challenge.9  One promising line of argument is based on comparison with set theory:  
“I know of no accusation against possibles that cannot be made with equal justice 
against sets. Yet few philosophical consciences scruple at set theory. Sets and possibles 
alike make for a crowded ontology. Sets and possibles alike raise questions we have no 
way to answer. [. . .] I propose to be equally undisturbed by these equally mysterious 
mysteries.”10 
In much of my discussion of counterpart theory, I will be assuming modal realism 
for simplicity.  However, note that it is possible to formulate and defend counterpart 
theory without accepting modal realism.  Although counterpart theory seems most 
favorable against the backdrop of modal realism, other accounts of possible worlds have 
been put forth, which make use of counterpart theory without accepting modal realism.11  
Therefore, the status of Modal Realism should not be used to rule out counterpart theory 
as such.   
 
1.3 Analyzing Modal Claims 
 
Assuming modal realism, though, we can analyze a sentence like: “It is possible 
that panda bears are carnivorous,” by considering a possible world at which panda bears 
                                                          
8 Lewis has a convincing response to this consideration.  He asks us to consider set theory, which includes 
ontological commitment to an infinite number of sets.  In this case, the cost is worth paying in order to 
receive the immense mathematical benefits of set theory.  In similar fashion, he argues, modal realism can 
be accepted on the grounds that the ontological costs are paid for by their theoretical benefits and 
explanatory power.  See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.  
9 See Lewis ibid for a thorough discussion and many arguments in favor of the view.   
10 Convention, 208. 
11 For discussion of this point, see, for example, Sider, “The Ersatz Pluriverse.” 
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are carnivores; and we can analyze sentences like: “Necessarily, all humans are mortal,” 
by considering whether all humans in all possible worlds are mortal.  So far, the analyses 
are pretty straightforward and more complicated semantic analyses may seem 
unnecessary.  However, some modal statements are more challenging.  Compare the 
claims that:   
1) Oskar, my cat, could have been polydactyl. 
 and 
 2) A cat could have been elected president.   
Like the above examples, 2) can be analyzed simply by identifying a possible world in 
which some cat is president.  But 1) seems to require a world in which Oskar himself 
exists and has extra toes.12   
In general, this corresponds to a distinction between de re modal claims and de 
dicto modal claims, roughly, claims that make reference to a particular individual, and 
those that do not.13  In sentence 2), the identity of the cat does not matter, and the 
statement concerns de dicto claims about the objects at a world.  But in sentence 1), the 
identity of the cat does matter, and it is a de re claim. 14  
                                                          
12 This sentence also has a de re  reading: it is true of some particular cat that it could have been elected 
president. 
13 Graeme Forbes uses the following example to illustrate the distinction between de dicto and de re modal 
statements:  For the sentence (x)(x is made of matter) to be true at a world w, the objects that exist at w 
must be made out of matter at every world.  But the sentence (x) (x is made of matter) will be true at w 
just as long as, at each world, all of the objects that exist there are made of matter (there).  This is because 
the sentence is claiming that in all possible worlds, everything that exists is made out of matter. (Forbes, 
The Metaphysics of Modality, 49).” 
14
 It should be noted that some philosophers have raised concerns for the de dicto/ de re distinction.  Quine 
was famously skeptical of de re modality. In particular, he thought the substitutivity of identity caused 
problems for de re modal statements.  Quine argued that claims involving the necessity operator can create 
“referentially opaque” contexts, when two terms that refer to the same individual cannot be substituted for 
each other while preserving the truth value.  Here is his famous example:   
 
1. Necessarily 9 is greater than 7. 
2. 9 = the number of planets. 
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One way of spelling out what is meant by the claim that some formulas are 
sensitive to the identities of objects at worlds claim involves “transworld identity,” or 
identity between an individual at two distinct worlds.  Accordingly, the claim that ‘Oskar 
could’ve been polydactyl’ is to be understood as the claim that there is a possible world 
in which Oskar exists, and has extra toes.  That is to say that the same individual cat 
exists in multiple possible worlds.   
In general, we can draw a distinction between de re modal claims and de dicto 
modal claims, and note that de re modal claims seem to require transworld identity or 
some other way to account for this way of referring to the modal properties of a particular 
individual.   
 
1.4 Transworld Identity and the Counterpart Relation 
 
Considering a world where Oskar exists and has extra toes seems to rely on there 
being identity between individuals across possible worlds, or “transworld identity.”  
However, Transworld identity is not the only way to analyze de re modal statements, and 
some have found it counterintuitive to imagine that, e.g., one and the same cat exists in 
multiple distinct possible worlds.  This is further complicated depending on one’s 
understanding of the nature of possible worlds.  It may be difficult to image that my cat is 
identical with a merely possible cat who is part of a non-concrete possible world.   
                                                          
3. Necessarily the number of planets is greater than 7. 
 
Both (1) and (2) are true.  However, it seems possible for there to have been less than seven planets, and so 
(3) is false.  But (3) comes from an instance of substitution in (1), of another way of referring to ‘9’, shown 
in (2).  Quine thought that modal operators could not be attached to objects or individuals independently of 
how they are referred to.  He took the fact that modal contexts are referentially opaque to show that one 
cannot ‘quantify into’ modal contexts.  Therefore, he concluded that de re modal claims are incoherent.  
(For more see, e.g., Quine, From a Logical Point of View).   
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Counterpart theory, introduced by David Lewis in 1968, provides an alternative 
account of de re modal claims that rejects transworld identity.  According to the view, an 
individual exists only in its own world, and nowhere else, and there are no identity 
relations that hold between objects in distinct possible worlds.  There is no identity 
relation between my actual cat Oskar, and the otherworldly polydactyl cat.  Instead, 
another relation, the ‘counterpart relation’ connects these cats.  The counterpart relation is 
not an identity relation, and individuals in different worlds are never identical: 
“Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have 
somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I prefer to 
say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have counterparts in several 
other worlds.  Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important 
respects.  They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds.  But 
they are not really you.”15  The counterpart relation is a relation of similarity.  Whether 
two things are counterparts depends on the “similarities and dissimilarities in a multitude 
of respects, weighted by the importances of the various respects and by the degrees of the 
similarities.”16 
A counterpart of you is therefore an individual in a possible world who is 
relevantly similar to you relative to a particular context, and can represent de re modal 
properties of you, by instantiating those properties in its world.  To say that Oskar is 
possibly polydactyl is to say that in some context, it is true to say that another cat in 
                                                          
15 Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 114. 
16 Ibid, 115. 
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another possible world is similar to Oskar and represents Oskar as being polydactyl by 
having extra toes in that possible world. 17   
An illustrative example of the representation of modal facts about individuals 
comes from considering Hubert Humphrey, the losing democratic candidate of the 1968 
election:  “Humphrey may be represented in absentia at other worlds, just as he may be 
in museums in this world. The museum can have a wax work figure to represent 
Humphrey, or better yet an animated simulacrum. Another world can do better still: it can 
have as part a Humphrey of its own, a flesh-and-blood counterpart of our Humphrey, a 
man very like Humphrey in his origins, in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role. 
By having such a part, a world represents de re, concerning Humphrey - that is, the 
Humphrey of our world [. . .] that he exists and does thus-and-so.”18   
 
1.4.1 Further Details of Counterpart Theory 
Counterpart theory is first introduced by Lewis in his 1968 paper Counterpart 
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.  There, Lewis provides four primitive predicates of 
counterpart theory: 
Wx (x is a possible world) 
Ixy (x is in a possible world y) 
Ax (x is actual) 
Cxy (x is a counterpart of y) 
 
                                                          
17
 Interestingly, something like Counterpart Theory has been suggested in the work of Leibniz, whose 
reference to ‘possible worlds’ is well known.  Elisabeta Sarca, for example, cites the following passage 
from Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 72 : “I have said that all human events can be deduced not simply by 
assuming the creation of a vague Adam, but by assuming the creation of an Adam determined with respect 
to all these circumstances, chosen from among an infinity of possible Adams. […] [B]ut when speaking of 
several Adams, I was not taking Adam as a determinate individual. […] [W]hen one calls Adam the person 
to whom these predicates are attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the individual, for there can be 
an infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different from one another, whom this fits.” 
Sarca notes that this description is similar to the notion of an individual’s counterparts in other possible 
worlds. (Sarca, “Leibniz and Kripke”, 75).  
18 On the Plurality of Worlds, 194. 
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The domain of quantification contains every world and everything in every world.  In 
addition, there are eight postulates: 
P1: xy (IxyWy)(Nothing is in anything except a world) 
P2: xyz ((Ixy & Ixz) y = z)(Nothing is in two worlds)   
P3: xy (Cxy  z Ixz)(Whatever is a counterpart is in a world) 
P4: xy (Cxy z Iyz) (Whatever has a counterpart is in a world) 
P5: xyz ((Ixy & Izy &Cxz)  x = z) (Nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its 
world) 
P6: xy (Ixy  Cxx) (Anything in a world is a counterpart of itself) 
P7: x (Wx & y (Iyx  Ay)) (Some world contains all and only actual things) 
P8: x Ax (Something is actual) 
 
In a postscript to this paper, Lewis rejects P5, since it may be possible for an 
individual to have multiple counterparts in his own world, including counterparts that are 
distinct from himself.19   
Lewis points out that the world in P7 is unique, given P2 and P8.  This is because 
there is at least one thing that is actual (P8), and because nothing is in two worlds (P2), 
there is a unique world that is actual.   He also offers an abbreviated description of this 
world: 
@ = df. xy (Iyx  Ay)  (the actual world) 
This is the world that contains all and only the actual things.  In this way, the 
actual world is special, but it is not ontologically different from the other worlds. Because 
the objects in the actual world are ontologically on a par with all the other possible 
objects and individuals, there is no ontological difference between a counterpart in the 
actual world or any other possible world.   
Lewis emphasizes the point that the difference between his view and the 
transworld identity view is not verbal.  In part this is because the counterpart relation, 
                                                          
19See Lewis, Counterfactuals, and On the Plurality of Worlds, 232.    
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unlike the identity relation, is not an equivalence relation; it is not transitive or 
symmetric.  
Because the counterpart relation is not transitive, even though a is a counterpart of 
b, and b is a counterpart of c, it is not necessarily the case that a is a counterpart of c. To 
illustrate, Lewis asks us to consider the possible world w1.  In that world, there is an 
object x1 that resembles you more closely than anything else in w1 does.  In w1, x1 is your 
counterpart.  In another world, w2, there is an object x2 that resembles x1 far more closely 
than anything else in w2.
20  This means that x2 is a counterpart of x1, and is therefore a 
counterpart of your counterpart.  At the same time, x2 might not resemble you very 
closely at all, and there may be another object in w2 that resembles you more closely.  If 
so, then this object is your counterpart, and x2 is not.
21     
In addition, the counterpart relation is not symmetric.  Here, Lewis asks us to 
imagine a world w3, where there is an object x3 that is a blend of you and your brother, 
such that x3 resembles both of you closely, far more closely than anything else in w3 
resembles either of you.  In this example, x3 is your counterpart.  However, if x3 
resembles your brother more closely than it resembles you, you are not a counterpart of 
x3.
22  
Lewis holds that something in one world can have more than one counterpart in 
another world.  Here he provides the example of two twins, x4a and x4b both of whom 
resemble you closely, and both of whom resemble you far more closely than anything 
                                                          
20 E.g., “X's counterparts in other worlds are all and only those things which resemble X closely enough in 
important respects, and more closely than do the other things in their worlds (“Counterparts of Persons and 
Their Bodies, 205).” 
21 Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 115. 
22 Ibid, 116. 
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else at w4.  In this case, both are your counterparts, and so an individual can have 
multiple counterparts in one world.  Similarly, based on the same example, Lewis accepts 
that two things in one world can have a common counterpart in another world.  Again, 
since both of the twins can have you as a counterpart, there can be two things in one 
world with a common counterpart in another.23 
Lewis also provides a counterexample to the claim that for any two worlds, 
anything in one is a counterpart of something in the other.  Here he asks us to imagine w5, 
which contains an object x5 which does not resemble anything at the actual world very 
much, such as Batman.  Since Batman is not a counterpart of anything in the actual 
world, there can be things in one world without counterparts in another.24 
Lastly, he rejects the claim that for any two possible worlds, anything in one has 
to have some counterpart in the other.  Similar to the last example, there might be a world 
where the object that most resembles you is very unlike you, such that nothing in this 
world resembles you closely at all.  In this world, you have no counterparts.25   
 
1.5 Preliminary Benefits of Counterpart Theory 
 
Although the main use of counterpart theory is to make sense of de re modal 
statements, the theory has many theoretical virtues which make it preferable to 
Transworld identity.   
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lewis’s emphasis on the looseness of context, which becomes more apparent later, will allow an 
individual to have more counterparts than it might seem based on this claim.  For example, see Lewis’s 
response to Feldman’s “there but for the grace of God” cases (see Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 
Feldman, “Counterparts”).     
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Perhaps its main virtue is that it is much more flexible than the standard view, 
since the counterpart relation is a relation of similarity rather than identity.  This 
flexibility also allows counterpart theory to reflect the shifting nature of our de re modal 
intuitions.  For example, in two different contexts, I might make claims that seem 
inconsistent, but can be understood.  For example, I might claim that “I could have been 
a professional gymnast,” perhaps while watching an interview with a young Olympian 
describing her initial lack of athleticism and childhood interests and goals, which might 
be very similar to my own.  Later the same day, perhaps I claim that “There is no possible 
way I could have ever been a gymnast!” while watching this Olympian perform a 
complicated flip on a balance beam, highlighting the chasm between this athlete’s 
comfort and skill and my own inability and discomfort at the thought of being hurled 
through the air onto a narrow landing space.  These two utterances seems perfectly 
acceptable for me to make, and we speak this way often.  However, such claims are not 
easily accommodated by transworld identity, since then I am both identical to this 
gymnast in some possible world, and yet identical to no gymnast in any possible world.  
Although some transworld identity theorists may be able to offer explanations for this 
phenomenon too, the flexibility of counterpart theory can easily account for such facts 
without any inconsistency.26  This is an important benefit since it reflects our actual 
patterns of modal speech, and the flexible nature of de re modal properties.  
In addition, the flexibility of the counterpart relation is able to provide answers to 
various modal paradoxes and can explain haecceitistic intuitions without commitment to 
                                                          
26 Lewis discusses this issue in On the Plurality of Worlds.  There, he lays out several alternative views, 
including ways for ersatz views to accommodate this inconstancy while incorporating something like 
transworld identity.  However, he argues that modal realism with transworld identity cannot be inconstant.  
See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 262-263.  
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haecceitism.27  Although some philosophers accept haecceitistic differences between 
worlds, others do not, and it is beneficial for such additions to be optional, rather than 
required by the view.  For example, counterpart theory provides a straightforward 
solution to certain versions of the paradox of material constitution, without the need to 
posit particular haecceities or essences of objects across worlds. 28   
Related to the ability to avoid commitment to haecceities, counterpart theory is 
also compatible with a purely qualitative, descriptive metaphysics of modality which may 
be seen by many as a benefit.29  
 Parallel theories have been constructed in other areas, such as temporality.  Using 
a relation like the counterpart relation to analyze temporal statements provides similar 
benefits, such as the ability to deal with various temporal paradoxes. Finally, as will be 
explored below, there have been recent attempts to further modify counterpart theory in 
order to extend the benefits to other areas, such as to a relational account of quantity and 
a property counterpart view.  Such extensions would increase the benefits of the view.     
 
                                                          
27 Lewis gives the following definition of a haecceitistic difference: “two worlds differ in what they 
represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way.”  For example, it 
might seem possible for Ted and Fred to ‘switch places’ without there being any qualitative difference—
Fred would be Ted and Ted would be Fred.  Whether or not this represents a distinct possible world from 
the world where Ted is Ted and Fred is Fred is at stake.  Haecceitism is the view that there are at least some 
cases of haecceitistic differences between worlds, such that this switching would result in a distinct 
possible world.  (Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 221.)     
28 A classic example of the paradox comes from Alan Gibbard. The basic idea is that two halves of a statue 
are made out of some clay.  The halves are joined forming both a new statue, Goliath, and a new lump of 
clay, Lumpl.  The statue is then smashed, destroying both Lumpl and Goliath.  It appears that Lumpl and 
Goliath are one and the same thing, given their common historical properties, relational properties, etc.   
However, if the statue had been smashed just before the clay hardened, then Lumpl would continue to exist, 
although Goliath wouldn’t.  If two things are identical, then they are necessarily identical.  However, it 
appears to be possible for Lumpl and Goliath to exist without being identical.  (Goliath= Lumpl &  
(Goliath exists & Lumpl exists & Goliath  Lumpl)).  See: Gibbard, “Contingent Identity.”  See Lewis (On 
the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263) for a similar case along with discussion and reply using the resources of 
counterpart theory.  
29 See Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey Objection,” 2). 
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1.6 Criticism of Counterpart Theory 
 
 However, it should be noted that Counterpart theory has also been met with much 
criticism.  In 1972, Kripke presented what is perhaps the most famous objection to the 
view, claiming that counterpart theory strongly conflicts with our intuitions about cases 
like the possible success of Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.  
According to Counterpart theory, Humphrey is not actually identical to the other-worldly 
Humphrey, his counterpart, who wins the election.  Therefore, Kripke claims that we are 
not actually talking about what could’ve happened to Humphrey, and this is at odds with 
our intuitive analysis of the claim.30   
 Because this objection has had lasting influence and may immediately make 
counterpart theory appear to be counterintuitive even before getting into further details, it 
is worthwhile to briefly discuss what I take to be a promising and decisive response to 
this objection, as outlined by Ted Sider.   
 Sider argues that although the objection can be understood in multiple ways, each 
of them fails to damage counterpart theory, and is instead based on a mistaken 
understanding of the view or can be otherwise explained.  First, if the objection is taken 
to be claiming that Counterpart theory is false because Humphrey himself does not have 
the modal property of possibly winning, given that only his counterpart wins, the 
counterpart theorist can respond by noting that this is just what it is for Humphrey to have 
a modal property according to counterpart theory.  If the objection is instead based on 
whether or not Humphrey cares about that he has a counterpart who wins, the counterpart 
                                                          
30 As Kripke puts it, “Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter 
how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world (“Naming and 
Necessity,” 45, n. 13).”   
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theorist can respond by noting that this is a paradox of analysis: Humphrey cares about 
his modal property of winning under one description, but not another.  A similar response 
applies if the objection is based on the claim that ‘possibly winning’ is obviously not the 
same thing as ‘having a counterpart that wins.’   
Lewis responded in similar fashion: “The philosophers' chorus on behalf of ‘trans-
world identity’ is merely insisting that, for instance, it is Humphrey himself who might 
have existed under other conditions, … who might have won the presidency, who exists 
according to many worlds and wins according to some of them. All that is 
uncontroversial. The controversial question is how he manages to have these modal 
properties.”31  This objection will briefly re-surface within the upcoming discussion of 
chapter 2, but can otherwise be set aside.   
There are other objections to the view, for example, a group of objections 
stemming from the potential need for an actuality operator to account for our ordinary 
modal language, and the inability of counterpart theory to accommodate this.32  Other 
objections have been raised as well.33  These objections require detailed analysis and 
response, which will not be undertaken here.34  
 
1.7 The Components of Counterpart Theory 
 
Nevertheless, the vast theoretical virtues of counterpart theory make the view an 
interesting and important theory and certainly a live option worthy of a careful analysis.     
                                                          
31 On the Plurality of World, 198. 
32 See Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, Ramachandran, “Alternative Translation Scheme” and Fara 
and Williamson, “Counterparts and Actuality.”  See also Meyer, “Counterpart Theory and the Actuality 
Operator,” for discussion and replies.   
33 See also Merricks, “The End of Counterpart Theory” and Hazen, “Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics.” 
34 For detailed discussion of these and further objections and replies, see Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey 
Objection.”  
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In particular, this means taking a further look at these essential components of standard 
counterpart theory: 1) that the counterpart relation is a similarity relation, and 2,) that 
context reflects the inconstancy of de re modality, and plays an important role in 
determining whether or not the counterpart relation holds.  The remaining notion, that the 
entities in question are world-bound, will be further discussed in subsequent chapters as it 
is applied to two distinct views; lump theory, and property counterpart theory.  In 
addition, I will attempt to provide background for a view of properties, since they are 
essential to the understanding of similarity suggested here, and to the discussion of 
property counterpart theory in chapter three.    
 
1.8 Similarity 
 
In order to evaluate counterpart theory, and to apply it to the relevant discussion 
going forward, the details of similarity, and a suggestion for how to analyze this notion, 
need to be explored.  Although instances of resemblance are easy to identify, the question 
of what accounts for similarity in general is more difficult to answer.  One popular 
account is to explain similarity in terms of property sharing.  Therefore, although a 
thorough exploration of the nature of properties will not be undertaken here, a brief 
discussion will provide background for the rest of the chapter.35   
 
1.8.1 Properties 
 
Properties have typically been called upon to account for resemblance and 
recurrence, and are often defined in this connection, e.g., “Particular objects have 
                                                          
35 For a thorough discussion, see, for example Loux, Universals and Particulars; Oliver, “The Metaphysics 
of Properties;” and Galuzzo and Loux, The Problem of Universals. 
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properties, respects in which they may be alike or differ.” 36 Properties are also called 
attributes, qualities, features, and characteristics, and “those entities that can be 
predicated of things or, [. . .], attributed to them.”37  For example, to say ‘the ripe tomato 
is red’ is to say that the tomato exemplifies redness, or has the property of being red; that 
redness is a characteristic of the tomato.   
One of the main reasons that entities like properties and universals have been 
posited is to explain and account for resemblance among objects, for example to account 
for the “One Over the Many” problem, roughly, the need to provide an explanation for 
why it is that all of the many distinct red things that exist have something in common.38  
Properties are a natural choice to provide the underlying support for such similarities.  
For example, Earth and Venus are similar in many ways; being planets in our solar 
system, being roughly 4k miles in diameter, having roughly 5 x 10^24 kg mass, etc.  At 
the same time, there are other ways that they are dissimilar; being covered in volcanoes, 
being second from the sun and being inhospitable to human life.   We can say they are 
similar in some ways (by sharing certain properties) and dissimilar in other ways, (by 
failing to share other properties). 39   
Of course, the details of one’s view of properties will play a role in establishing 
the details of this notion of similarity.  Detailed discussion of the nature of properties can 
be a challenging task due to a lack of general agreement as well as an abundance of 
                                                          
36 Mellor and Oliver, Properties, 1. 
37 Orilia, and Swoyer, “Properties,” 1.  
38 This problem has been discussed since antiquity by philosophers like Plato, e.g. Parmenides and The 
Republic, and Aristotle, e.g., Metaphysics.   More recently, see, Armstrong, e.g., “Against Ostrich 
Nominalism,” and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “What is the Problem of Universals?”   
39 As discussed below, Lewis holds that only certain types of properties can do the work of accounting for 
similarities between individuals.  This is in part because properties are abundant, according to Lewis’s 
view, which is to say that there is property corresponding to every predicate, even disjunctive and 
gerrymandered ones.  Such properties cannot be the markers of similarity.  See below. 
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distinctions among properties, such as the distinction between universals and particulars, 
described below.  Still, it will be useful to put a specific view of properties into the 
discussion.     
 
1.8.2 Properties as sets of actual and possible individuals   
 
Given that the current discussion assumes much of Lewis’s metaphysical 
framework, his explanation of properties is a natural place to start.  In addition, several 
contributors to the discussion assume that properties are something along these lines, and 
so it will simplify the discussion to do so as well.40  For Lewis, properties are sets of 
possible and actual individuals (or ‘possibilia’).  For example, the property of being blue 
just is the set of all actual and possible blue things from every world.  Properties are 
abundant on this view, since for any given set of possible and actual individuals, there is 
a corresponding property.  This yields an incredibly large number of sets and therefore of 
properties.   
Identifying properties with sets is a natural choice for Lewis as it follows from 
two other commitments; set theory and modal realism. 41  Lewis justifies these 
commitments in part by consideration of their explanatory power; commitment to set 
theory includes commitment to an infinite number of sets; but on the other hand, it 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Heller, “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds;” Ball, “Property Identities and Modal 
Arguments,” and Egan, “Second-order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.”   
41 We might ask whether properties should be taken to be sets of possibilia, or classes of possibilia.  Lewis 
talked about properties as classes of possibilia (e.g., “New Work for a Theory of Universals”) and as sets 
(e.g., On the Plurality of Worlds), where he says “I say ‘set’ not ‘class’.  The reason is that I do not want to 
restrict myself to properties of individuals alone; properties themselves have properties.  Properties must 
therefore be sets so that they may be members of other sets (Ibid 50 n. 37).”  A ‘proper class’ is a collection 
that is not a set, e.g., the set of all sets (Bagaria, “Set Theory,” 4).  Some properties, therefore, might be 
classes of possibilia even though there is no corresponding set of possibilia.  Unless otherwise noted, there 
is no need to distinguish between the two terms throughout my discussion.   
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provides immense mathematical explanatory power.  In a similar way, Lewis argues that 
modal realism can be supported in part because the theoretical benefits outweigh the 
ontological cost.42  Once these components are included in one’s ontology, properties can 
be posited without extra assumptions or commitments.  Because properties just are these 
sets, this adds nothing additional to one’s ontology.   
There are important benefits to this view.  For example, it overcomes issues with 
non-modal realist attempts to classify properties as sets of actual instances,43 and 
provides an answer to the One Over the Many Problem.  In addition, this view can 
account for ‘higher-order’ properties (properties of properties), which are taken to be sets 
of sets.   
Although this is not the only way to understand properties, these elements work 
together to provide a straightforward and useful explanation of the counterpart relation. 44   
In addition, properties so understood can be used (with an additional primitive notion, 
discussed below) to formulate a reductive account of similarity.  This will be supported 
below.  Still, there are important objections to this view, 45 and further details to consider, 
                                                          
42 See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.    
43
 In the past, objections were raised in response to the suggestion to understand properties as sets of actual 
individuals.  An important objection is based on the problem of co-extensive properties; any properties that 
have the same members cannot be distinguished.  Every actual individual with a heart also has a kidney.  
So, if the property of having a heart is identified with the set of individuals with hearts, then that same set 
will be identified with the property of having a kidney, and on this account, they would be the same 
property. Intuitively, they are distinct properties, and yet the view cannot distinguish between them.  This 
example of the co-extension problem comes from a case discussed by e.g., Quine, “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism,” and Philosophy of Logic.  A similar objection arises for world-bound properties, as discussed 
in chapter 3 below. 
44 Trope theory is not discussed in detail here, but is an important alternative to consider.  See, for example, 
D.C. Williams, “On the Elements of Being,” and “Universals and Existents,” and Keith Campbell, Abstract 
Particulars.  
45 There is an additional problem related to this understanding of properties, e.g., as discussed by Andy 
Egan.  He presents the follow case: Elmer has a favorite property, being green, and therefore, being green 
has the (higher order) property of being someone’s favorite property.  Given the understanding of 
properties as sets, that means that being green is in the set being someone’s favorite property.  However, it 
seems possible that being green might not have been anyone’s favorite property.  If so, then being green 
does not have the property of being someone’s favorite property, and is therefore omitted from that set. It 
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which slightly complicate this straightforward view.  The first stems from the distinction 
between sparse and abundant properties, which is needed in order to use these properties 
to establish similarity.  This distinction can be understood by comparison to another 
distinction, between universals and particulars.  
 
1.8.3 Universals and Particulars 
 
Arguably one of the most important distinctions between opposing accounts of 
properties concerns whether they are universals or particulars.  In general, properties are 
taken to be either universals, such that the same property can be instantiated by multiple 
numerically distinct things, or particulars; such that two distinct individuals never 
exemplify exactly the same property.  Universals and particulars can be distinguished in 
part by the differences in their instantiation.  Universals exist wherever they are 
instantiated, and if properties are universals, then they are “wholly present recurrently as 
non-spatiotemporal parts of all their particular instances.”46  In contrast, many take 
properties to be made up of particular instances.  
Properties as particulars and as universals can also be distinguished by their 
abundance:  universals are ‘sparse’: “[t]here are the universals that there must be to 
ground the objective resemblances and the causal powers of things, and there’s no reason 
                                                          
seems like we want to say that being green both is, and is not in the set being someone’s favorite property, 
and so at least one of these seemingly plausible possibilities must be ruled out.  Either no one can possibly 
have green as their favorite property, or someone must have green as their favorite property, both of which 
seem unpalatable.  This is specifically a problem for properties taken as sets.  Egan suggests that a world-
bound property counterpart theory could allow for a response to the objection.  I will discuss this objection 
in Chapter 3, and show how a specific property counterpart view responds.  (See Egan, “Second-order 
Predication,” 49). 
46Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 204.  One recent and important theory of Universals is Armstrong’s 
account.  See Armstrong; (Universals and Scientific Realism, “In Defence of Structural Universals,” 
Universals). 
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to believe in any more.”47  However, properties can also be taken to be ‘abundant,’ such 
that: “[a]ny class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and 
indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing the 
world, is nevertheless a property. So there are properties in immense abundance.”48   
 
1.8.4 Natural properties  
 
Lewis argues that we cannot make due with just the sparse universals since, e.g., 
we cannot accommodate certain comparisons without them,49 and yet we need more than 
just the abundant properties in order to account for genuine similarity. 50  Although 
property sharing can account for similarity, sharing just any the abundant properties will 
not be sufficient.  
Return to the comparison of Earth and Venus.  In addition to sharing properties 
like those mentioned above, these planets share an infinite number of additional 
properties, some of which, like being a planet or a cat or a hydrogen atom, or being an 
entity, do little to establish similarity in any meaningful way.  Worse yet, they share 
properties that are so unspeakably gerrymandered that we cannot express them, let alone 
use them to establish similarity; like infinite strings of disjunctive properties.   
                                                          
47Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics an Epistemology, 11-12. 
48 Ibid, 12. 
49 For example, color properties are not likely to be sparse universals, and yet we need them for 
comparisons such as ‘red resembles orange more than it resembles blue’ (Ibid, 16)).  Lewis argues that it is 
unlikely for there to be genuine universals like colors, as well as properties like ‘humility’ and ‘ripeness’.  
Worse yet, there are properties like “grueness” that are even less likely candidates for universals, and yet, 
are needed for similarity comparisons (Ibid 17-18).  Lewis opts for keeping the abundant properties in 
addition to a primitive distinction discussed below.  
50 The abundant properties cannot fill the various roles played by universals.  For example, they cannot 
account for Lewis’s explanations of counterfactuals, as well as the concepts of ‘closeness of worlds,’ 
‘intrinsic properties’ and ‘duplication’, all of which are defined in terms of the sharing of ‘natural 
properties’, discussed below.  There are additional uses and benefits of natural properties.  See Lewis (e.g., 
Philosophical Papers Volume I and II, Counterfactuals, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology). 
 23 
 
As Lewis puts it, “[a]ny two things, be they two peas in a pod or be they a raven 
and a writing-desk, are alike in infinitely many respects and unlike in equally many.”51  
Therefore, the abundant properties alone are not capable of accounting for similarity.   
Instead of including universals in his ontology Lewis introduces a primitive 
distinction among properties; some properties are special in ways that make them useful 
and fill the role that universals would play.52  Lewis calls this privileged group of 
properties ‘natural properties.’53  Natural properties are those that ‘carve nature at its 
joints’ and reflect things like the fundamental physical properties (mass, charge, spin, 
etc.). 54,55    
The most elite properties, the perfectly natural, are so specific that that ‘there are 
just enough of them to characterize things completely and without redundancy.’56  
Sharing properties like these can establish similarity in a meaningful way, even though it 
somewhat complicates the view of similarity as property sharing.   
 
                                                          
51 Philosophical Papers Volume II, 53. 
52 In “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Lewis lays out four options with respect to how to handle 
universals, and ends that discussion agnostic between them (1983b).  Elsewhere, (“Against Structural 
Universals”), he rejects one of these options, which is to rely on a theory of structural universals.  In On the 
Plurality of Worlds, Lewis suggests the option supported above: “If we have the abundant properties (as we 
do, given set theory and possibilia) then we have one of them for each of the sparse properties. So we may 
as well say that the sparse properties are just some – a very small minority – of the abundant properties. We 
need no other entities, just an inegalitarian distinction among the ones we’ve already got. When a property 
belongs to the small minority, I call it a natural property (60).”    
53Lewis notes that ‘natural’ is meant to reflect the notion of natural kinds and is not supposed to have 
anything to do with nature in the way that it would be contingent: “A property is natural or unnatural 
simpliciter, not relative to one or another world. (Ibid, 60, n. 44) 
54
 Perfectly natural properties are described as ‘carving nature at its joints’ given that, taken together, their 
patterns of instantiation makes up the fundamental structure of reality, or the ‘joints’ at which nature can be 
carved.  See Hall (“David Lewis’s Metaphysics,”10).  See also Sider (Writing the Book of the World), and 
Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds).    
55 Another suggestion is that the natural properties are those such that “if somebody is presented with some 
of their members, he can very easily go on and pick out further members.  The class of blue things would 
be a case in point (Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 40).”   
56 On the Plurality of Worlds, 60. 
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1.8.4.1 Degrees of Naturalness 
 
It is important to note that although some properties are perfectly natural, and 
therefore do the most to establish similarity, it is unnecessary to rely only upon the 
perfectly natural properties to establish similarity.  Even though perfectly natural 
properties allow for more precise similarity comparisons, we often discuss aspects of 
similarity that correspond to less than perfectly natural properties.  In fact, Lewis argued 
that naturalness comes in degrees, from the perfectly natural to more derivative natural 
properties, like colors, all the way to the most gruesome properties, like infinitely long 
disjunctive properties.57    Presumably, the more gruesome and less natural a property is, 
the less useful it is to our similarity comparisons, with the most gruesome being 
completely useless.58   
Although perfect naturalness is fairly well understood and thoroughly explained, 
less-than-perfectly-natural naturalness is somewhat more difficult to pin down.  We know 
that naturalness comes in degrees and that less than perfectly natural properties are 
derived from perfectly natural properties, but exactly how this functions isn’t fully 
explained.59   
                                                          
57 “The colors, [. . .], are inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural properties as mass or charge; grue 
and bleen are inferior to the colors; yet even grue does not plumb the real depths of gruesomeness. If it did, 
we would not have been able to name it (On the Plurality of Worlds, 61).”   Although Lewis does not 
provide complete details or a specific method for determining how natural a property is, he does make 
comments to suggest how this might work.  See below.  On a related point, note that perfect naturalness is 
not thought to vary from world to world or context to context.  However, which properties are natural 
enough, in the sense of being useful enough for similarity comparisons varies with context or degree of 
specificity.  For example, color properties might not be natural enough in some contexts to establish 
similarity, but in others, are sufficiently natural.      
58 Note that there could very well be similarity comparisons, and therefore counterpart relations, that are 
based on strange gerrymandered properties as well; e.g., given philosopher’s examples or very broad 
contexts. (E.g., anything that is possible is similar in that respect, and so there is a corresponding 
counterpart relation).      
59
For example, Hall notes that: “Given Lewis's reductionist commitments, he [. . .] needs some account of 
how the facts about the pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties make it the case that among 
those properties that are not perfectly natural, some are nevertheless more natural than others [. . . ]. He 
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However, one way Lewis suggests accounting for the spectrum of properties—
from the fundamental physical perfectly natural ones, to slightly less natural properties, to 
somewhat gruesome ones, to unspeakably gerrymandered properties—is in terms of 
chains of definability:  “physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of 
all; but others are elite also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because they 
are connected to the most elite by chains of definability.  Long chains, by the time we 
reach the moderately elite classes of cats and pencils and puddles; but the chains required 
to reach the utterly ineligible would be far longer still.”60   This can provide a sense of 
how we can get from perfectly natural properties to less natural ones, and gives the sense 
that even somewhat gerrymandered properties might be natural to some degree, since 
they can be reached by sufficiently long chains.   
Elsewhere, Lewis says: “Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even 
though they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural in a 
derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of 
definability from the perfectly natural properties. The colours, as we now know, are 
inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural properties as mass or charge; grue and 
bleen are inferior to the colours; yet even grue does not plumb the real depths of 
gruesomeness. If it did, we would not have been able to name it.”61  Here, it might seem 
that the utterly gruesome properties are contrasted with natural properties, and that if the 
chains of definability are too complicated, the properties that they reach might not be 
                                                          
says very little about this issue, but the account he evidently favors gets hinted at occasionally (Hall “David 
Lewis’s Metaphysics,” 34).”  See, for example, Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox,” “New Work for a Theory of 
Universals,” and On the Plurality of Worlds. 
 
60Lewis, “Putnum’s Paradox” reprinted in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 66. 
61 On the Plurality of Worlds, 61. 
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deemed natural at all, drawing solid lines between perfectly natural, natural, and non-
natural properties.     
Whether or not all properties are natural to some degree (such that the 
gerrymandered, gruesome, and ineffable properties are still natural, just to a very minimal 
degree), or if instead there is a distinct line between the least-natural natural properties 
and the non-natural properties seems to be somewhat unsettled.62, 63   Therefore, 
imperfect-naturalness seems to be less than fully specified, and some details appear to be 
left open.  Nevertheless, we have a general sense of the distinction, which can be 
strengthened by our ability to extrapolate from perfect naturalness to less than perfect 
naturalness, all the way down to utter gruesomeness.  Therefore, there are many ways to 
explain and support naturalness among first order properties.   
For our purposes, we can note that two things can be similar in a variety of more 
or less natural respects, and while some of these respects can establish similarity in a 
meaningful way, others cannot.  Which respects of similarity are relevant plays an 
important role in selecting counterpart relations, and this depends upon context.    
                                                          
62
 The distinction is sometimes put in terms of natural and non-natural properties, suggesting that some 
properties are natural, others are less natural, and others are not natural at all (perhaps the ‘ineligible 
properties’ mentioned above below in the category of non-natural properties).  On the other hand, it could 
be that the most gruesome are the least natural, but, since they can be reached by some (perhaps infinite) 
chain of definability, they are still minimally natural.  Perhaps this option can be supported by the fact that, 
in some very broad contexts, extremely gruesome properties might be made salient (e.g., we might wish to 
discuss a very general sense in each property is similar to every other, given an infinitely long disjunctive 
property).  The answer to this question will not impact the overall feasibility of a higher order naturalness 
distinction, and so can be set aside.   
63 In addition, the role of context is unclear.  Perfect naturalness does not vary from world to world (On the 
Plurality of Worlds, 60).  Non-perfect naturalness is derived from perfect naturalness, would seem to be 
similarly fixed.  However, it seems like context still has a role to play if our de re discourse is inconstant 
when it comes to properties in addition to individuals.  For example, it could be that which properties are 
natural depends upon which properties are ‘natural enough’ to be useful within a particular context. While 
it is important to ensure that naturalness is not merely equated with usefulness, it seems that considerations 
of naturalness might be made within a context, such that in some cases, degrees of naturalness correspond 
to these features of properties, and in others, to those features.  For example, in some circumstances, 
blueness would be more natural than roundness, and in others, less natural, depending on what is relevant. 
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1.9 Context 
 
Consider again the comparison between Earth and Venus.  Even after reducing 
the types of properties relevant to similarity comparisons to those that are sufficiently 
natural, they have many properties in common, and far more than we are typically 
interested in considering or discussing.  Therefore, when comparing two objects like 
Earth and Venus, we do not need to rely on all or even many of the ways they are similar 
to each other, but instead can base our comparison upon some particular aspect (or 
aspects) of similarity.64  Which aspects of similarity matter to the comparison vary with 
the context of utterance, such that context selects which shared properties are relevant, 
and which properties are relevant depends upon the “relative importances we attach to 
various different respects of similarity and dissimilarity.”65  The relevant properties will 
be used to determine whether or not two things are similar.  In other words, whether or 
not two things are similar or not depends upon whether or not they share certain 
properties, which are relevant within a particular context.     
Applied to counterpart theory, this means that which counterparts an individual 
has will depend on which properties a particular context makes salient.  In some contexts, 
Earth and Venus are counterparts because they both share the property of being planets; 
in other contexts, they are counterparts because they share other properties, like being 
                                                          
64 I have been assuming that similarity can be reduced to property sharing.  Given this assumption, an 
‘aspect of similarity’ can be taken to be a common property that the individuals share.  This does not 
appear to be controversial given the assumptions already undertaken.  However, nothing seems to depend 
on this way of describing contextual variation, and it is merely an attempt to clarify and explain whatever 
the underlying grounds for similarity comparisons might be given the background assumptions included 
here.  If similarity is otherwise understood, e.g., as a primitive irreducible notion, then ‘aspects of 
similarity’ would refer to something else. See chapters 3 and 4 below for continued discussion.    
65 “Counterparts of Person and Their Bodies,” 206.  
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spherical.  Selecting certain other of Earth’s properties as relevant will no longer find 
Venus among Earth’s counterparts; for example, a context that makes a property like 
being hospitable to human life salient will exclude Venus from Earth’s counterparts.   
Therefore, we cannot say that Earth and Venus are similar ‘a-contextually,’ and similarity 
must be linked to a particular context.66   
 
1.9.1 Inconstancy 
 
In general, similarity comparisons are flexible on multiple fronts.  For example, 
Lewis acknowledges that the counterpart relation “is subject to a great deal of 
indeterminacy (1) as to which respects of similarity and difference are to count at all, (2) 
as to the relative weights of the respects that do count, (3) as to the minimum standard of 
the similarity that is required, and (4) as to the extent to which we eliminate candidates 
that are similar enough when they are beaten by competitors with stronger claims.  
Further, (…) the vagueness of the counterpart relation – – and hence of essence and de re 
modality generally – – may be subject to pragmatic pressures, and differently resolved in 
different contexts.”67 
The fact that similarity is context dependent and flexible reflects the more general 
fact, according to Lewis, that de re modal discourse is inconstant in the sense that modal 
                                                          
66 This is slightly misleading as stated.  We often do say that two things are similarity without specifying a 
context.  The point is that there is an underlying context, and this makes some properties salient.  In other 
words, similarity comparisons are delineated by the relevant context, even though the specific context it is 
not necessarily stated or identified.  When we say ‘Earth and Venus are similar,’ we often do not specify 
the relevant respects of similarity.  However, as long as there is some possible context in which it is true, 
the claim comes out true; and, if pressed, we could likely explain what sort of similarity comparison we 
meant to make.  Similarly, when we note that two things are similar, it is always within some context; but it 
is not usually stated that they are similar-within-a-particular-context.  It is also possible to stipulate that we 
mean to refer to the broadest possible context, as we say something like “all of my counterparts are 
possibilia” which is, plausibly, true in any context. 
67 Philosophical Papers Volume I, 42. 
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claims about individuals, and therefore, which counterparts an individual has, is not a 
fixed matter, but varies with context.  Because of this, there is no fact of the matter about 
whether Humphrey is essentially human, for example, but only with respect to certain 
contexts.  In some contexts, it makes sense to say that Humphrey is essentially human, 
and could not have been an aardvark, but in other contexts, it might make sense to claim 
that he could have been an aardvark.  As discussed above, this could be understood in 
terms of selecting different shared properties in different contexts—in contexts in which 
it comes out true that Humphrey is essentially human, we might be focusing on properties 
of Humphrey like that he has particular DNA or ancestors that followed a particular 
evolutionary path.  In contexts in which Humphrey is possibly an aardvark, other 
properties are made salient, like that he is a mammal, or lives in a particular region.      
This means that modal claims about individuals, and therefore, which counterparts an 
individual has, are not a fixed matter, but vary with context. 68  To claim that “all of my 
counterparts are humans” should be understood as saying “given a particular context, all 
of my counterparts are human,” even if we do not directly specify the context. 69,70    
The flexibility of the counterpart relation allows us to easily accommodate this 
inconstancy.  Although this is reflected by the fact that the counterpart relation is a 
similarity relation, is not caused by it.  Therefore, other relations could potentially 
accommodate this inconstancy.71   
                                                          
68 Whether or not de re modal claims about properties are similarity inconstant is explored below.   
69
 See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263.      
70 The ‘set of all your counterparts’ will therefore vary with context as well, as it depends on which 
counterpart relation or relations are relevant.  For example, you might refer to an especially permissive 
context in which the counterpart relation picks out all things that are in some respect similar to you; 
perhaps all the things that are, in some context or other, your counterparts.  Perhaps this particular 
counterpart relation does not vary. 
71In addition to accepting a primitive notion of similarity, there are other reductive alternatives as well.  For 
example, one could take properties to be structural universals, in which case similarity might be explained 
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To summarize, although this is more complicated than the straightforward 
description of similarity in terms of property sharing, it is not difficult to accommodate 
the distinction between natural and non-natural properties (as well as that this naturalness 
comes in degrees); and also that similarity is context dependent, reflective of the nature 
of de re modal discourse.  Whether and how it can explain similarity between properties 
given a property counterpart theory as well will be explored in Chapter 3.  First, I will 
discuss a proposed alternative to both counterpart theory and transworld identity views.    
 
  
                                                          
in terms of sharing of parts, see Armstrong, e.g., Universals, 102-107.  Lewis rejects this alternative, see 
Lewis, “Against Structural Universals”. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LUMP THEORY - AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF DE RE MODALITY?  
 
The main options for accounting for de re modal statements about individuals are 
transworld identity views (according to which, ordinary objects like individuals exist in 
multiple possible worlds, and the facts about these individuals ground the truth of de re 
modal claims), and counterpart views, according to which ordinary objects exist only in a 
single possible world (and de re modal statements depend for their truth upon the facts 
about world-bound individuals picked out by a counterpart relation).  
A third view has cropped up in a few interesting discussions, but has received 
little discussion overall.  We can call this position ‘lump theory,’ after the transworld 
fusions, or ‘lumps,’ that are taken to account for the truth of de re modal claims 
according to this view.72   
Something equivalent to lump theory is outlined and rejected by Lewis, in On the 
Plurality of Worlds, and is related to a view previously discussed by Quine.73  More 
recently, Meg Wallace has further discussed the view as a possible alternative to 
counterpart theory and transworld identity.74  Additionally, identifying objects with 
transworld sums of modal parts is part of Takashi Yagisawa’s modal ontology.75 
                                                          
72
 This terminology comes from Weatherson, and is adopted by Wallace (See Weatherson “Stages, Worms, 
Slices and Lumps” ).  See also Wallace (“Composition as Identity,” “The Argument from Vagueness,” and 
“The Lump Sum.”).  Although credit for raising my interest in the general idea is due to Wallace (“The 
Lump Sum”), my criticism is more general: my goal is to present and evaluate a particular view that makes 
use of the general outline presented by Wallace, and attempts to fill in the remaining details in the most 
plausible way.  This view has been discussed, although under different titles, by McDaniel (“Modal 
Realism with Overlap”) and Kaplan (“Transworld Heir Lines”). 
73 See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds: 217, Quine “Worlds Away.” 
74
 See Wallace (Ibid).  Weatherson also suggests that it might be a novel alternative (“Stages, Worms, 
Slices and Lump.”).    
75
 Yagisawa defends a similar view, which he compares to Four-dimensionalism with respect to time.  
Four-dimensionalism is the view that objects extend in time by having temporal parts.  The sum of these 
parts makes up the object. According to Yagisawa, ordinary objects are extended across space, time, and 
possible worlds by having parts in various “space-time-world regions” all of which are equally real 
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Because it would be a potential benefit to have a live alternative to transworld 
identity and counterpart theory, this view deserves careful attention.  However, I will 
argue that this view fails to meet this goal, as it cannot be distinguished from counterpart 
theory in any relevant way.76  My comments will apply generally to any view that takes 
this notion to be distinct from counterpart theory.77 
Although this view has cropped up in several discussions, many details remain 
unsettled.  Therefore, while I am attempting to flesh out a version of a view based on 
transworld sums, my criticism is not directed toward any specific position, and I do not 
mean to imply that any of the authors mentioned support the specific view presented in 
section 2.2.  Still, the overall issue will apply to any view that relies on transworld sums 
to ground de re modal claims for ordinary objects—unless some way of distinguishing 
the relevant relation from the counterpart relation is identified, this view does not appear 
to be distinguishable as a new position.  As it stands, the most plausible version relies on 
counterpart theory, without which, it is not a distinct view.    
   
                                                          
according to his view.  Although he has a unique ontology that includes both possible and impossible 
worlds, Yagisawa is relying on a similar concept, for example, for an individual like Humphrey to possibly 
win is for Humphrey to have a (modal) part in some world that wins.  The view I am outlining here has a 
distinct background ontology, and therefore, although similar comments might apply to Yagisawa’s view, 
this is not explored here.  See Sider (Four-Dimensionalism) and Yagisawa (“Primitive Worlds,” Worlds 
and Individuals, and “Impossibilia”). 
76
 Assuming that both views have the same background assumptions, namely, Modal Realism and 
Unrestricted Mereological Composition.   
77
 One potential application of these transworld lumps could be as a means to represent properties.  For 
example, perhaps properties could be mereological sums of individuals.  Although this is not discussed 
here, it might be worth further consideration, as it might seem more suitable than using these lumps to 
represent individuals.  However, it is not clear that they are an improvement upon the view of properties 
assumed in Chapter 1.     
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2.1 Background Assumptions: Modal Realism and Unrestricted Mereological 
Composition 
Modal Realism was taken up as a background assumption in the previous chapter, 
where some supporting reasons for accepting the view were given.  The most 
controversial part of the view; which is that these worlds are concrete, is again not a 
necessary part of the view under consideration here, as long as some notion of possible 
worlds is in play.78,79  Although modal realism is assumed here, a suitable notion of 
possible worlds plus the view known as ‘Unrestricted Mereological Composition,’ 
discussed next, will provide the background ontology needed for lump theory.   
 
2.1.1Mereology 
 
Mereology is the study of part-whole relations in the familiar way that we think of 
our hands being part of our bodies, keys being part of the keyboard, a nucleus being part 
of an atom.  Despite our familiarity with parts and wholes, various questions arise.  For 
example, we can ask whether parts have to be spatiotemporally contiguous in order to 
compose a whole, or whether an object can be composed of parts that are spread out.   
Based on our typical experience with ordinary objects, it is initially plausible to assume 
that all objects must have contiguous parts.  However, there are many examples of 
                                                          
78
 Most modal metaphysicians who rely on a possible worlds framework reject Lewis’s Modal Realism and 
deny that the worlds are concrete. Lewis labels these ‘ersatz’ views (On the Plurality of Worlds, 136).  
Proposals for what these worlds might be include sets of sentences, sets of propositions, pictorial objects, 
and maximal states of affairs.    See, for example; Adams, “Theories of Actuality;”  Bricker, “Absolute 
Actuality;” Plantinga “The Nature of Necessity; Stalnaker “Possible Worlds;” and van Inwagen, “Plantinga 
on Trans-world Identity,” among others.  See also Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, for thorough 
discussion.    
79
 Yagisawa’s view is an outlier in that it has a distinct ontology that includes both possible and impossible 
worlds.   
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composite objects with disconnected parts, like decks of cards or fleets of ships.80  
Another question in this area is whether or not there are some smallest particles at the 
most fundamental level, or whether everything can be further divided into smaller parts 
all the way down.81      
One question of interest to the current discussion stems from the attempt to 
identify criteria for distinguishing between situations in which some objects make up a 
further object, and situations in which they do not.   
This is known as the “Special Composition Question,” which can be stated as: 
When do some objects together compose a further object?82  
There are three mutually exclusive ways to respond.  First, one can hold that 
composition takes place only sometimes; parts form an object under some conditions (as 
when they are connected in space and time), but under other conditions (as when they are 
spread out in space or time) they do not.  Although this answer accommodates certain 
intuitions, it can be challenged by “Arguments from Vagueness.”83  These arguments are 
based on the idea that if composition occurs only sometimes, it is possible to construct a 
“Sorites series” of objects, which points to there being vagueness in our understanding of 
composition.  Sometimes, it appears that the boundaries between cases of one thing, like 
a heap or a composite object, are vague.  A Sorites series is the result to setting up a 
series of cases, with a paradigm case of something, e.g., a heap at one end (a huge pile of 
                                                          
80
 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 211.    
81
 See, for example, Sider, “Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk,” Nolan, “Classes, Worlds, and 
Hypergunk,” Hudson, “Simples and Gunk,” and Coitnoir and Baxter Composition as Identity. 
82
 See, e.g., van Inwagen, Material Beings, 30.  
83
 See, for example, Wallace, “Composition as Identity Part I and Part II,” “The Argument from 
Vagueness,” and “Composition as Identity, Modal Parts;” Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds; Hawley, 
“Vagueness and Existence,”and Merricks, “Composition and Vagueness.”   
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sand, perhaps), and a clear failure of the case, e.g., a non-heap (a single grain of sand), at 
the other.  Any step along the way, e.g., from the heap to the single grain, can be arrived 
at by a seemingly acceptable move, here, e.g., taking away one grain.  However, this 
makes it impossible to find a cutoff point, given that one single grain of sand cannot seem 
to make a difference between a heap and a non-heap.  Although at some point there is no 
longer a heap, it seems to be a vague matter given that it only differs by a single grain, 
and any place to draw the line seems as good as any other.   
Similarly, we might compose a series with human persons at one end (a clear case 
of composition, perhaps) and at the other end, the fusion of two objects separated by 
space and time, such as a hydrogen atom in ancient Athens and a helium atom in a lab in 
Geneva.  A similar move could be made here; at any point at which we draw the line, we 
could find an equally good point to draw it somewhere else. 
In both cases, it is strange to imagine that there might be ‘vague objects,’ things 
that are literally indeterminate in what they are.  In some cases, we can provide a quick 
explanation.  For example, it might be that our language is just not precise enough to 
identify when something is a heap, and when it is not.  If so, then there are no 
indeterminate objects that lie somewhere between a heap and a non-heap, and it is only 
that ‘heap’ is imprecise.  However, if it is not just language, but actual vagueness in the 
world, this is objectionable in many ways.  It just seems unintuitive to imagine that 
whether or not there is an object in front of us is a vague matter; that there is no fact of 
the matter as to whether or not there is one or two objects in front of us. 84  One way to 
                                                          
84
 The argument from vagueness depends upon the claim that there cannot be vagueness in the world or in 
objects, only in language.  For example, Bertrand Russell proposed that “vagueness and precision alike are 
characteristics which can only belong to a representation. They have to do with the relation between a 
representation and that which it represents” (Russell, “Vagueness,” 85). Lewis makes the same point: “The 
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resolve this issue would be to find a clear cut-off point between cases of composition and 
cases where composition does not occur.  Although vagueness can sometimes be 
accommodated or explained, this one reason to reject this option.  
 A second option is to claim that composition never occurs—that there are no 
composite objects whatsoever.  This view is known as ‘Mereological Nihilism’.  
Although he does not accept the view, van Inwagen provides the following statement of 
nihilism: “(y the xs compose y) if and only if there is only one of the xs.”85   
Certain issues, such as the intuition that at least some things have parts, make it 
difficult to accept a wholly nihilistic view, and few philosophers accept options at this 
extreme.86  For example, if you split something into two parts, it seems logical in many 
cases that one object remains, even though it now has two parts (e.g., a sandwich cut in 
half does not seem to become two sandwiches).  Further, our intuitions in cases of 
persons (which seem to be composite) and lifeforms in general, might make it difficult to 
support a view according to which there are never any composite objects, even in the case 
of living things.87  Instead, it might seem that a living organism is not reducible to the 
smaller parts that make it up, e.g., that a human person is more than just a collection of 
smaller parts.  Because this view in effect assumes that composition takes place only very 
                                                          
only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought or language. The reason it’s vague where the 
outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback, with imprecise borders; rather, there are many 
things, with different borders, and nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them as 
the official referent of the word ‘outback’. Vagueness is semantic indecision.” (On the Plurality of Worlds, 
212).”  Because there does not seem to be a reason to draw the line at one point rather than another, there 
would seem to be vague objects in the world, and therefore, the argument goes, this option should be 
rejected.   
85 van Inwagen, Material Beings, 73. 
86
 Unger (“There are no Ordinary Things” and “Skepticism and nihilism”) defends a form of nihilism, 
arguing that there are no ordinary objects.  van Inwagen (e.g., Material Beings,  “Against Ontological 
Structure”) and Merricks (“No Statues,” Objects and Persons) defend restricted views that are nearly 
nihilistic except that they allow exceptions for composite living things, and for conscious things, 
respectively.  True Mereological Nihilism is the view that nothing is ever composed of any parts.       
87 See for example, Van Inwagen (Ibid) and Merricks (Ibid). 
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rarely, and because there are principled reasons for distinguishing between life 
forms/persons and other objects, it avoids some issues tied to vagueness.  In addition, it 
could be argued that it is a simpler or more elegant position to hold.88  However, it 
depends on the strength of the argument that the only composite objects are living things, 
and, given the changes that occur over the course of time among other issues, this is not 
the easiest view to support.89   
The third way to respond to the special composition question is to say that 
composition take place always—any two objects compose a third object, which is their 
sum.  This is sometimes called ‘Unrestricted Mereological Composition;’ and is the view 
supported by Lewis.90  Although there are some unintuitive consequences, (discussed 
below), this view is preferable to the alternatives in many ways.  Here, it is taken on as an 
assumption in order to lay out lump theory.       
 
2.1.2 Unrestricted Mereological Composition 
 
 According to this view, any two parts can be combined to form a sum or fusion: 
“[t]he mereological sum or fusion, of several things is the least inclusive thing that 
includes all of them as parts.  It is composed of them and of nothing more; any part of it 
overlaps one or more of them; it is a proper part of anything else that has all of them as 
parts.  Equivalently: the mereological sum of several things is the thing such that, for any 
X, X overlaps it iff X overlaps one of them.”91  
                                                          
88
 See, e.g., van Inwagen: Material Beings.   
89 Because these are restricted versions of nihilism, they must overcome the issues of vagueness as well.  
An absolute nihilist would avoid that problem, but only at the expense of denying that there are any 
composite objects at all, which is a weighty challenge.   
90 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.   
91 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 69n. 
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 In addition to providing an explanation for ordinary things that are spatially and 
temporally contiguous, this view can accommodate objects with spatially disconnected 
parts like decks of cards.  It also makes sense of the intuition that some objects, e.g., 
persons, might have temporally disconnected parts, one part being a 7 week old, another 
being a 7 year old and another being a 77 year old.92  Our common sense view, which 
includes non-living objects with parts like watches and mountains, can be easily 
accommodated.  However, given unrestricted mereological composition, there are also 
very strange fusions of objects with great distances between their parts.  There is a sum 
made up of a fragment of concrete from the Berlin Wall and the shortest of my cat’s 
whiskers, for example, and another made up of George Washington’s apple tree and the 
face on a freshly printed one dollar bill.   
Although it might seem somewhat odd or extravagant to include objects like these 
fusions within one’s ontology, in addition to avoiding the problems plaguing other 
answers to the special composition question, Lewis argues that the ontological cost of 
accepting unrestricted mereological composition is very low:  “To be sure, if we accept 
mereology, we are committed to the existence of all manner of mereological fusion.  But 
given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further 
commitment. [. . . ]  Commit yourself to their existence altogether or one at a time, it’s 
the same commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of reality according to [the 
opponent’s] scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the cats and then also 
                                                          
92
 Of course, this assumes commitment to times outside of the present moment, as well as details about 
identity over time.  If other temporal parts are not part of what there is, they will not be included in any 
trans-temporal sums.  In addition, distinctions between past and future temporal parts may come into play.  
The details of the nature of time can be set aside, as other examples (e.g., objects with spatially 
disconnected parts, like a person and their right and left hands) can be used to illustrate the same point.      
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list their fusion.”93  Another example discussed by Lewis is Baxter’s case of plots of land.  
If a landowner divides his land into six plots, he cannot sell all six while maintaining 
ownership of the whole.94,95     
 
2.2 Modal Parts and Transworld Fusions 
One result of this view is that we have strange fusions in our ontology.  Within 
the actual world, this includes odd fusions like the tip of my left pinky and the oldest 
brick in the Great Wall in China.  But, these oddities are further exaggerated given the 
inclusion of Modal Realism and the abundance of additional parts entailed by the view.  
Just as Lewis thinks that we cannot restrict composition at our own world, he does 
not think that we can restrict transworld composition either.  Both examples of 
unrestricted composition can be supported by the vagueness argument.  Therefore, there 
are objects with parts that are not spatiotemporally or causally related to each other in any 
way; in addition to trans-temporal and trans-spatial sums, there are transworld sums: 
“I claim that mereological composition is unrestricted: any old class of things has 
a mereological sum. Whenever there are some things, matter how disparate and 
unrelated, there is something composed of just those things. Even a class of things 
                                                          
93
(Lewis, Parts of Classes, 81-82)  
94
 See Baxter, “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense,” 579, discussed in Lewis, Parts of Classes, 83-84. 
95
 Baxter is using this case to support the view often called “Composition as Identity.”   Roughly, if the 
parts are identical to the whole, then commitment to the parts includes commitment to the whole but does 
not introduce an extra entity.  Another example from Baxter illustrates the same point quite well: “Someone 
with a six-pack of orange juice may reflect on how many items he has when entering a 'six items or less' 
line in a grocery store. He may think he has one item, or six, but he would be astonished if the cashier said 
'Go to the next line please, you have seven items'. We ordinarily do not think of a six-pack as seven items, 
six parts plus one whole. (ibid 579).”   See e.g., Baxter, “Identity,” and “Many-one Identity,” Lewis, , Parts 
of Classes, and Coitnoir and Baxter, Composition as Identity.  This view is not uncontroversial, (see e.g., 
van Inwagen, “Composition as Identity,”) but these examples can hint at the sort of ontological innocence 
or minimal ontological baggage that unrestricted mereological composition is supposed to provide.  Still, 
Composition as Identity is not a necessary part of the background included here.    
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out of different worlds has a mereological sum. That sum is a trans-world 
individual. It overlaps each world that contributes a part of it, and so is partly in 
each of many worlds.”96 
Given modal realism, there are also world-bound objects in other possible worlds, 
which means that they provide more potential parts (‘modal parts’) to combine. 97,98  Just 
as there are fusions of things spread out across space and time, there are fusions spread 
out across worlds.  This means that we will also have trans-world fusions, like the fusion 
of myself and my possible brothers.  There are also extremely odd trans-world fusions, 
like the left lens of Gandhi’s favorite pair of glasses and the tail of an otherworldly 
talking donkey.   
These fusions seem odd, perhaps even more so than the fusions restricted to the 
actual world, and they are not usually thought to be the sorts of things that figure into our 
speech or lives in any important way.  However, given Lewis’s arguments, we can note 
that just like this-worldly cases of cat fusions and plots of land, transworld fusions carry 
no further ontological baggage.  Once we have included possibilia in our ontology, 
fusions of modal parts do not add any commitment over and above these parts.   
Assuming modal realism, there are an infinite amount of modal parts to combine, and an 
infinite amount of transworld sums, but they do not add more to our ontology once the 
parts are included.   
                                                          
96 On the Plurality of Worlds, 211. 
97
 In addition, we might think that there are mereological sums that include abstract and concrete things, 
like the mathematical point of a knife, to use an example from van Inwagen (“Doctrine of Arbitrary 
Unattached Parts”). See Lewis (Parts of Classes) as well.  
98
 Of course, if one accepts unrestricted mereological composition and yet denies non-actual concrete 
things, (e.g., if possible worlds are not included in any sense) then there will be no concrete modal parts in 
this sense.  If possible worlds are ‘abstract’ ersatz formulations, they can still contribute parts, if, e.g., there 
are sums made of abstract objects or of abstract and concrete objects.  
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They are, in this way, a harmless part of our ontology that is perhaps seldom used 
outside of philosopher’s examples, but not a cause for any concern either.  These objects 
are what Lewis called oddities.99  Lewis acknowledges these transworld sums in On the 
Plurality of Worlds, where he briefly defends his own view against an argument put forth 
by Quine, who, Lewis argues, has taken modal realism to entail this position.100  While 
Lewis accepts that these sums are to be included within his ontology, he does not think 
that they are of any use to us.101   
2.2.1 Uses for these Sums?  
 
  However, given that these modal parts and their transworld sums are already 
included within our ontology, it is natural to try to find uses for them.  As noted above, it 
has been suggested that they can provide a third option in accounting for de re modal 
claims.  
Since these sums are made up of individuals from other possible worlds, some of 
whom can be our counterparts and thus represent de re modal facts about us, there are 
sums that are formed out of a person and her counterparts.102  Wallace suggests that sums 
                                                          
99
 Because all possible individuals are world-bound on his view, these sums are “impossible” in the sense 
that they are not world-bound.  They are still part of his ontology, just not the typical useful objects we 
discuss.  “To call the trans-world individuals ‘impossible’ in this sense is not an argument for ignoring 
them—that comes later.  It is only a terminological stipulation.  If we thought they should not be ignored, 
perhaps because we thought that we ourselves were trans-world individuals, it would be appropriate and 
easy to give ‘possible individual’ a more inclusive sense (On the Plurality of Worlds: 211).” 
100 “In his ‘Worlds Away’, Quine portrays a version of modal realism that treats ordinary things as trans-
world individuals, perduring through non-overlapping worlds in just the way they perdure through time and 
space.  It isn’t that he advocates such a view; rather, he takes for granted that this is what modal realism 
would be (On the Plurality of Worlds: 217).”  
101 “[I]f summation is unrestricted, so that indeed there are trans-world individuals, are these mere oddities? 
Are they nameless, do they fall outside the extensions of ordinary predicates in the domains of ordinary 
quantification? Or do they include things of importance to us, such as ourselves? I consider these questions 
in section 4.3, where I shall acknowledge the existence of trans-world individuals but dismiss them as 
oddities (On the Plurality of Worlds, 193).” 
102
 Although Wallace singles out transworld sums composed of counterparts, we can note that the same 
Transworld sums will exist given other analyses. In fact, as noted above, these sums stem directly from 
unrestricted mereological composition and modal realism.  Therefore, the fusion of myself and all of my 
 42 
 
like these might correspond to persons and ordinary objects, and that the various 
otherworldly modal parts of any given sum can account for de re modal facts.  According 
to this view, you are a Transworld sum with different parts in different worlds.  One 
world-bound part of you is in the actual world; this part corresponds to what a non-lump 
theorist might take to be an individual.103  Other modal parts of you have other properties, 
and can therefore account for this world-bound part of you possibly having those 
properties.  Accordingly, what a non-Lump theorist would take to be all of Humphrey 
(call him ‘Humphrey@’) is actually just one small world-bound modal part of a 
Transworld sum, which the lump theorist would call ‘Humphrey.’ 104  The fact that a 
modal part of Humphrey exists in another world, w1, and wins the election in w1, makes 
it the case that Humphrey@ possibly wins the election.  
 
2.2.2: Which Parts and Which Sums?  
 
Some transworld fusions are composed of individuals and their counterparts.  The 
proposal under consideration is that these sums are ordinary individuals.  However, 
because every individual is a part of infinitely many distinct mereological sums, there are 
many possible sums that might be used to pick out an individual.  We need a method of 
picking out sums that is able to show why some parts are important enough to be parts of 
individuals like us.  
                                                          
“counterparts” contributes to what there is regardless of whether one accepts Transworld identity or 
counterpart theory, even if this lump or sum is referred to in other ways.  (Note that referring to a single 
lump as the fusion of a person and all of her counterparts needs further explanation, given the importance 
of context, as discussed in section 2.3 below).    
103 See below for some concerns related to the potential for an individual to have multiple counterparts in 
their world.   
104
 ‘Humphrey@’ is meant to pick out the world-bound part of Humphrey that is in the actual world.  Since 
Humphrey is the transworld lump of all of Humphrey’s counterparts on this view, ‘Humphrey’ is not 
specific enough to pick out the object in question.    
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As noted above, Quine describes and criticizes a view that corresponds to lump 
theory.  His argument is based on a comparison to temporal parts, which, he argues, are 
connected by various relations, importantly, by relations of causal dependence.  The coin 
in your pocket yesterday can be linked to the same coin in your pocket today by relations 
like these.  However, he argues, with transworld individuals, there is no reason to prefer 
any one sum over any other, and we can basically have anything as a part.  Therefore, 
such a position would make little sense without some way to ‘connect’ up some parts into 
a relevant transworld sum.105    
Therefore, we can ask the lump theorist why it is that we select certain parts over 
others in order to form the transworld lumps that correspond to persons.  All parts are 
united by mereological composition, but this alone does nothing to set apart the special 
group of sums that is supposed to correspond to ordinary objects and individuals, and to 
support modal claims about these objects and individuals.  Any and all modal parts are 
equally good candidates to compose further objects and so, it is important to find some 
underlying grounds to limit these sums to those that are relevant.  This can be made clear 
by comparison to the non-modal case: it is not just mereology that underlies the various 
temporal stages of a person, or the various scattered spatial parts of a deck of cards while 
playing 52 Pickup.  Given unrestricted mereological composition alone, any parts can be 
combined to form an object, and so my left half and your right half are just as much of a 
coherent sum as my left and right halves together are.  Therefore, if we think that there 
                                                          
105
 Lewis describes the contrast between trans-temporal connections and trans-world connections within 
Quine’s objection like this: “[Unlike the temporal case] [t]here is no such one-dimensional ordering given 
in the modal case.  So any path is as good as any other; and what’s more, in logical space anything that can 
happen does.  So linkage by a chain of short steps is too easy:  it will take us more or less from anywhere to 
anywhere.  Therefore it must be disregarded; the unification of trans-world individuals must be a matter of 
direct similarity between the stages (On the Plurality of Worlds, 218).” 
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are any special sums at all, then there must be some way to pick them out, and mereology 
alone is insufficient.106 
 
2.2.2.1 The Counterpart Relation 
 
A quick answer is that counterpart theory, and therefore, the counterpart relation, 
is what distinguishes the relevant fusions that make up individuals from the myriad other 
sums.  After all, a lump is taken to be the transworld fusion of an individual and all of her 
counterparts.  However, if it is just the counterpart relation, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish lump theory from counterpart theory.  Given that modal realism and 
unrestricted mereological composition are both assumed, all possible individuals from all 
possible worlds exist, and any possible way to put them together results in a sum.  
Therefore, both views include all of these sums.  If the counterpart relation is what 
underlies picking out certain parts over others on both views, then the same parts will be 
selected as relevant to an individual by both views.  Both views can talk about the sum of 
an individual and all of her counterparts.107  In addition, it seems like both views will rely 
on the same ‘parts’ to ground the truth of de re modal claims.  Whether we refer to him as 
‘Humphrey’ or ‘Humphrey@,’ the same world-bound individual possibly wins, and 
                                                          
106I do not mean ‘special’ in any deeper sense then that they are relevant to the purpose being considered.  
We could make certain sums ‘special’ in this sense, by stipulation.  E.g., the examples of strange fusions 
discussed it this chapter are special in that they are used to exemplify weird fusions.  Sums of temporal 
parts of persons are special because they are connected by various relations that unite them into a particular 
individual.  Sums of 52 scattered playing cards are special because of causal and spatiotemporal relations 
that make them a deck.  All of these methods require something in addition to mereology.  While the lump 
theorist could just stipulate that she is relying on whatever unites modal parts of individuals, this answer is 
insufficient to silence the objection that it is the counterpart relation that is doing the work.       
107 Below I will discuss a further complication, regarding the role of context and ability to pick out the sum 
of an individual and all of her counterparts.   
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whether we think that they are mereologically connected or not, Humphrey’s winning 
counterpart in w1 grounds the claim.   
Therefore, it seems that the only difference is the decision to say that these sums 
are more important than their world-bound parts are.108  Other than the claim that these 
sums are what ‘matter’ in the sense that they are what we are actually picking out when 
we refer to ordinary objects, it is challenging to distinguish the views.109   
This view could be distinguished, perhaps, by identifying a relevant method for 
picking out some sums over others, and showing why the sums matter more than their 
parts.  One way to establish that the view is distinct would be to find a way to identify the 
important sums that goes beyond what the counterpart relation offers.  I will set out some 
potential options.  Later, I will evaluate two additional attempts to distinguish the views.    
  
2.2.2.2 Options Beyond the Counterpart Relation   
Some of the main options appear to be identity, causal dependence, 
spatiotemporal connections, collective interest or other potential relations of personal 
                                                          
108
 There are a few other details to be considered shortly.  First we can ask what exactly is included in a 
world-bound part.  Given the details of counterpart theory, there are cases where an individual has 
counterparts in its world.  Are both of these individuals included in the world-bound part of the transworld 
individual?  Second, we can ask whether the same sum is always associated with an individual, or whether 
it is a context dependent matter.  Both of these issues will be considered below, as potential means of 
distinguishing the views.   
109 Other than that this is a novel view, it has been argued that it would be beneficial to have the same 
picture of trans-temporal and trans-world individuals, e.g., see Weatherson (“Stages, Worms, Slices and 
Lumps”), Wallace (“The Lump Sum”) and Yagisawa (“Primitive Worlds” and “Impossibilia”).  In addition, 
it has been suggested that lump theory provides a different answer to Kripke’s Humphrey Objection 
(Weatherson ibid, Wallace ibid).  Finally, Wallace (2009) has used this view in combination with the view 
known as Mereological Essentialism to support Composition as Identity.  A careful analysis of this 
potential would go too deeply into issues beyond the present concerns, and does not appear to offer any 
way to distinguish the views.  I will discuss the first two of these considerations. 
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identity, and perhaps a brute ‘part of individual’ relation.  Another option might be to rely 
upon some notion of similarity that is distinct from the counterpart relation.110   
Since modal realism is part of the background, it would be unfavorable to include 
transworld identity, given, e.g., Lewis’s arguments against “Modal Realism with 
Overlap” considered in On the Plurality of Worlds.111   Such a view leads to unintuitive 
results like the problem of accidental intrinsics and the inability to accommodate the 
inconstancy of de re modality.112 There would also be further issues if it were used to 
select the relevant sums.113    
Another way to try to select the relevant sums of modal parts would be to look to 
the relations that connect temporal parts, given that analogies between temporal and 
modal parts are often made.114  Unfortunately, temporal parts are connected in ways that 
do not apply to all modal parts, and certainly not to most modal parts.  For example, 
although temporal parts of the same object might be connected by relations of causal 
dependence and spatio-temporal connections, this is ruled out given that possible worlds 
                                                          
110 I am not claiming that any of the authors mentioned are relying on any of these relations or methods.  I 
am attempting to fill in what I take to be a missing detail that is needed to distinguish lump theory from 
counterpart theory.     
111
 See section 4.2 and 4.3 of On the Plurality of Worlds, 198-220.  As noted at the outset, lump theory is 
also compatible with ersatz views. 
112
 I consider whether or not the lump theorist has room for inconstancy below.  It was assumed in chapter 
1 that this is a favorable view to hold, however, it could be rejected.  Nevertheless, even if one is seeking a 
constant relation, identity does not seem to be the right one.  In particular, Wallace seems to rule out this 
option: “By ‘trans-world’ in ‘trans-world object’ or ‘trans-world individual’ I mean something similar to 
‘trans-continental’ in ‘trans-continental country’. An object (country) is stretched out across worlds 
(continents), yet is not wholly located in one world (continent). I do not mean by ‘trans-world individual’ 
(as it is sometimes used) to indicate an individual that is wholly located in more than one world, as in 
‘trans-world identity’ (“The Lump Sum,” 2).”   
113
 In addition, if transworld sums are connected by identity relations, then parallel arguments could be 
made to the arguments being made here with respect to counterpart theory.  If transworld identity is what 
connects the parts of the lump, then it seems that the resulting view would not be interestingly different 
from transworld identity.     
114
 For example, see Sider, Four Dimensionalism, Wallace “The Lump Sum”, Yagisawa “Impossibilia.”  
As noted above, those who discuss lump theory have sometimes suggested that this would be a benefit.  
Wallace defines ‘world-bound part’ based on Sider’s definition of ‘temporal part,’ see below.  
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are not connected in these ways.115  Other ways that parts of individuals might be thought 
to be united across time (common histories, match of origins, or having a collective self-
interest, for example), 116 are problematic for the same reasons, and trans-temporal 
relations like these are irrelevant.117  
Another way to put the current question is, “why should we care about the lumps 
rather than the parts?”  Perhaps this could be answered by relying upon a primitive 
relation of transworld sums used to link together all of the relevant modal parts of an 
ordinary object.  However, this would negate the otherwise minimal ontological 
commitments of this view in comparison to the alternatives.  Finally, it could seem ad 
hoc to state that there is a new view that depends upon a primitive relation that is 
otherwise difficult to distinguish from the counterpart relation.  
Perhaps a better option would be to rely on a relation of similarity between the 
various parts.  Given that these sums are supposed to be composed of a world-bound 
objects and their otherworldly counterparts, and that the counterpart relation is a relation 
of similarity, this seems to be the obvious option.  Like the counterpart relation, a 
similarity relation could connect these various world-bound individuals without relying 
on identity.  At the same time, a similarity relation could connect parts in distinct worlds 
despite a lack of spatiotemporal or causal dependence, and without the need for there to 
be common histories or collective self-interest.  However, given that the counterpart 
                                                          
115
 See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 217-220 for discussion of some of the connections between 
temporal parts.  He argues that the same connections fail to apply across worlds.    
116 See, for example, Perry, Personal Identity, and Parfit, Reasons and Persons, for discussion of some 
potential relations of personal identity.  
117
 Finally, since the resulting transworld objects are to be used to support de re modal claims, it is 
important to note that many of these relations would conflict with constancy as well, unless some 
allowance for contextual dependence is provided.    
 48 
 
relation is just a relation of similarity, it is hard to imagine how relying on this notion 
would allow for the lump theorist to distinguish their view.   
One way to distinguish the view would be to rely on a notion of similarity that is 
not identical to that used in counterpart theory.  This may not seem to be plausible since 
we might have thought that there is only one relation of similarity, and that it is the 
similarity notion used by the counterpart theorist.  However, if, e.g., counterpart theory 
relies on a flexible notion of similarity, and lump theory does not, then this would be a 
way to show that they are distinct, as well as to explain what it is that selects certain 
trans-world sums as relevant.  This option is explored briefly below, but for the moment, 
it is sufficient to imagine that some notion of similarity unites the world-bound parts of 
transworld sums.       
 
2.3: Comparison to Counterpart Theory 
Similarity appears to be the best way to represent the part-whole relationships 
relevant to the transworld sums that compose ordinary objects.  If this is the notion that 
lump theory is relying upon, then it shares this relation, and this way of selecting modal 
‘parts’ with counterpart theory.  Looking deeper into the resulting theory, it is difficult to 
find any other relevant differences between counterpart theory and lump theory so 
understood.118   
 
 
                                                          
118
 There might be other options not considered here, but of those considered, similarity seems to be the 
best option.     
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2.3.1: Potential Differences?  
 
As noted above, both views have the same background ontology, the same world-
bound parts, and the ability to form all the same sums.  In some instances, counterpart 
theory can even talk about the equivalent of the lump, i.e., by discussing what is possible 
for an individual and all of her counterparts.119  The counterpart theorist can talk about 
any transworld sum she wishes; she just typically chooses not to.  If lump theory amounts 
to nothing more than the view that we should talk about these sums instead of their parts, 
it is not a very interesting alternative.   There are a few additional avenues to consider, 
but I will argue that none provide a way to distinguish lump theory.  
 
2.3.1.1  Concern for Your Parts 
 
It has been suggested that this view can provide a distinct, and possibly better, 
reply to Kripke’s Humphrey Objection.120  As discussed above, the objection is that 
counterpart theory cannot provide the correct analysis of our de re modal statements, 
since the activities of otherworldly individuals have nothing to do with our own wants 
and concerns.  Put another way, counterpart theory says that what it is for Humphrey to 
possibly win the election is for a distinct otherworldly individual to win, and yet 
Humphrey doesn’t care about what takes place for this otherworldly individual.  This is 
not typically taken to be a successful objection, but it might be a means of distinguishing 
the views, provided that they respond in relevantly distinct ways.     
                                                          
119 Note that this is more complicated given that counterpart theory is based on a flexible counterpart 
relation meant to reflect the inconstancy of de re modal claims.   
120 E.g., see Weatherson, “Stages, Worms, Slices and Lumps,” and Wallace, “The Lump Sum.” 
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One might think that lump theory can provide a more satisfying answer, given 
that we are now looking at a modal part of the transworld object that is Humphrey, rather 
than a counterpart.  Even though Humphrey does not care what happens to his 
counterpart, he might care about what happens to his otherworldly modal part, given that 
he and his part make up a portion of the same composite individual.    
There are problems with this claim, however.  First, it looks like the same ‘part’ is 
doing the work to ground the de re claim that Humphrey possibly wins.  This can be 
made clear by considering that unrestricted mereological composition is taken on as a 
background assumption, and therefore counterpart theory has the same machinery 
available.  The counterpart theorist could also try to reassure Humphrey by telling him 
that he is a part of a transworld mereological sum that includes a winning part.  
However, given that the counterpart relation is what picks out the relevant sums, 
this means that the same ‘part’ will be picked out by either view.  Therefore, even if 
Humphrey is comforted by this fact, it does not show that there is a metaphysical 
difference between the views.   
Furthermore, mereology without the counterpart relation cannot distinguish a 
relevant transworld sum from any of the others, and there are infinitely many.  
Presumably, there are plenty of trans-worldly fusions that Humphrey is part of, yet 
doesn’t care about.  Given that Humphrey@ does not care what happens to a piece of 
 51 
 
dryer lint in Linz, why would he care more just because that lint is part of a mereological 
sum that he is part of?121  The lump view cannot be distinguished in this way.122   
2.3.1.2 Distinct World-bound Parts?  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the counterpart relation is permissive enough to allow for 
an individual to have counterparts in her own world, as well as allowing individuals to 
have multiple counterparts within a single world.  We can ask whether or not there are 
also multiple modal parts of an object at a single world.  Wallace bases her working 
definition of modal part on Sider’s definition of temporal part.  It appears that there is to 
be only one part per world:  
X is a world bound modal part of Y at a world W means that 1) X exists at, but only 
at W, 2) X is a part of y at W, and 3) X overlaps at W everything that is a part of y at 
W. 123 
Each of these world parts is world bound in much the same way that an instantaneous 
temporal part is temporally bound.  
Although world-bound parts are supposed to be analogous to temporal parts, it is 
not clear that the analogy is sufficiently strong to ground the meaning of world-bound 
                                                          
121 Note that nothing depends on the claim that we don’t care about what happens to our otherworldly 
counterparts.  It might be the case, as Wallace suggests, that we do care about other modal parts of 
ourselves (“The Lump Sum”).  For example, we might hope that we would do the right thing in a 
counterfactual situation—e.g., I hope that if I would have witnessed the murder of Kitty Genovese, that I 
would have called the police.  In this case, I seem to care about what happens to my counterparts in nearby 
worlds, and what they are like.  Of course, if I care about them or not, I will care about the same part, the 
same individuals in the same worlds, given either view.  
122 To be fair, Weatherson suggests that lump theory can provide a better answer in part because of the way 
that it can answer more puzzles overall, including the Humphrey objection, then rival views, rather than 
specifically arguing that this objection fares better with lump theory.  The objection is used here to 
illustrate the point that mereology is not enough to provide a relevant difference between a person and 
some of her counterparts, and a sum of a person and her counterparts.  
123 “The Lump Sum,” 2. 
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based on instantaneity.124  In order to pick out a world-bound part of an individual, we 
need to know what (sub)parts from that world to include.  For example, we can ask 
whether more than one object (in the traditional sense of object) from within a world 
makes up the world-bound part of the transworld sum from that world.  In other words, in 
w2, does the world-bound part of Humphrey include both the winning candidate and the 
second runner up? Or only one of these parts?  We can evaluate the response provided by 
counterpart theory, and compare to what the lump theorist might say.  If they provide 
distinct answers, this can distinguish the views.       
First, according to counterpart theory, there are cases in which an individual has a 
counterpart at their own world.  Lewis imagines an example in which he trades places 
with another actual individual, his unfortunate neighbor Fred.125  Because it seems 
possible for there to be a situation in which all else is qualitatively just the same as it 
actually is, and yet Lewis is Fred, this possibility needs to be accommodated.  There are a 
few options, here, one in which there is a distinct yet qualitatively identical world where 
Fred and Lewis have switched places; another is that the actual world itself can represent 
the possibility, by Fred and David Lewis being counterparts.  Lewis opts for the second 
choice, given the chance to avoid commitment to haecceitism.126   
According to lump theory, for there to be two or more ‘counterparts’ within one 
world would mean that there are sometimes two (or more) ‘individuals’ (in the traditional 
                                                          
124 Consider the fact that in the temporal case, we have past, present, and future.  Perhaps the present could 
be said to correspond to the actual, but it is not clear what non-actual corresponds to.  Wallace 
acknowledges that the analogy might not hold up.     
125 On the Plurality of Worlds, 231-232. 
126 Lewis gives the following definition of a haecceitistic difference: “two worlds differ in what they 
represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way.”   Haecceitism is the 
view that there are at least some cases of haecceitistic differences between worlds.  Without taking a stance 
on haecceitism, it can be seen as a general benefit if a view allows more options.  (Ibid, 221.) 
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non-lump sense) within one world-bound part.  For example, the actual world would have 
the David-Fred fusion as the world-bound part that makes up the transworld sum that is 
David.  This would diminishes the intuitive understanding of world-bound modal part for 
the lump view, given that it cannot easily explain why it is that we think we are a single 
individual in a world when really, we are part of a world-bound mereological sum of 
parts that may also include other individuals.127      
Another option would be to accept haecceitism and argue that these are distinct 
worlds, and that therefore, Fred and Lewis are never parts of the same trans-world sum.  
If the first option is taken, it looks like we will again have a situation in which we cannot 
distinguish the views.  However, the second option will only provide a difference based 
on acceptance of haecceitism, and therefore, may not be distinguished from counterpart-
theory-plus-haecceitism.  Of course, it would also be possible to reject the notion that this 
is a possible situation (on essentialist grounds, for example) or to provide another 
explanation not considered here.  
 
2.3.1.3 Context and Modal Parts 
 
I suggested that lump theory relies on a similarity relation that may or may not be 
distinct from the counterpart relation.   If a similarity relation supports the view, we need 
to mention an important feature, discussed in Chapter 1—the role of context.  
 A popular understanding of similarity holds that context plays an essential role in 
determining which aspects of similarity are relevant to the particular de re statement we 
                                                          
127 Furthermore, it seems to point to some difficulties in the analogy between temporal and modal parts, and 
potentially, a problem for the lump theorist’s ability to pick out a world-bound individual.  However, it 
should be noted that to some extent, all views have the issue of how to individuate world-bound objects, 
(e.g., ‘the Problem of the Many’ mentioned in Chapter 3). See Lewis, Parts of Classes. 
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are considering, and therefore, which things are our counterparts.128  Similarity is 
notoriously flexible, and seems to depend on context even in non-modal cases: "even 
when all talk of similarity is explicit and de re modality is out of the picture. I can say 
that Ted and Fred are very much alike, yet very different. Uniform resolutions would 
make that a contradiction - so much the worse for them!” 129, 130  Depending on the 
context, we will identify Ted and Fred as counterparts, or not.  Perhaps they are similar in 
that they are philosophers, for example.  Still, one can say that they are very dissimilar in 
other ways, e.g., in their specializations or alma maters.   
Of course, counterpart theory does rely on a flexible notion of similarity, in part 
because that’s taken to be how similarity is, but also to reflect the claim that de re modal 
claims are an inconstant matter.  This is taken up as an assumption with counterpart 
theory,131 but perhaps it could be omitted from lump theory.  Some support for the claim 
that de re modal claims are inconstant is provided in Chapters 1 and 3, and Lewis 
provides many more examples.132  Nonetheless, it might be rejected.  This alternative is 
not explored here, however, because it will also fail to set the views apart either.  If 
counterpart theory and lump theory are otherwise metaphysically indistinguishable, the 
                                                          
128
For example, Lewis explains that: “The principle advantage of the method of counterparts over the 
method of inter-world identities is that if we adopted the latter in its most plausible form, we would say that 
things were identical with all and only those things which we would otherwise call their counterparts. But 
that could not be correct: first, because the counterpart relation is not transitive or symmetric, as identity is; 
and second, because the counterpart relation depends on the relative importances we attach to various 
different respects of similarity and dissimilarity, as identity does not. (“Counterparts of Persons,” 206)." 
129 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 255. 
130
 See, for example, Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” for concerns about the pervasively 
contextual element of similarity comparisons.  The examples of Earth and Venus in Chapter 1 also support 
the idea that similarity is had in a context.  Earth and Venus might be similar in that they are both planets, 
but dissimilar in that they are not both inhabited by humans.     
131 See the arguments against constancy in Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263. 
132 ibid. 
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choice to add an additional assumption to one or other of the views will not be sufficient 
to establish that they are relevantly distinct.     
If instead, lump theory relies on a flexible notion (and accepts inconstancy), then 
it cannot be distinguished from counterpart theory.  In addition, it seems to offer a strange 
view of individuals, given that what parts one has is a matter of context.  Counterpart 
theory would appear to be in a better position in this respect.  Consider that, according to 
counterpart theory, Humphrey has angel counterparts in some contexts, and Humphrey 
has poached egg counterparts in other contexts.133  In addition, in some contexts, he is 
essentially human and therefore has neither angels nor eggs as counterparts.  These are 
both potential counterparts of Humphrey, but will not typically be picked out in the same 
context.  As counterparts of Humphrey, they are not literally ‘parts’ of him, as they will 
be according to lump theory.  Lump theory (with inconstancy) will hold that 
‘Humphrey@’ (the actual world-bound modal part of the transworld sum that is 
Humphrey) is literally a part of multiple trans-world mereological sums, and which parts 
this transworld sum has is a matter of context.   Although this view can be helped perhaps 
by analogies to views about identity across time, it may seem odd to imagine that what 
parts an individual has is not a fixed matter.    
  
2.4 Conclusion 
I have argued that lump theory is not an acceptable alternative to counterpart 
theory.  If what delineates a particular “transworld sum” turns out to be nothing more 
than the typical counterpart relation, then we do not appear to have a relevantly different 
                                                          
133 See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 251.  This example is used in a footnote in section 4.3.1 as well.   
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theory.  First, I argued that the counterpart relation is the best option for picking out the 
relevant parts.  With respect to counterpart theory, talking of ‘all of one’s counterparts’ is 
a bit misleading without further clarification, given that which counterparts an individual 
has depends upon the context.  Therefore, I attempted to clarify what the lump theorist 
might mean, and argued that the choice is either to give up inconstancy, or accept that 
lump theory becomes more unattractive given that what parts something has is a matter of 
context.  There may also be other ways to distinguish the views but that I have laid out 
what I take to be the best options and none seem to set it apart.   
 In conclusion, it seems like transworld mereological sums cannot do the work of 
ordinary objects in our modal language without relying on the tools of counterpart theory, 
and, given that they seem to offer no benefits beyond what is offered by counterpart 
theory (and may be less intuitive in some ways) they are not an acceptable alternative for 
grounding the truth of de re modal claims.  In the remaining chapters, I return to 
considerations of counterpart theory in particular, beginning with an attempt to apply 
counterpart theory to properties.   
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CHAPTER 3 
COUNTERPART THEORY AND PROPERTIES 
  
Counterpart theory has recently been applied to entities like properties, relations, 
and propositions.134  The goal of this chapter is to analyze attempts like these, and to 
comment more generally on the overall viability of views that fit into this category. In 
addition, I will outline a specific property counterpart view and provide initial support.   
 
3.1 Motivation  
 
Properties play a central role in current discussion of causation, dispositions, 
natural laws, theories of measurement and more, and so it is a worthwhile endeavor to 
explore counterpart theoretic applications.  The move to apply counterpart theory to 
properties has been suggested in various contexts by multiple philosophers.  For example, 
in the context of comparing haecceitism and quidditism, 135 David Lewis mentions, and 
ultimately rejects, a property counterpart view according to which no property is ever 
instantiated in two different worlds.136   
Other philosophers are more optimistic about the potential applications of 
counterpart theory to properties and similar entities, and have suggested that such views 
                                                          
134 I am focusing primarily upon properties in this chapter for simplicity.   
135 As discussed above, haecceitism is the view that there are haecceitistic difference between worlds; i.e., 
worlds that differ in some non-qualitative way, but not in any qualitative way.  Quidditism is more or less 
the property analogue of haecceitism—quidditism allows the possibility for properties to swap their roles, 
or replace each other, in other possible worlds.  (For discussion, see, for example Armstrong, “Universals,” 
Hawthorne, “Causal Structuralism,” Heller, “Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory,” and Black, 
“Against Quidditism”).  
136 He is concerned about the viability of such a view, and ultimately finds that it is unwarranted except to 
provide support for applications that he rejects:  “It could be for the sake of upholding identity of 
structurally indiscernible worlds, but I see no good reason for wanting to uphold that principle. Or it could 
be for the sake of blocking the argument for Humility. But why would I want to block that argument? 
(“Ramseyan Humility,” 211).”  
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could solve metaphysical puzzles or support other philosophical theses.  For example, 
Derek Ball suggests relying on a counterpart-theoretic understanding of properties in 
order to respond to modal arguments against Physicalism; Mark Heller proposes a 
property-counterpart view in order to allow for the ‘Linguistic Ersatzist’ to respond to 
several objections; Andy Egan suggests taking the de re modal facts of properties to be 
understood counterpart theoretically as a potential response to a problem he raises for a 
Lewisian conception of properties; and Cian Dorr raises a problem for a particular view 
of propositions, and initially considers a proposition-counterpart view in reply.137,138  In 
the next chapter, I will discuss an attempt put forth by Shamik Dasgupta to use a 
relational counterpart theory to allow relationalists about quantity to avoid particular 
puzzles.139    
There are other reasons to consider property counterpart theory as well.  Some 
philosophers reject the “hybrid nature” of taking de re facts about individuals and about 
properties to be analyzed in distinct ways.  For example, Dorr argues that we ought to 
have a counterpart view for properties if we have one for individuals:  “[n]o matter what 
sort of thing we take propositions to be, if we accept counterpart theory for individuals 
we must also accept some form of counterpart theory for propositions, properties and 
relations.”140  Similarly, Derek Ball argues that attempts to treat modal claims about 
                                                          
137 See Ball “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” 
“Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist,” Dorr, “Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” Egan “Second-order 
Predication,” Ehring “Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism.” See also Guigon 
“Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases”, and “Coextension and Identity.” 
In addition, Denis Robinson briefly discusses a potential property counterpart view, which relies on 
transworld similarity.  He makes this suggestion (which he ultimately rejects) in response to an argument 
about Epiphenomenalism.  (See Robinson, “Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties.”   
138 The most complete explications of property counterpart views are put forth by Heller (“Property 
Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,”), and Ball, (“Property Identities and Modal Arguments,”) and although 
they have set out some of the groundwork, this chapter provides an in depth analysis. 
139 See Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absolutism about Quantity.” 
140 Dorr, 213. 
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properties in a different way from modal claims about individuals “is rendered 
problematic by the disuniform, arguably non-compositional treatment of modal claims 
that it would require.  It would be inelegant and methodologically undesirable to give 
entirely different semantics for modal claims involving properties and those involving 
other individuals.”141    
In contrast, one might think that the differences between individuals and 
properties are sufficient to warrant non-uniform treatment of de re modal claims in these 
areas, as Lewis does in his discussion of the ‘accidental intrinsics’ problem.142   
Properties and individuals are distinct in many ways and these might be sufficient to 
justify different semantics for each.   
In any case, the question of whether or not counterpart theory is uniquely 
applicable to individuals, and/or if properties can benefit from such an analysis will be 
explored in more depth within this chapter.  My primary task will to set forth and analyze 
a property counterpart theory.  I will also explore the effects of these considerations on 
the overall viability of standard counterpart theory in connection to the issues explored 
here. 
3.2 Property Counterpart Theory    
 
In chapter 1 I suggested one particular view of properties.  Using this view, I will 
set out a preliminary property counterpart view for evaluation by briefly reviewing the 
                                                          
141 Ball “Property Identities,” 8. 
142 For example, there are concerns about the transworld identity of individuals that do not apply to 
properties (for example, the view known as ‘quidditism’ might be taken to be more acceptable than the 
equivalent for individuals; ‘haecceitism’).  See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds. In addition, the reasons to 
support a world-bound view for individuals and not for properties discussed below can further support this 
distinction. 
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elements of counterpart theory and attempting to incorporate each into a property version 
of the view.  The goal will be to remain as close to standard counterpart theory as 
possible while attempting to accommodate important intuitions, and holding fixed the 
background assumptions laid out so far, e.g., Modal Realism, properties as sets of 
possibilia, and similarity understood in terms of property sharing, which reflects the fact 
that de re modality is inconstant.  
 
3.2.1 Components of a Counterpart Theory Revisited 
 
Above I suggested that the essential components of standard counterpart theory 
appear to be that the counterpart relation is a (non-transitive) similarity relation143, that 
context plays an important role in determining whether or not the counterpart relation 
holds, and that the entities in question are world bound. 144   
As discussed in the first chapter, counterpart theory assumes that individuals exist 
in one world only.  In other versions of counterpart theory, (e.g., when the entities under 
consideration in are not individuals or ordinary objects, or when the underlying structure 
is not modal but e.g., temporal), it seems that there are still analogies to an entity’s being 
world-bound.  For example, Sider’s temporal counterpart theory, takes stages to be 
instantaneous time slices, which is the equivalent of being ‘world-bound’ within his 
                                                          
143  Similarity relations are not transitive; x can be similar to y, and y can be similar to z and without x 
being similar to z.  Similarity, as an alternative to identity, seems to be the backbone of counterpart views, 
and most views rely on similarity or nearby notions (e.g., for a related notion, see Fara, “Relative-Sameness 
Counterpart Theory,” and “Possibility Relative to a Sortal.”). 
144 Although I will suggest and explore views that do not rely on all of these components, there are some 
reasons to doubt that these components can be separated from each other.  For example, Woodward’s reply 
to Schaffer, “The Internal Relatedness of All Things,” raises an issue for anyone who seeks to rely on the 
notion of being world-bound without the other elements of counterpart theory (Woodward, “Worldmates 
and Internal Relatedness,” 423).  
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theory.145  Heller’s ersatz view includes that properties are ‘world’ bound as well, as they 
are restricted to the actual world plus representations of them in ersatz worlds.146   The 
property counterpart theories discussed in the introduction, (e.g., Ball’s view) rely on a 
worldbound notion of properties as well.147  Still, it is worthwhile to question whether or 
not this is a necessary part of any counterpart theory, given that counterpart theory can be 
formulated without this condition as well.148  The initial goal is to formulate a property 
counterpart theory with as much in common with traditional counterpart theory for 
individuals as possible, and so this assumption is taken on initially.  Later, restricting the 
theory to include only worldbound properties will be challenged, but initially, we can 
assume that any form of counterpart theory would require each of these key components, 
or suitable substitutions.  Later, ways to modify and adjust this requirement are explored, 
since a property counterpart theory with all of these elements appears to lead to 
counterintuitive results. 
 
3.2.2 Initial Complications 
 
 Preliminarily, then, we can assume that a property counterpart view is any theory 
that holds that properties are world bound, and that a distinct counterpart of a given 
property is a property that is similar to the given property within a particular context.149  
                                                          
145 Sider, Four Dimensionalism. 
146 Heller, “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”   
147 Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments.” 
148 For example, the counterpart relation could be relativized to worlds, as a four-place relation such that an 
individual ‘x’ in world w is a counterpart of an individual ‘y’ in w2.  Thanks to Phillip Bricker for this 
suggestion.   
149 An entity can also be its own counterpart.  See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds. 
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Although this is just an outline of a theory, questions arise even before attempting to fill 
in the details.   
First, there may not be a straightforward translation from a theory about objects 
and individuals to a theory about properties for any of the components, given the 
substantial differences between properties and individuals.150  These differences will 
affect whether or not all components of counterpart theory can be applied to properties, 
and become apparent when we try to formulate the theory.    
For example, consider what it means for the counterpart relation, a similarity 
relation, to be applied to properties.  Although we have a general sense of what it takes 
for two individuals to be similar to one another, we might not have the same intuitive 
grasp of what it is for two properties to be similar to one another.  Furthermore, our very 
understanding of similarity can complicate things; e.g., if similarity is understood as 
property sharing among individuals, then it is difficult to see how this definition could 
apply in a straightforward way to similarity among properties, rather than individuals.151  
Here again, the nature of properties will partially determine our understanding of the 
similarity between them.  
 Consider next the claim that an individual is world-bound according to standard 
counterpart theory.152  Although we have a straightforward understanding of what this 
                                                          
150 E.g., as mentioned above, differences between the nature of properties and of individuals have been 
upheld to account for certain metaphysical distinctions, e.g., choices to support haecceitism without 
admitting quidditism.   
151 Perhaps, the closest analogy would be sharing of higher order properties, or properties-of-properties. 
This will be explored below. 
152 In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis mentions his preference for the terminology “possible individual” 
instead: “I avoid the convenient phrase ‘world-bound individual’ because it often seems to mean an 
individual that exists according to one world only, and I very much doubt that there are any such 
individuals (214 n.)”  However, it has become more or less standard terminology, see Lewis elsewhere, 
e.g., (“Ramseyan Humility,” 211).  I will continue to use the phrase ‘world-bound individual’ here, and 
given that modal realism is a background assumption, ‘world-bound’ should reflect this meaning. 
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means for individuals in standard counterpart theory, ‘world-boundness’ for properties 
will depend on the nature of properties.  This seems to be a point of departure from 
individuals, since properties are typically thought to be constant across worlds—they 
appear to pick out the same thing in every world, such that saying that something is 
possibly red in the actual world means that there is a world in which an object has that 
property, of being red as we mean the term here.  In other words, it seems that redness 
picks out the same property in all worlds, and is therefore a transworld property.   
In addition, we might question whether the inconstancy of de re modal statements 
about individuals has a corollary with respect to properties, such that ‘redness’ picks out 
different properties in different contexts.  These questions will be explored below.  
 
3.3 Similarity among Properties 
 
Recall that one of the main reasons that entities like properties and universals 
have been posited is to explain and account for resemblance among objects.  In chapter 1, 
I adopted the suggestion that similarity be reduced to property sharing.  Because this is an 
appealing and plausible account of similarity generally, it would be beneficial if other 
counterpart relations based on similarity (such as the property counterpart relation) were 
compatible with this account.   
A main goal of this section will be to see if this view can be supported given a 
similarity based property counterpart theory, and in particular, one that includes the 
assumption that properties are understood to be sets of possibilia.  I will argue that this 
understanding of similarity can also underlie a property counterpart relation, with slight 
modifications.  
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When it comes to individuals, similarity is easy to discuss, as we tend to have 
pretty clear views on whether or not two individuals are similar.  We know that 
Humphrey could be similar to a winning candidate in terms of being a potential 
presidential candidate, in terms of being a human, being a Democrat or many other 
things.  However, we do not have such clear views when it comes to similarity among 
properties.153  In part, this may be because we do not compare properties as often or as 
freely as we compare individuals, and are less familiar in general with the nature of 
properties than we are with individuals. 
Even if we make fewer property comparisons in everyday discourse, we do seem 
to have insight into what makes for similarity among properties, as when we say that 
redness is more similar to orangeness than it is to blueness, or that roundness and 
triangularity are similar, but less similar than triangularity and rectangularity.  We also 
group together certain properties in terms of other properties that they share, such as 
being natural, physical, gruesome, moral, intrinsic, qualitative, categorical, or 
dispositional properties.  We might claim that e.g., redness and blueness are similar in 
terms of properties that they share (that they are both color properties; that their 
instantiations come in various hues; that they are typically visible to human beings in the 
actual world under normal conditions; etc.).  Property comparisons are not entirely 
unfamiliar.  
We can also get a sense of property comparisons from the examples discussed in 
the literature.  According to Heller, for example, two properties are similar when they 
                                                          
153
 Heller acknowledges this difficulty and asks: “Is positive charge more similar to spin up than it is to 
negative charge? (“Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” 301).” 
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play the same causal and nomological roles.  Ball considers commonalities such as being 
compatible with similar laws of nature, or being sets with similar members. 154  In other 
cases, we group together properties based on features like that they possess certain 
conditional powers, as in the case of dispositional properties, or that they figure into the 
fundamental structure of the world, as in the case of perfectly natural properties.   
Because properties are sets of possibilia, it is important to keep this in mind when 
discussing similarity among properties.  One way to establish similarity between two sets 
is for these sets to have some member (or members) in common.  With respect to 
properties, that is to say, two properties might be similar by having instantiations in 
common.  For example, the set of all red things and the set of all round things have some 
instances in common, e.g., some particular red balloon.  Considering an individual object 
like the balloon, and two of the sets that it is a member of, we can establish similarity 
between the two properties.  In other words, the set of red things and the set of round 
things are similar in that they share a red balloon as a member, and therefore, redness and 
roundness are similar in this respect.  
A related way to try to establish similarity between properties might be to 
compare individual members of two sets, which is to say, to compare individual 
instantiations of two properties.  For example, the set of all red objects includes a stop 
sign, and the set of all green objects contains a green traffic light.  There are various 
similarities between these two objects, (e.g., they are both traffic signals, are both 
                                                          
154 Heller proposed relying on Ramsey sentences to describe the distribution of properties, which is 
connected to his ‘linguistic ersatz’ theory of possible worlds.  However, the comparison he makes between 
property roles depend on things like which patterns of space time points they instantiate, and what their 
relationships to various natural laws are.  Ball makes similar suggestions.  See Heller, “Property 
Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments.”    
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instantiated in the actual world, etc.), any of which might be used to establish that the set 
of red objects and the set of green objects are similar (since they have members that are 
also members of the set of actual objects, for example) and therefore that redness and 
greenness are similar.   
 
3.3.1  Sharing Higher Order Properties  
 
These comparisons share an important feature: each of these options can be 
described in terms of properties sharing further ‘higher order’ properties.155  While “first-
order” properties are only instantiated by individuals, “higher-order properties” are 
instantiated by properties; they are properties of properties.  For example, a first-order 
property like being fragile can have a higher order property being a dispostional property 
in common with other properties, like being poisonous.   Likewise, first-order properties 
like being positively charged and being two grams mass have in common that the second-
order property being a fundamental property.  In each of these cases, it is possible to 
describe similarity between properties in terms of properties sharing higher order 
properties.   
Taking similarity among properties in terms of higher order property sharing 
provides a close approximation of the particular understanding of similarity we have been 
using to compare individuals, and requires no additional primitive notions or entities to 
explain similarity.  In addition, it seems that however similarity is understood, it should 
                                                          
155
 I wish to acknowledge, but set aside, concerns regarding the existence of higher order properties.  While 
some (e.g., Bergmann, “Meaning and Existence,”) have denied that there is any need to posit higher order 
properties, there is not space for further discussion here, beyond the preliminary remark that, given the 
ontology being assumed here, higher order properties do not require further ontological commitments 
beyond sets of possibilia that make up first order properties.     
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be understood the same way regardless of the entities being compared. 156   Because this 
view fits well with the other assumptions made so far, as well as with standard 
counterpart theory, it is worth further consideration.     
 
3.3.2 An Account of Similarity among Properties 
 
 Even if this is initially promising and closely related to similarity among 
individuals, these methods of comparison could seem to be unsatisfying in terms of 
establishing similarity among properties.  Return to the property comparisons discussed 
above.  In the first example, it might seem somehow artificial to claim that redness and 
roundness are similar to each other in virtue of the fact that some particular object 
instantiates both properties.  Regarding the second suggestion, we might worry that the 
similarities between the stop sign and traffic light have little to do with the properties of 
redness or greenness, but only to the common properties that the objects they instantiate 
share as individuals.  Given that many properties have infinite instantiations, two 
extremely disparate properties are likely to have members with shared properties, making 
this notion of similarity feel particularly weak.  Other instances of higher order property 
sharing seem to be even less useful.  The potential for two properties to share extremely 
gruesome higher order properties makes the problem clearer, as two properties can be 
similar by sharing properties like those represented by infinite chains of disjunctive 
higher order properties.  Other higher order properties, like ‘being a property’ or maybe 
‘being instantiated by something or other,’ will be shared by all properties and also fail to 
                                                          
156
 Intuitively, it seems likely that however similarity is understood, it should be understood in the same 
way whether it is applied to properties or to individuals.  However, it could perhaps turn out that the 
differences between the nature of properties and the nature of individuals could justify such a difference in 
treatment.  This is not explored here.    
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establish meaningful similarity comparisons.157  In contrast, there are properties, like 
being fundamental properties or being compatible with the same laws of nature, which 
seem to establish useful respects of similarity.   
 One could respond to concerns about the usefulness of higher order property 
sharing as a means of similarity comparison between properties by rejecting this method 
of analyzing similarity in favor other alternatives.  However, higher order property 
sharing is intuitively plausible and worthy of further exploration.  It may also allow us to 
mirror the cohesive picture Lewis has developed with respect to standard counterpart 
theory.  Therefore, it is worth exploring other options.  
 
3.3.2.1 Higher-order Naturalness?  
 
One method of response is to draw a distinction among higher order properties 
akin to the distinction between natural and non-natural first order properties.  There are 
prima facie reasons to support holding a distinction of this sort, since we need to be able 
to pick out certain higher order properties and exclude others if we are to make useful 
similarity comparisons among properties, and this method is successful when applied to 
first order properties. 
First, we can note that this is no different than in the case of individuals, who can 
be similar in very broad and uninteresting respects, like being part of the same world as 
each other, or being part of a world that has more than two objects in it.158  Similarly, 
                                                          
157
 Whether or not there are un-instantiated properties is not explored, but nothing in the current discussion 
depends on this.   
158
 Again, there are similarity comparisons among individuals based on strange properties as well, as this 
stems from the fact that properties are abundant, and so very different properties can play a role in 
similarity comparisons.  To use an example from Woodward; “If the only respect of resemblance you care 
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even though the property of redness does not seem to have much to do with the property 
of being a traffic signal, these two properties are related by many other higher order 
properties, (including, being instantiated by a stop sign), which can be used to establish 
similarity between them.  If similarity among properties is explained in terms of higher 
order property sharing, then the fact that higher order properties are abundant leads to 
issues like those found when making similarity comparisons among individuals.  
Properties can be similar in countless ways by sharing any number of properties, and 
unless we have some way of distinguishing the useful respects of similarity from the 
gruesome and gerrymandered, this way of establishing similarity seems fatally flawed.   
This seems to support a distinction at the level of higher order properties similar 
to the distinction between natural and non-natural properties.  Although this distinction 
could potentially resolve the abundance issue here, it needs to be carefully spelled out 
and evaluated, and sufficient support must be provided. 
  First, recall that with respect to first order properties, naturalness in general is 
derived from perfect naturalness.  Although they are the most useful in establishing 
similarity, perfectly natural properties are not defined by their usefulness in establishing 
similarity—that is just one of the jobs that they can do.  Instead, they can be distinguished 
by the role that they play in establishing and defining the fundamental structure of reality.  
There is a set number of these perfectly natural properties such that, taken together, they 
specify the world completely and without redundancy.159  In other words, the perfectly 
                                                          
about is self-identity, you can say that I might have been a pure set (“Worldmates and Internal 
Relatedness,” 424).”   
159 See Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.” 
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natural properties form a minimal supervenience base for all else.160  Furthermore, 
perfectly natural properties play a role in explanations of natural laws, causation, events, 
mental content, supervenience, closeness of worlds, and world mates.  When it comes to 
perfectly natural properties, we can say much more about them than just that they are 
useful for establishing respects of similarity.  Therefore, we ought to consider whether or 
not there are higher order perfectly natural properties, and if so, how they are 
distinguished from other higher order properties.  However, it may seem that higher order 
perfect naturalness must be based on more than just that it is needed to establish 
similarity.  Although the fact that some properties are useful in this sense can go some 
way towards establishing such a distinction, 161 there are additional reasons to support 
perfect naturalness among higher order properties as well.   
3.3.2.2 Higher Order Perfect Naturalness?  
 
One possibility is to base a higher order distinction upon the first order 
distinction.  Given that first order imperfectly natural properties can be connected to 
perfectly natural ones by chains of definability, we can attempt to apply a similar 
concept, by working from first order natural properties (and what they have in common), 
to less natural higher order properties.  If higher order perfectly natural properties can be 
                                                          
160
According to Lewis, the perfectly natural properties and relations do not just characterize the world 
completely, they also characterize it minimally: “there are only just enough of them to characterise things 
completely and without redundancy (Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, 60).”   
161
 In her discussion of higher order perfectly natural relations, Maya Eddon makes the related claim that 
there must be more to such a distinction than just its usefulness within a theory of quantities: “In a related 
vein, one might be reticent to posit an objective distinction between natural second-order relations and 
gerrymandered ones without evidence that such a distinction is required beyond an account of the structure 
of quantity. After all, a more conservative explanation for why we’re inclined to posit such a distinction is 
that some second-order relations are interesting or useful to us, and nothing more. If the distinction between 
perfectly natural quantitative second-order relations and gerrymandered ones is not required to do any 
philosophical work, then it seems unduly extravagant to claim that certain second-order relations are 
metaphysically privileged (“Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties,” 15).”  Because higher 
order perfectly natural properties are able to support similarity comparisons, this might be sufficient to 
justify the inclusion of such a distinction.  
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distinguished based on their connection to first order perfectly natural properties, it might 
be possible to define the imperfectly natural higher order out of these162.   
One way this could work is by considering that first order perfectly natural 
properties share many higher order properties, like being a fundamental property.  It is 
plausible that these higher order properties are themselves more natural than others, like 
being a gruesome property.  Properties like being perfectly natural could be used to 
establish genuine similarity, given that all of the properties that fit within this set will 
have important further respects of similarity in common, like ‘being the properties that 
can form a minimal supervenience base,’ which help to distinguish them as perfectly 
natural.163  This is due in part because the degree of specificity with respect to 
fundamental properties is maximal.  Although the details would need to be further 
supplied, these types of higher order properties appear to be the most natural.  If so, we 
could use them to define less natural higher order properties.   
If higher order naturalness can be grounded in first order naturalness, then even if 
there are insufficient reasons to posit the distinction beyond its use in similarity 
comparisons, it might still be a justified move since it would not require any additional 
metaphysical machinery.  There are additional considerations in favor of supporting such 
                                                          
162
 Another method might be to group together higher order and first order properties based on their degree 
of naturalness. This might be more difficult given that imperfectly natural natural properties are not as well 
explained, as discussed in Chapter 1.  
163
 Some respects of similarity among these fundamental properties, like ‘being of concern to philosophers’ 
are less important than others, like those that ground the fundamentality of these properties.  This could 
also correspond to the fact that some higher order properties are less natural than others. Certain similarity 
comparisons seem to be tied to the naturalness of the properties in question as well.  For example, given 
that the distribution of fundamental properties determines things like laws and causation, two natural 
properties might be similar in terms of the roles that they play in establishing these laws.  Presumably, 3 g 
mass plays a far different role than blueness, and a more similar role to 5 g mass.  This could be used to 
establish that natural properties are more similar to each other than to non-natural properties, and these 
roles can be expressed in terms of higher order properties as well.  
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a distinction as well.  For example, Maya Eddon provides a strong argument for higher 
order perfectly natural relations, based in part upon issues stemming from the structure of 
quantitative properties and the need to make useful similarity comparisons between 
them.164  Although she ultimately argues that including this distinction conflicts with the 
possibility of a minimal supervenience base, her considerations open up potential avenues 
of support for the distinction under consideration here, and provide further reasons why 
certain higher order properties might be taken to be privileged over others, grounding the 
claim that the distinction is based on more than just usefulness.165  
So far, there are preliminary reasons for accepting a distinction of this type.  
Assuming that these reasons can be strengthened, we can support perfectly natural higher 
order properties, which will provide an explanation for why certain higher order 
properties are more or less useful than others.  In addition, this method fits with the above 
considerations regarding comparisons between properties in terms of similarity between 
sets.  It is likely that none of the options considered there represent anything like higher 
                                                          
164
 Eddon argues that the fact that some first order quantitative properties are more similar to each other 
than to others calls out for explanation, and one explanation is that some higher order properties are better 
suited than others to establish similarity; e.g., and object a, having .001 grams mass, is more similar to an 
object b, having .002 grams mass than it is to an object c, having 5000 metric tons of mass.   Many metrics 
can be used to make these similarity comparisons, and unless certain higher order properties and relations 
are privileged in some way, there is no way to account for this.  See Eddon (“Fundamental Properties of 
Fundamental Properties,” 16). 
165
 As mentioned above, another option might be that higher order naturalness could be based off of first 
order naturalness is such a way that there is no corollary to perfect naturalness, but still the chance to 
support and distinguish more and less natural higher order properties based on their connection to first 
order perfectly natural properties.  This explanation has the added benefit of providing and explanation for 
why and how the most perfect higher order natural properties fail to have other important features that first 
order perfect naturalness does – e.g., why it cannot form a minimal supervenience base.  In fact, it may 
seem as if higher order perfect naturalness will have to be far weaker than first order perfect naturalness, 
given the fact that higher order properties play a minimal role in establishing anything like fundamentality.  
Even though a distinction is needed that goes beyond just what is useful, it might not be possible to get all 
the way to a consideration of something like perfect naturalness among higher order properties. The idea is 
that even if we cannot get perfect naturalness in a robust sense among higher order properties, the most 
natural higher order properties can be distinguished based on their connection to first order perfectly natural 
properties.   
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order perfect naturalness, even though they may correspond to lesser degrees of 
naturalness.  This view can also explain why it is more obvious that two properties are 
similar given that they are fundamental properties than that two properties are similar in 
that they are properties instantiated by more than seventeen individuals.166    
Without a notion like this, there are seemingly problematic cases of similarity 
between properties, given that similarity between two properties is established by 
properties sharing higher order properties, and sometimes these higher order properties 
fail to correspond to any useful respect of similarity.  For example, the property of 
blueness and the property of greenness share the higher order property being instantiated 
by blue or green things.  With a notion like the current proposal in play, we can explain 
this as well, given that being instantiated by blue or green things does not appear to be a 
good candidate for a perfectly natural higher order property.    
A question remains regarding how well a notion like higher order perfect 
naturalness can fit within our overall project of supporting property counterpart theory.  
Given that certain details (e.g., inconstancy, and whether or not properties can be world-
bound) have been left open so far, these remarks are preliminary.  However, it appears so 
far that such a notion could work well in establishing a property counterpart relation.   
3.4 Context and Inconstancy among Properties 
 
The standard counterpart relation is a similarity relation, which allows the theory to 
accommodate the inconstancy of de re modality.  Similarity relations in general depend 
                                                          
166 With regard to a specific property, like redness, it might be that higher order properties like being 
instantiated in conditions where 650nm wavelengths of light are reflected are more natural than properties 
like being instantiated by ripe tomatoes and canaries.  It seems plausible that the first property is more 
useful than the second in establishing similarity, and that it is directly tied to first order naturalness, 
whereas the second is not.   
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on context, even when making non-modal comparisons167, and so if the property 
counterpart relation is a relation of similarity, it must include a role for context.        
There are two related, but distinct questions to explore in this regard.  The first is 
a question of our modal discourse concerning properties, and whether or not it is 
inconstant.  Second, we can ask whether our proposed theory accurately reflects the 
inconstancy168.   
First, it is important to consider whether or not the inconstancy of de re modal 
statements about individuals has a corollary with respect to properties.  Does our modal 
discourse suggest that we are flexible in our discussion of the modal properties of 
properties? Do we sometimes focus on these aspects of properties, and other times those? 
Does our speech seem to make certain properties important in some contexts, and others 
in different contexts?  For example, it seems possible that yellowness could’ve been 
instantiated by more things, but does this hold true without regard to context?  Or does 
this vary depending on which properties of yellowness are made salient?  
It seems plausible that just like claims about individuals, modal claims involving 
properties are inconstant.  For example, just as it might not be a context independent truth 
that a red object is more similar to an orange object that is to a blue object, it might not be 
a context independent fact that redness is always more similar to orangeness than it is to 
blueness.  Sometimes we might have other features of these colors in mind that make 
                                                          
167
 See, for example, Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” and Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds,: 
255.  Goodman ultimately rejects that there is any genuine notion of similarity.  The above comparison of 
Earth and Venus is an example of a contextually shifting similarity relation between two individuals in the 
same world.  With respect to properties, we could note the way that properties like ‘3 grams mass’ and 
‘green quark color’ are similar in that they are fundamental properties, but that these properties are 
dissimilar in that only one is a mass property.   
168
 With respect to individuals, Lewis outlines ways that several views can accommodate inconstancy.  He 
argues that one view, modal realism with overlap, cannot.    
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different comparisons relevant.  For example, redness and blueness are more similar in 
the sense that they are primary colors and therefore cannot be mixed or formed by some 
other combination of colors, unlike orange.  Two shades of blue might be less similar in 
terms of hue, or chroma, or saturation, than a particular shade of blue and a particular 
shade or red, etc.  Context selects which aspects of similarity are relevant.   
Above, I suggested that the aspects of similarity used in comparisons between 
individuals could be properties, such that different properties are relevant to different 
similarity comparisons.  If this explanation holds, then applying it to comparisons 
between properties would mean that context selects which properties of properties are 
relevant.  In other words, different higher order properties are made salient in different 
contexts.169 
 
3.4.1 Additional Concerns  
 
There seem to be additional sources of inconstancy with respect to similarity 
comparisons among properties.  Since properties correspond to all sets of possibilia and 
are therefore incredibly abundant, it seems that there are cases in which our language will 
not pick out a specific property, but will be somewhat indeterminate between a range of 
potential properties.   For example, it is difficult to imagine that we can distinguish 
between a property of blueness that includes all instantiations in all possible worlds, from 
a property associated with blueness that includes all but one of these infinite 
                                                          
169
 This is only an attempt to provide a further explanation of how contextual selection might function, in 
line with the current background assumptions.  There may be other potential explanations for how this 
takes place, but this is not explored here.  The view proposed at the end of this chapter includes the idea 
that inconstancy applies to discourse about properties, and that this is reflected by a context-sensitive 
similarity relation, but as long as this notion is accommodated, it is not necessary to rely on any particular 
method of accounting for contextual selection.    
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instantiations of blue, other than by stipulation.  Of course, discussing the de re modal 
properties of a property means looking at the modal properties of particular properties.170  
However, this imprecision with respect to property terms carries over to our discussion of 
de re modal properties, given that not only will different contexts make different higher 
order properties relevant, but the same term in different contexts can select entirely 
different properties. 171  Therefore, we must be cautious when evaluating claims involving 
property terms to ensure that our intuitions are meant to reflect the relevant property.  I 
will return to this consideration briefly below, in responding to concerns affecting the 
current understanding of properties.      
Returning to the example of blueness, we can note that it is possible to refer to 
any number of properties—to a particular set of blue things corresponding to a particular 
shade of blue a specific wavelength of light, to objects in worlds like ours or as viewed 
by beings like us, or to a general property meant to encompasses the blue things from all 
possible worlds.  Here, it is not just that we are focusing on some aspects of a particular 
                                                          
170
 See the discussion of the de dicto/de re distinction in Chapter 1.   
171
 Although the situation appears to be far better in the case of individuals, there are issues there as well.  
For example, consider “The Problem of the Many,” here discussed by Lewis: “Think of a cloud—just one 
cloud, and around it a clear blue sky. Seen from the ground, the cloud may seem to have a sharp boundary. 
Not so. The cloud is a swarm of water droplets. At the outskirts of the cloud, the density of the droplets 
falls off. Eventually they are so few and far between that we may hesitate to say that the outlying droplets 
are still part of the cloud at all; perhaps we might better say only that they are near the cloud. But the 
transition is gradual. Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be the boundary of the cloud. Therefore 
many aggregates of droplets, some more inclusive and some less inclusive (and some inclusive in different 
ways than others), are equally good candidates to be the cloud. Since they have equal claim, how can we 
say that the cloud is one of these aggregates rather than another? But if all of them count as clouds, then we 
have many clouds rather than one. And if none of them count, each one being ruled out because of the 
competition from the others, then we have no cloud. How is it, then, that we have just one cloud? And yet 
we do (Lewis “Many, but almost one,” 164).” There are other potential issues in distinguishing individuals 
from one another as well; e.g., issues of identity over time.  These issues might affect the ease with which 
we refer to any particular individual.  Therefore, this is not an issue unique to properties.  
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property as relevant, but are instead selecting a different set of individuals altogether, and 
therefore, a different property altogether.172  
These complications seem to be exaggerated in the case of properties, perhaps 
because of the sheer abundance of properties, but inconstancy is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon for properties and individuals alike.  It seems that there is inconstancy based 
on picking out different properties in different contexts as well as in picking out distinct 
possibilities for the same property.  
 
3.4.2 Inconstancy and Perfectly Natural Properties 
 
Whether this inconstancy applies to perfectly natural properties is a further 
question.  For example, it appears to be a fixed and constant matter which properties are 
fundamental.  Does this mean that a fundamental property cannot possibly have been 
otherwise, such that fundamental properties essentially fundamental? Does it make sense 
to say that a natural property might not have been a natural property? And in addition, 
does the degree of naturalness vary with context?   
Because perfect naturalness does not vary from world to world,173 this might seem 
to eliminate any role for inconstancy.  However, as with non-perfectly natural properties, 
it appears that our intuitions with respect to what is possible for fundamental properties is 
inconstant.  Whether or not some property is necessarily perfectly natural might depend 
                                                          
172
 Sometimes, it might not be clear which particular property is meant, especially since two properties, 
perhaps with infinite members, can differ by a single instantiation.  This might yield distinct properties that 
our language is not precise enough to differentiate.  Presumably, we can stipulate that a particular property 
is meant, or accept that there will be some property corresponding to that claim, even we cannot precisely 
specify which one.  Similar concerns will crop up below in consideration of world-boundness applied to 
properties as well, since ‘blueness’ seems to refer to a set of world-bound instantiations in some contexts, 
and a set of instantiations from multiple worlds in others, which suggests that both notions must be 
included in one’s theory.  This will be explored below. 
173 See Lewis, e.g., On the Plurality of Worlds, 60. 
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upon context.  For example, if a context is selected that focuses on particular aspects of 
that property that are relevant to naturalness, (e.g., being joint carving) then we might say 
that there is no way that it could have been a non-natural property.  But if we focus on the 
fact that it is instantiated by some particular number of things, we might say it could have 
been non-natural given that there are non-natural properties with 897 members that are its 
counterparts. 174  Inconstancy would provide an explanation for these otherwise 
inconsistent claims.175  It seems that the current view can accommodate the inconstancy 
of de re modality, by modeling what takes place with individuals.   
 
3.5 World-bound Properties 
 
So far, it has been possible to model the elements of property counterpart theory 
directly on those for standard counterpart theory for individuals.  The next element to 
consider is the world-bound condition.  Standard counterpart theory holds that individuals 
exist in only one world, and are represented at others by counterparts.  The idea that 
individuals might be world-bound has long been considered to be a worthy option.176  In 
                                                          
174
 Given that our de re modal discourse tends to be a vague and inconstant matter in general, inconstancy 
among natural properties might be expected.  However, this is tied into issues not considered here, for e.g., 
quidditism, and the details about the essential properties of properties.  This need not be settled here, but it 
is a benefit that the property counterpart view arrived at here will be able to accommodate either intuition.    
175
 Imperfect naturalness also appears to be inconstant.  While it is important to ensure that naturalness is 
not merely equated with usefulness, the point is that considerations of naturalness might be made within a 
context, such that in some cases, degrees of naturalness correspond to these features of properties, and in 
others, to those features.  For example, in some circumstances, blueness would be more natural than 
roundness, and in others, less natural, depending on what is relevant. 
 
176 The idea of individuals being bound to a particular world is often thought to have its roots in Leibniz’s 
philosophy, for example Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). E.g., Elisabeta Sarca quotes Leibniz as follows:  
“I have said that all human events can be deduced not simply by assuming the creation of a vague 
Adam, but by assuming the creation of an Adam determined with respect to all these 
circumstances, chosen from among an infinity of possible Adams. […] [B]ut when speaking of 
several Adams, I was not taking Adam as a determinate individual. […] [W]hen one calls Adam 
the person to whom these predicates are attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the 
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contrast, properties (and especially universals) are usually conceived of as transworld 
entities, and taking properties to be world-bound is somewhat unfamiliar.177  This is due 
in part to their use as the markers of similarity both in general and across worlds, which 
seems to require properties to be identical from world to world. 
Despite the tradition to consider properties as transworld entities, several 
philosophers have found reason to put forth or discuss world-bound property counterpart 
views.178  Derek Ball suggests that a property counterpart view that relies on world-bound 
properties can overcome certain metaphysical puzzles, especially with respect to 
arguments against physicalism.   Mark Heller’s property counterpart theory also includes 
the claim that properties are world-bound.  Heller’s view is based on an ersatz 
understanding of possible worlds, and property counterpart theory is suggested as a way 
to overcome various objections to that view.  Although his property counterpart views is 
not considered from within a modal realist background, on his view, properties are 
equivalent to world-bound entities.179    
                                                          
individual, for there can be an infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different 
from one another, whom this fits.”   
Sarca continues: “This description is very similar to David Lewis’ notion of an individual’s counterparts in 
other possible worlds. (Sarca, “Leibniz and Kripke on Trans-World Identity,” 75).”  However, see Cover 
and Hawthorne, “Leibniz on Superessentialism,” for an argument in opposition to this view.   
177 In Ramseyan Humility, Lewis outlines a potential world-bound property counterpart theory, and 
concludes that there are few reasons to support such a view it other than to uphold identity of structurally 
indiscernible worlds, (where structurally indiscernible means that the worlds differ just by permutation or 
replacement of properties); or to reject humility, which he thinks unnecessary.  In the same article, Lewis 
notes that just as we find it unproblematic to think of properties as being located in different spatiotemporal 
locations, it is unproblematic to think of properties as being located in different possible worlds. See Lewis 
“Ramseyan Humility,” 210-211. 
178 See, for example, Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” Ehring, “Property Counterparts,” 
and Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” “Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist,” For 
additional discussion, see: Dorr, “Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” Egan, Egan “Second-order 
Predication,” Guigon “The Metaphysics of Resemblance,” Coextension and Identity,”, “Quidditism and the 
Resemblance of Properties.” 
179
 Although his is not an example of a property counterpart view, it is worth mentioning that Sider’s 
temporal counterpart theory includes ‘instantaneous’ temporal parts, which appear to be analogous to 
world-bound parts: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at an instant t =df (i) x exists at, but only at, t, 
(ii) x is part of y at t; and (iii) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t.  (Four Dimensionalism, 60). 
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In addition, there seem to be instances in which transworld properties are 
insufficient for our purposes, suggesting the need for a world-bound notion.  Although 
there are several issues facing a world-bound property counterpart theory given the 
parameters defined so far, I will suggest that with a few modifications yield an intuitively 
promising view, based on inclusion of transworld as well as world-bound properties.  
This is a departure from a view that directly mirrors standard counterpart theory, but I 
think it is the most reasonable way to compromise while maintaining other attractive 
assumptions.     
 
3.5.1 Background Assumptions 
 
Before discussing world-bound properties and their potential to fit within the 
property counterpart view being developed, I would like to briefly review some of the 
assumptions underlying the view thus far.  I am assuming that properties are sets of 
possibilia, and that they are abundant.  Similarity among individuals and among 
properties has been explained in terms of property sharing, and I have suggested that the 
primitive distinction between natural and non-natural properties could be extended in 
order to include higher order properties.  Additional assumptions are that de re modality 
is inconstant, and that this extends to include our discourse involving properties as well.  
I find each of these assumptions to be independently plausible, and since I am attempting 
to extend Lewisian counterpart theory in particular, I have tried to maintain the 
assumptions that fit with this view.  However, any of these assumptions might be rejected 
in favor of other views.  For example, as suggested above, we could instead employ a 
different notion of properties.  This would yield a property counterpart theory distinct 
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from what I sketch here.  Nevertheless, the property counterpart view ultimately 
supported within this chapter stems from these assumptions, and is taken to be 
compatible with all of these.   
 
3.5.1.2 Goals  
 
Given these assumptions, my goal is to formulate a property counterpart theory 
that makes intuitive sense and can also accommodate several additional intuitions that I 
take to be important, while avoiding some issues effecting the assumptions undertaken 
here.  These issues stem from the attempt to restrict properties to world-bound entities, 
which I will ultimately reject.  First, with respect to the assumption that properties are 
sets of individuals, a new version of an old worry about co-extensive properties arises.  
Second, intuitions like that Humphrey’s counterpart wins in w2 seem to require one and 
the same property being shared across worlds, and these intuitions need to be 
accommodated.  Third, the claim that properties are world-bound interferes with the 
current proposal for similarity.  In addition, I will argue that intuitive examples of 
properties are ruled out by this restriction, and that therefore, properties are not abundant.  
Because of this, I will argue that properties cannot be taken to be only world-bound 
entities. 
In response, I will outline a property counterpart view that avoids these problems 
while still accommodating the desired assumptions.  First, it will be necessary to layout 
specific details regarding what is meant by ‘world-bound’ as it applies to properties.   
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3.5.2 Defining World-bound Properties 
 
According to Heller’s property counterpart theory, other possible worlds are 
Ramsey sentences describing all the possible distributions of properties, and being 
‘world-bound’ means that no property is represented by more than one world.180  
Considering views like Heller’s property counterpart theory, it is clear that what is meant 
by world-bound will depend upon one’s background metaphysics and understanding of 
properties, and it is challenging to provide a neutral definition.181  Some philosophers 
have opted to rely directly upon the definition of world-bound as applied to individuals.  
For example, Ball describes world-bound properties by stating that: “redness, for 
example, exists only at this world, and is represented by counterparts at other worlds.”182  
Similarly, Lewis notes that for a property to be world-bound would mean that no property 
is ever instantiated in two different worlds.183  
 Although these definitions stem directly from definitions of world-bound 
individuals, without further detail, it is not clear how to apply them to a property 
counterpart theory.  Obviously, properties and individuals are distinct types of entities, 
and this affects the plausibility of relying on a direct analogy to world bound individuals.   
While it is clear what it means for some particular individual to exist at some world, it is 
less clear what it means for some particular property (rather than, some instantiation(s) of 
a property) to exist at a world.  So far, I have relied upon Lewis’s framework, according 
                                                          
180 This is a technique used to replace the theoretical terms of one’s theory with variables.  See Ramsey, 
“Theories;” Carnap , “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts;” Lewis “How to Define 
Theoretical Terms,” and “Ramseyan Humility;” and Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”  
181Douglas Ehring also discusses the possibility of rejecting transworld trope identity in his counterpart 
theory for natural class tropes.  There, he rejects modal realism and instead considers this view given a 
combinatorial modal background as well as an ersatzist approach like Heller’s. See Ehring, “Property 
Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism.”     
182 Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 8. 
183“Ramseyan Humility,” 211. 
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to which properties are sets of possibilia, and so a world-bound understanding of 
properties will be a world-bound understanding of these sets.  However, it is not clear 
that definitions of ‘world-bound’ for individuals can be applied to sets in any 
straightforward way.  One could question whether these sets exist in worlds, as parts of 
worlds, or whether distinctions like these fail to apply to sets.  
 
3.5.3 Properties as Sets 
 
Consider the property being yellow.  So far, we have taken this to be the set of all 
possible and actual yellow objects from this and every other possible world.  This set of 
objects is not part of any single world, and does not vary from world to world, since 
which things are in this set does not depend upon which world is being considered.  
Different worlds will contribute different members of the set, but the property of 
yellowness is the entire set of yellow objects from all worlds.  Therefore, to say that 
yellowness, exists “only at this world” seems to be contradictory.   Lewis explicitly 
denies that sets (and properties) are parts of worlds, in his postscript to Counterpart 
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic:  
“Finally, there are the non-individuals: the sets.  Provisionally, my 
ontology consists of iterative set theory with individuals; the only 
unorthodox part is my view about what individuals there are.  I take it 
that the part-whole relation applies to individuals, not sets.  Then no set 
is in any world in the sense of being a part of it.  Numbers, properties, 
propositions, events---all these are sets, and not in any world.  Numbers 
et al. are no more located in logical space than they are in ordinary time 
and space.  Even a sequence of possible individuals all from the same 
world is not, strictly speaking, itself in that world.” (Philosophical 
Papers: Volume I, 40, emphasis added). 
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That is to say that no set (and therefore, no property) is part of any world; and no set is in 
any world. 184  These ‘non-individuals’ must be handled in a way that is distinct from the 
treatment of individuals, and therefore, it seems that notions like ‘world-bound’ must be 
modified in order to apply to properties.  Definitions like these do not seem suitable for 
properties as sets, and it might be that in general, properties so understood do not fit well 
with such a distinction.185.  However, I will suggest one option that I take to be plausible. 
 
3.5.3.1 World-bound Properties as Sets  
 
Even though a property (as a set of possibilia) has the same members regardless 
of what world is being considered, perhaps world-bound properties can be captured by 
considering the ways that worlds can differ with respect to how and what they contribute 
to a property.  There are many ways distinct worlds can differ in what they contribute to a 
property; some may add many members, others, none at all; the overall portion of objects 
in that world that are members of a set will vary; there can be different types of 
individuals selected, and different proportions of world-members contributed to a set.     
                                                          
184 Note that Lewis explicitly sets aside universals: “I’m not sure what to say about universals, as advocated 
in D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, except for this: they are not to be confused with the 
sets of individuals that I call properties. If there are universals, they differ in many ways from properties 
and they meet completely different theoretical needs (Philosophical Papers: Volume I, 40 n.).”  Because 
perfectly natural properties correspond to universals in some ways, this might suggest that they require a 
different treatment as well.  However, recall that in On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis suggests that this is a 
distinction between things of the same type, such that there are only sets of possibilia, and then a primitive 
distinction among them such that some are fundamental and others are not.  This would suggest that all 
properties, whether abundant or fundamental, are sets.  That is the assumption here, however, given the 
property counterpart theory suggested at the end, there are additional resources and therefore, they might be 
able to be accommodated even if other proposals are adopted.  In addition, the considerations below appear 
to rule out a clean division between world-bound and transworld properties on the basis of the distinction 
between natural and non-natural properties.       
185  Ball appears to be relying on a Lewisian notion of properties: “So far, we have generally taken for 
granted Lewis's class nominalism, according to which properties are classes of actual (and, on Lewis's 
version, possible) entities. (“Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 14).”  However, he also discusses 
Lewis’s suggestion that there can be different properties suited for different roles, and so that response 
might apply here as well.  (See section 3.4 below and On the Plurality of Worlds, 55). 
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 If we focus on the aspects of properties that vary from world to world, these 
features can provide a sense of ‘world-bound’ for properties as sets, as these facts are a 
function of which particular world is being considered, and are more or less equivalent to 
the ‘world-bound parts’ of the whole set.  For example, call ‘yellowness@’ the world-
bound property of being yellow at the actual world, and ‘yellownessw2’ the equivalent 
world-bound property at another world, w2.  Yellowness@ is instantiated by lemons, 
canaries and daffodils, and yellownessw2 by pigs, clouds and pomegranates.  If we can 
establish that these two world-bound properties are counterparts, then we could then say 
that e.g., yellowness@ could have been instantiated by pigs, since that is a property that 
its counterpart has (in other words, yellowness@ could have had different properties than 
it actually has).186  This is in line with the above considerations regarding similarity, and 
so it seems that this method could support a similarity-based world-bound property 
counterpart theory, and one that relies on a notion of properties as sets.   
3.5.4 Evaluating this Proposal  
 
Unfortunately, there are a few issues with this proposal, including a problem 
based specifically on the assumption that properties can be sets of possibilia.   
3.5.4.1 Coextensive Properties 
 
As noted in chapter one, a traditional issue raised against the understanding of 
properties as sets of actual individuals is that co-extensive sets of objects are identical 
properties, and this sometimes yields counter-intuitive results.  For example, the property 
                                                          
186 While we are typically interested in the modal properties of the transworld property of yellowness, and 
not yellowness@, this is one straightforward example of how to use these worldbound counterparts within 
property counterpart theory.  Below, I discuss ways that property counterpart theory can accommodate 
transworld properties as well.   
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of having a heart is the set of all things that have a heart.187  But all creatures with hearts 
(or ‘cordates’) in the actual world, are also creatures with kidneys (or ‘renates’).  
Therefore, the property of being a cordate has the same members as the property of being 
a renate.  Since the same set of objects makes up ‘each’ of these properties, they are 
identical on this view, even though they seem to be distinct properties. 
 Lewis avoids this issue by including otherworldly objects in his sets—since not 
every possible cordate is also a renate, these sets have some distinct members, and 
therefore are distinct properties188.  However, with world-bound sets of properties, it 
seems that the co-extension problem returns, given that all ‘cordate@’s will be ‘renate@’s 
as well.  There are some suggestions as to how to resolve the issue, including the property 
counterpart view discussed below.189  Although this problem can be avoided by denying 
that properties are sets, other issues seem to plague world-bound notions of properties 
more generally.190  
3.5.4.2 Intuitive Concerns 
 
There are cases in which the notion that properties might be world-bound is at 
odds with our intuitions about modal claims involving properties.  Although a property 
                                                          
187
 This example of the co-extension problem comes from a case discussed by e.g., Quine, “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism,” and Philosophy of Logic.  
188 There are instances in which two seemingly distinct properties have the same extension in all worlds; 
e.g., triangularity and trilaterality.  Lewis proposes that even if this view of properties cannot overcome this 
issue, there might be another notion that does.  He gives some reasons why it would be acceptable to rely 
on different notions of properties for different purposes.  (See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 55, also 
discussed below).  Also, the property counterpart theory presented in this chapter provides additional 
flexibility that might be able to accommodate this issue, but this is not explored further here.   
189 Other responses, include a property counterpart theory for ersatz worlds, as discussed by Heller (e.g., 
“Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”).  See also Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 9; 
as well as Ehring (“Property Counterparts”) and Guigon (“The Metaphysics of Resemblance,” 
“Coextension and Identity.”).   
190 Although these problems could be avoided by alternative views of properties, this is an attractive 
account, especially if one is working from within a Lewisian ontology that includes possibilia and sets.  
Fortunately, both of these issues can be explained by relying upon a property counterpart view like the 
theory ultimately suggested at the end of this chapter 
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counterpart relation provides additional resources for accommodating these intuitions, we 
are still left with some unfavorable results if properties are taken to be world-bound 
entities.  Consider again the property of yellowness, which we might have thought was a 
transworld property, spread across worlds such that the yellow things in the actual world 
share this same property with the yellow things in other worlds.191  Instead, this is to be a 
world-bound property not shared among individuals in distinct worlds.    
In many contexts, world-bound sets seem to be sufficient to represent yellowness.  
Consider the claim yellowness might have been instantiated by more things.  If we mean 
a property like actual world bound yellowness, world-bound sets are sufficient to 
determine the truth of the claim.  However, if instead we mean a more general property 
that includes everything that is yellow from all possible worlds, then this claim depends 
upon the transworld property corresponding to the entire set of yellow objects from all 
possible worlds. 192   
                                                          
191
 Note that calling this property ‘transworld’ is not entirely accurate.  Typically, transworld objects can 
exist in multiple worlds, and are identical across worlds.  Taking properties to be sets of possibilia 
complicates this explanation, as discussed above.  It is more accurate to say that a property has parts (or 
instantiations) in different worlds.  For example, see Lewis: “A property [. . .] is spread around. The 
property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey, in this or any other world.  Far 
from the property being part of the donkey, it is closer to the truth to say that the donkey is part of the 
property. But the precise truth, rather, is that the donkey is a member of the property (Papers in 
Metaphysics and Epistemology, 10 – 11).”  In this discussion, ‘transworld’ can be taken to mean 
‘instantiated in more than one world.’  Alternatively, given that properties are understood in terms of sets of 
possibilia, ‘having members in more than one world’ also establishes this notion.   
192 A property counterpart theory could provide a translation of this claim, such that some world-bound 
yellowness has a counterpart property that has more members, but it is not clear that this is sufficient to 
distinguish between these properties.  The world-bound and transworld notion appear to be distinct, as can 
be seen by the fact that the first seems to be true, while the second comes out false, given the current view 
of properties as sets.  Even if property counterpart theory can provide a paraphrase, there are less resources 
than are needed to distinguish between these claims.  The objection is that there are two distinct properties, 
(as can be seen by the fact that substituting one for the other makes the sentence change its truth value), and 
world-bound counterpart theory can only accommodate one of them.  Not that there is an objection to the 
view that properties are sets based on the fact that claims like this one come out false.  This will be 
discussed briefly at the end.        
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There seem to be many different properties that we can refer to by ‘yellow’, and 
world-bound properties can account for some but not all of them.193  Other examples, like 
yellowness-in-this-and-all-nearby-worlds, or positive-charge-in-worlds-with-the-same-
laws-of-nature will be ruled out as well.  Although there are transworld sets 
corresponding to these entities, they are not properties and will not figure into our de re 
modal claims. 
There are other claims that rely on transworld properties as well.  For example, 
‘alien properties’ are fundamental properties that are not instantiated in the actual 
world.194  Like all properties, on the current view, alien properties must be world-bound.  
However, on this view, every fundamental property that is instantiated in a world other 
than this one will be alien.  Intuitively, some, but not all otherworldly fundamental 
properties are alien properties, but this view does not distinguish alien fundamental 
properties from any of the other fundamental properties that have instantiations in other 
worlds.  It’s not clear what the best way to translate this into world-bound counterpart 
theory would be, but perhaps these could be taken to be fundamental properties that are 
not instantiated in the closest worlds, or by considering fundamental properties that are 
very dissimilar to the properties in the actual world, or perhaps fundamental properties in 
other possible worlds that do not have counterparts in the actual world.195  The question 
                                                          
193 Of course, not all property terms are equally vague, and even when they are vague, we can stipulate, or 
otherwise specify, that we mean to pick out a particular property.  The point here is that there are many 
properties, and sometimes our terminology is ambiguous. What is important for the current argument is that 
some properties correspond to world-bound sets, others to sets with members in multiple worlds.  As 
discussed above, this vagueness can be made clear by considered two properties, each with infinite number 
of members, such that they are identical except for one single member.  Other than by stipulation, it seems 
likely that our language is too coarse grained to distinguish between properties like these.  Nevertheless, we 
should in principle be able to account for them.    
194 See, for example, Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Section 3.2.   
195 Note that in order to compare ‘fundamental’ properties across worlds, it seems that this would need to 
have the same meaning across worlds, or be a transworld property.  Since it is a property of properties, 
perhaps this is acceptable even given a world-bound property counterpart theory.    
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of whether any of these options can provide a translation that captures the intuitive notion 
of alien property remains.  In addition, Lewis’s definitions of duplication, intrinsic 
properties, and closeness of worlds rely on transworld properties as well, and would 
require similar translations.196   
 
3.5.4.3 A ‘Humphrey’ Objection 
 
Along the same lines, we might question whether our intuitions are captured 
regarding the possibility that actual properties are instantiated in other worlds.  For any 
property instantiated in the actual world, there is no other world where that exact 
property is instantiated.  For example, the current view cannot allow for there to be 
anything in any other world that has the property being human.  This means that no 
otherworldly humans are possible, even though there are otherworldly beings who 
instantiate properties very similar to being human.   
This objection might sound familiar, as it is very similar to Kripke’s ‘Humphrey’ 
Objection to standard counterpart theory, discussed briefly in Chapter 1.  The above 
concerns seem to depend upon our intuitions about how properties should be understood, 
and the claim that world-bound properties fail to accommodate these intuitions.  
Similarly, Kripke objected that the understanding of “Humphrey possibly wins the 
election” provided by counterpart theory fails to capture our intuitions.  It seems that 
                                                          
196 “We can say that two things are duplicates if and only if (1) they have exactly the same perfectly natural 
properties, and (2) their parts can be put to correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have 
exactly the same natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations. (The class might be 
redundant). Then we can go on to say that intrinsic property is one that can never differ between two 
duplicates (On the Plurality of Worlds, 61).” See also 20-27.  Although these terms could perhaps be 
explained in terms of counterparts as well, it seems unintuitive to accept that, e.g., duplicates would no 
longer share the same properties, but only similar ones, and this might even conflate scenarios involving 
duplicates, rather than merely similar counterparts.   
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Kripke’s objection has been adequately answered, and to some extent, a similar response 
is available here.  For example, cases involving the ‘transworld’ properties considered 
above can be translated by property counterpart theory, and the property counterpart 
theorist can reply that this just is what it means for a property to be alien on this view.  
While I am not convinced that this is plausible, given that, e.g., it seems less than obvious 
that this can capture claims about, e.g., duplication as opposed to extreme similarity, 
there are additional concerns with respect to property counterpart theory in particular.     
The original objection included the claim that Humphrey might not care that 
someone similar to him has the property of winning, which was supposed to show that 
this could not be the correct analysis of the claim.  In response to the original objection, 
one could say that while it is true that Humphrey might not care about this, this fact can 
be adequately explained, e.g., given that Humphrey might care about something under 
one description, and yet not care about that same thing under another description.197  
However, given property counterpart theory, Humphrey would have cause for more 
serious concern.  Not only is it someone other than Humphrey who wins the election, in 
this case, his counterpart does not even win, but instead does something like winning.  It 
seems that possibly doing something like winning does not capture what is meant by 
‘possibly winning’ any more than actually doing something like winning captures what is 
meant by ‘winning.’  In this case, it seems to be more than just a paradox of analysis.  In 
general, if properties are world bound, and represent different things in different worlds, 
                                                          
197 See, for example, Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey Objection,” and Chapter 1 above.  
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then cross-world comparisons are less than straightforward, and there are reasons to think 
that they cannot capture our intuitions. 198 
 Another problem is that world-bound property counterpart theory seems to affect 
the plausibility of standard counterpart theory as well.  Standard counterpart theory relies 
upon transworld similarity comparisons, and without shared properties, it is difficult to 
make such comparisons. 199  The main issue with a world-bound understanding of 
properties so far is the seeming inability to account for transworld similarity relations, in 
particular, when they are understood in terms of transworld property sharing.    
Although this is an intuitive notion of similarity, it is not the only option.  For 
example, similarity could be taken to be a primitive unanalyzable notion.  As suggested 
above, there are some potential problems with this option e.g., the addition of another 
primitive notion among our ontological commitments, and concerns related to the ability 
for a primitive similarity relation to include contextual variation, and therefore, to reflect 
inconstancy.  A different option might be to adopt structural universals like Armstrong’s, 
according to which similarity can be reduced to sharing of parts.200  Although this is a 
plausible account, it would require accepting additional abstract entities and may be 
                                                          
198 This problem can be raised in respect to other claims as well.  For example, the meaning of ‘Humphrey 
is essentially human’ will no longer be analyzed in terms of whether or not all of Humphrey’s counterparts 
in the given context are human.  Instead, it will be based on whether or not all of his counterparts have 
properties that are similar to being human (perhaps, have the most similar property to ‘humanness’ in their 
worlds).  This highlights the depth of the concern.  It appears to be more than just an issue of complexity, 
given that there is a sense in which ‘essentially human’ is lost on this account.  
199 Notice that it is not only that Humphrey’s otherworldly counterpart does not instantiate the property of 
winning that is problematic.  In order to establish that Humphrey and his counterpart are counterparts, the 
current proposal is to find properties that they share.  However, two world-bound individuals from distinct 
worlds will never share properties.    There are a few ways to respond: 1) to reject this notion of similarity 
in favor of a notion not based on property sharing (see comments below), 2) to reject the idea that word-
bound individuals can have counterparts in other worlds (which would severely limit the usefulness of 
counterpart theory for individuals and would be at odds with our intuitions about modality), 3) to reject 
property counterpart theory, and/ or 4) to include a transworld notion.  I opt for the last of these 
suggestions.    
200 See Armstrong, Universals:. 
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rejected on other grounds as well.201  While this could lead to a rejection of the proposed 
view of similarity instead, there are other options available that can accommodate this 
view in combination with a counterpart theory for properties, as explored below.  
Therefore, it is not necessary to reject this notion of similarity.      
The goal of this section has been to explore the limits of a view based on a 
number of plausible assumptions.  So far, it seems that the least plausible component is a 
condition for world-boundness, and if that is rejected, all other elements can remain, 
including the proposed understanding of similarity.  To some extent, the strength of these 
objections depends upon the strength of the intuition that properties must be transworld 
entities.  The final objection considered depends less upon that intuition, and more upon 
the notion that properties are abundant.  
  
3.5.4.4 Abundance Lost  
 
A final issue that plagues the view that properties are world-bound is tied into 
many of the concerns discussed above.  It appears that a world-bound notion of properties 
eliminates some examples of (what appear to be) properties, and that it does so without 
sufficient justification.  Although a world-bound property counterpart theory has some 
resources to explain away the apparent need for the transworld properties, given the depth 
of the issue, the view becomes less intuitive and more unfavorable.  In contrast, the 
assumption that properties are abundant is highly plausible and well-supported, and 
therefore, it should be maintained if possible.   
                                                          
201 See Lewis “Against Structural Universals.”  See also, Armstrong “ In Defence of Structural Universals.” 
 93 
 
Given the background assumptions undertaken here, there are sets corresponding 
to every possible combination of individuals, and properties corresponding to these sets.  
However, if properties are world-bound, then sets of possibilia with instantiations from 
more than one world are ruled out, and there are far fewer properties than originally 
suggested.202  Restricting properties to only the world-bound appears to be an arbitrary 
decision, as there are no obvious ways to draw a line between some of these sets (the 
properties) and others that selects only the world-bound ones as genuine properties.   
First, modal realism and set theory have been assumed, and therefore, abundant 
properties come at no extra cost.  There is no benefit to getting rid of transworld 
properties in terms of reducing ontological commitment, since there will still be an 
uncountably infinite number of world-bound properties.  Therefore, this is no reason to 
rule out transworld properties.  In addition, as noted above, certain objections raised with 
respect to individuals do not apply to properties.203     
Instead, it might seem that one of the many distinctions between properties could 
underlie this division.  However, they do not seem to line up with transworld and world-
bound properties.  Relying on only sparse properties (or only abundant properties), for 
example, will not support the decision to rule out transworld properties.  The 
sparse/abundant distinction does not correspond to the distinction between transworld and 
world-bound properties, since there are both abundant properties and sparse properties 
that have instantiations in single worlds and others that are instantiated in multiple 
                                                          
202 An obvious response would be to rule out the view that properties are sets of possibilia.  However, the 
view put forth at the end of this can incorporate this assumption without succumbing to this problems 
discussed, and other views need to account for transworld properties as well.    
203 For example, the problem of accidental intrinsics is not an issue, given that transworld bilocation of 
properties is innocuous (“Ramseyan Humility,” 211). See also Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.  
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worlds.204  In addition, we might agree with Lewis that we have a role for both the 
abundant and the sparse properties, in which case, we have reason to reject this attempt 
even if it could provide a way to rule out transworld properties.205  It will not help to rely 
on the distinction between first order and higher order properties either, for similar 
reasons; there are first order and higher order properties with instantiations in single 
worlds and multiple worlds.206   
Transworld properties cannot be ruled out on grounds of spatiotemporal or causal 
disconnection, either, since that would also rule out certain plausible examples of world-
bound properties, e.g., properties with no such connections between each member seem 
possible.   
There are no other obvious distinctions which can support the rejection of 
transworld properties.  In addition, it seems that an argument parallel to the argument 
from vagueness could be raised here.  In this case, one could ask “under what conditions 
does a set of possibilia correspond to a property?”  As it stands, a response of, 
‘sometimes’ must be rejected given that there seem to be no reasons to draw the lines at 
any particular point.207  It looks like to the extent that any sets of possibilia correspond to 
                                                          
204 For example, a non-perfectly natural property like ‘being instantiated by a transworld sum’ is not a 
world-bound property, but other non-natural properties, like ‘being a world-bound fusion of a cat and a 
dog’ are world-bound.  Given that fundamental properties are meant to correspond to universals, it might 
seem like they are good candidates for strictly transworld properties, but there is no reason to rule out 
world-bound fundamental properties either.   
205 See Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility,” 
206 For example, ‘being an actual fundamental property’ is a world-bound higher order property, while 
‘being instantiated in more than three worlds’ is instantiated in multiple worlds.   
207 One distinction that seems to more favorably line up with world-bound properties is the contrast 
between dispositional and categorical properties.  Because they seem to be dependent upon the particular 
facts and laws of the world where they are instantiated, perhaps they could be taken to be examples of 
world-bound properties.  (E.g., the fact that a glass has the dispositional property of fragility may seem to 
be dependent upon the physical facts of the world).  Assuming that these physical facts and natural laws are 
not necessary, these properties would correspond to world-bound properties.  However, this will not ground 
the distinction between transworld and world-bound properties for a few reasons.  First, the status of 
dispositional properties is somewhat controversial.  For example, some have argued that dispositional 
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properties, they all do.  This argument leaves open the choice to reject the current 
suggestion to take properties as sets of possibilia, or to rule out the view that world-bound 
properties are by themselves sufficient for our purposes.  Given the concerns raised for 
exclusively world-bound properties, this appears to be the best option.  However, it is 
important to note that the suggestion that properties are abundant will require inclusion of 
both transworld and world-bound sets.  This leads to a hybrid property counterpart 
theory.           
 
3.5.5 Modified Property Counterpart Theory 
 
Although world-bound properties alone do not appear to be sufficient for our 
purposes, a property counterpart theory can be supported as long as it allows for 
transworld and world-bound properties.  However, I suggested above that the world-
bound condition is the most essential to any counterpart theory—the rejection of 
transworld identity seems to be what distinguishes the view, and provides for many of the 
intuitive features and benefits.  It seems that we would be rejecting a main tenet of 
counterpart theory by abandoning the condition that the entities in question be world-
bound.  Therefore, this proposal needs additional support.  Fortunately, a hybrid property 
counterpart theory can be supported in many ways, and is compatible with the plausible 
assumptions taken on in this chapter as well as the other important elements of 
counterpart theory.       
                                                          
properties are not genuine properties, but “somewhat phoney world-bound properties that depend on what 
the laws of nature happen to be (described by Ellis, Scientific Essentialism, 7).” Second, whether or not 
they are world-bound is controversial.  For example, Ellis rejects the above description in favor of the view 
that there are natural dispositional properties that are the same across all possible worlds (Ibid).  Finally, 
even if dispositional properties line up with world-bound, categorical properties do not.       
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 First, it is important to note that this view can accommodate both types of 
properties while maintaining that the counterpart relation is a similarity relation.  Relying 
on a similarity based counterpart relation to ground de re modal claims can easily 
accommodate the inconstancy of modal discourse.  In this regard, it is worth recalling 
what was said above with respect to the flexibility of our de re modal discourse about 
properties, which seems to be an incredibly fluid matter.208  Acknowledging and 
providing for this inconstancy is important, and this view can do so.     
In addition, similarity can reduced to property sharing given this view.  Even 
though some properties are world-bound, and others are transworld, similarity 
comparisons can still be made in terms of higher order property sharing, which is a 
benefit.  In addition, this has the benefit of providing the same semantics for properties as 
for individuals.209  
  In addition, this view can provide replies to the problems considered here.  First, 
since not all properties are taken to be world-bound entities, it is possible to make 
similarity comparisons between properties that have instantiations in more than one 
world.  This provides the resources to say that Humphrey’s counterpart wins in w2 given 
that ‘winning’ in this sense refers to a property instantiated in multiple worlds.210  
                                                          
208 For example, as mentioned above, two properties with infinite instantiations might differ by a single 
instantiation.  It is unlikely (beyond through stipulation) that our language has the resources to select one of 
these properties over the other.  Still, both properties need to be accommodated and can be by this view.  
209 See, e.g., Ball: “It would be inelegant and methodologically undesirable to give entirely different 
semantics for modal claims involving properties and those involving other individuals. (“Property Identities 
and Modal Arguments,” 8),”  and Dorr: “No matter what sort of thing we take propositions to be, if we 
accept counterpart theory for individuals we must also accept some form of counterpart theory for 
propositions, properties and relations (“Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” 213).”   
210 Of course, if we wanted to rely on a less specific sense of ‘Humphrey possibly winning’ that is based on 
Humphrey having a counterpart who has a world-bound property that is similar to the world-bound 
property of winning@, this view has the resources to do so as well.  This does not undermine the claim that 
we need transworld and world-bound properties.  Instead, it shows that this view can accommodate even 
more intuitions.  
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Similarly, some considerations of what is possible for properties rely on transworld 
entities; e.g., comparing what is possible for 3 grams mass in worlds like ours relies on a 
property that is (presumably) instantiated in multiple worlds.  However, in other cases, 
we want to refer to world-bound properties, and can do so.  (E.g., in discussing what is 
possible for the particular property of yellowness restricted to some particular this-
worldly daffodil).  This supports the decision to include both types of properties.    
In addition, this view can accommodate our concerns with respect to co-extensive 
properties.  As with Lewis’s reply to the original problem, transworld properties provide 
the resources to show that it is not necessarily true that being a cordate has the same 
instantiations as being a renate, and this issue dissolves.  Because the property 
counterpart relation can select different counterparts in different contexts, the objection 
can be dissolved.    
Another example, mentioned above, was Egan’s concern that properties, taken as 
transworld sets, must have their properties necessarily.211  The solution offered to this 
problem applies to a related issue, based on the inability of a set-based property view to 
account for the intuition that e.g., a property like yellowness could possibly have more 
instantiations.  In each case, we have properties that are made up of transworld sets of 
individuals, and we run into problems given that all possible worlds are considered.  
There is a way to reply to cases like these given the suggested hybrid property 
counterpart theory.     
One of Egan’s examples is the property ‘being the subject of extended 
philosophical debate,’ which is a property of certain fundamental properties like ‘3 grams 
                                                          
211 Egan, “Second-order Predication.”   
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mass.’212  Because this property is within the set of all properties (from all possible 
worlds) that are discussed extensively, it seems that it cannot have been other than it is.     
Given the resources of property counterpart theory, we have a few ways that we 
can respond.  First, note that depending on the context, we might mean to pick out a 
world-bound property, in which case, a similar property that is not the subject of 
extended philosophical debate will serve as a counterpart.  World-bound sets do not raise 
the issue that Egan is concerned about, and we can accommodate that possibility.   
However, it seems that we also need to be able to discuss the transworld property 
‘3 grams mass’.  Property counterpart theory has the resources to deal with this as well.  
Assume that, e.g., ‘3 grams mass’ is within the set of all properties that are the subject of 
extended philosophical debate.  There are also properties that are not discussed by 
philosophers at all, which we can call ‘boring properties.’  Within the set of boring 
properties are some determinate properties, like ‘3 portions schmass’.  Grams of mass 
and portions of schmass are both determinable properties that can be divided into 
determinates.  Because ‘3 grams mass’ shares the property of ‘being a determinate 
property’ with ‘3 portions schmass’ they are counterparts, and because ‘3 grams schmass’ 
is boring, ‘3 grams mass’ is possibly boring.   
The related problem can make use of a similar reply.  The issue is that claims like 
‘yellowness might have been instantiated by more things,” seem to be true, but come out 
false if a property like yellowness is taken to be the set of instantiations from all 
worlds.213  That’s because this sense of yellowness selects the set of all possible yellow 
                                                          
212 Ibid, 50. 
213 See Ball “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 16 for a related example, based on classes of 
tropes. 
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objects from all possible worlds, and so it includes every possible yellow thing.  Any 
possible thing that is yellow is therefore already in the set, and so nothing else could 
instantiate yellowness.214  The method described above could show how it is that 
yellowness could have been instantiated by more things without abandoning the notion of 
properties as sets, for example, by showing that ‘yellowness@’ has some property in 
common with another property, e.g., ‘yellownessw1’ that has more instantiations.  In this 
way, the hybrid view can overcome this problem while maintaining the claim that 
properties are sets of possibilia.  In addition, this view is compatible with the claim that 
properties are sets of individuals, and that they are abundant.    
It is worth mentioning that properties are, as Lewis says, ‘creatures of theory’: 
“To deserve the name of ‘property’ is to be suited to play the right theoretical role.”215  If 
the hybrid property counterpart view discussed here can do more, that is justification for 
accepting it.  I have argued that it can accommodate our intuitions on several matters and 
is compatible with plausible assumptions.  Therefore, it might be right for the role of 
accounting for de re modal properties of properties.   
  
                                                          
214 This version of property counterpart theory has an additional benefit as well.  It seems like there is a 
sense in which this claim should plausibly come out false.  Here, I mean the same sense in which it makes 
sense to say that ‘There could have been more possibilia” is false.  Given that everything that is possible is 
in this set, there is nothing remaining outside of this set that is possible.  In the same way, any possible 
yellow thing is already in the set of all possible yellow things.  Both intuitions can be understood here.   
215 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 55. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MASS-COUNTERPART THEORY AND DOUBLING POSSIBLITIES 
 
Although the topic of this final chapter is somewhat distinct from the previous 
considerations, the common element is counterpart theory, and the attempt to apply it 
beyond the standard case of individuals.  An interesting case in point is the use of a 
“mass-counterpart relation” to provide a response to certain modal puzzles about the 
modal properties of quantities.   
Consider some particular actual object; such as your computer.  It appears to be 
possible for it to have been twice as massive as it actually is. What’s more, we might 
think it is possible for each and every actual massive object at our world to have had 
twice the mass that it actually does.  The correct theory regarding the modal properties of 
mass and other quantities should be able to make sense of possibilities like these.  
However, the ability to account for these scenarios seems to depend on one’s views on 
the fundamental facts of quantities.  For example, it appears that “Comparativist” views 
about quantity cannot accommodate situations like the doubling possibilities mentioned 
above, while rival “Absolutist” views can.   
After providing background on the views and setting out this objection, I will 
defend it against a recent attempt to prove that the Comparativist can account for this 
case, put forth by Shamik Dasgupta.216  In order to accommodate certain possibilities, 
Dasgupta introduces a new “mass-counterpart” relation, analogous to the Lewisian 
counterpart relation.  However, his account of this relation is underspecified, and several 
attempts to supply the necessary details are unsuccessful.  In addition, the analogy drawn 
                                                          
216 Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity.” 
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between standard counterpart theory and mass-counterpart theory is less than 
straightforward. 
4.1 Background: Quantities, Comparativism, Absolutism 
 
A quantity can be thought of as a property or relation that comes in amounts, or 
degrees.217,218  Taking mass as an example, one can specify not only that a body has 
mass, but can also specify how much mass that body has.219   When comparing the mass 
of two objects, such as a cup that has 250 grams of mass, and a laptop that has 500 grams 
of mass, we could say that the laptop has 250 grams more mass than the cup, or that the 
laptop is twice as massive as the cup.  This roughly corresponds to two ways of 
understanding mass—the first is in terms of particular intrinsic mass properties, 
(Absolutism), and the second is in terms of relational facts about the mass of the objects 
(Comparativism).220  
Of course, we can consistently hold the view that an object with mass has a 
determinate intrinsic property independent of its relationships to other bodies, while also 
maintaining that bodies stand in various determinate mass relationships to each other.  
The distinction between Comparativism and Absolutism goes further, and comes 
from asking which of these views is more fundamental.  Another way to ask this question 
                                                          
217 See, for example Bigelow and Pargetter, “Quantities,” 287-288. See also Mundy, “The Metaphysics of 
Quantity.”.   
218 Several features distinguish quantities from other properties and relations.  Eddon, “Fundamental 
Properties of Fundamental Properties,” provides a thorough discussion of the distinctive features of 
quantities.  In addition, Bigelow and Pargetter (Ibid) highlight aspects of quantities that require explanation 
and a correct theory.  Armstrong (“Are Quantities Relations?,” 305) notes the importance in developing the 
correct theory of quantity for anyone who accepts scientific realism (305).  Finally, the correct theory of 
quantities is shown to be important in theories of measurement (Koslow, “Quantity and Quality”).     
219 Other examples of quantities includes things like length, charge, volume, and density. 
220 There is significant disagreement about the correct view.  For example, Bigelow and Pargetter (1988, 
1990) support a view that can be considered Comparativist, while Mundy (1987) and Armstrong (1988) 
support views that can be considered Absolutist.  
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is in virtue of what do bodies stand in determinate mass relationships?  The Absolutist 
thinks that particular intrinsic mass properties ground all other mass facts.  In contrast, 
the Comparativist thinks that fundamental facts about mass stem from the mass 
relationships between bodies, and that all other mass facts hold in virtue of these 
relationships.  So, Absolutists take absolute statements like “the laptop has 500 grams 
mass” to be the fundamental mass facts, while Comparativists take comparative 
statements like “the laptop is more massive than the cup” to be fundamental.   
Throughout this chapter, I am making several assumptions.  The modal arguments 
are presented within the framework of modal realism and make use of Lewis’s 
counterpart theory for individuals.  Accordingly, properties can be thought of as sets of 
possible individuals, and relations as sets of ordered n-tuples.  Within this discussion, I 
am assuming, with Dasgupta, that only objects can be counterparts of one another.221  I 
will now set out the objections to Comparativism.  
 
4.2 Modal Objections to Comparativism 
 
The modal objections to Comparativism are closely related. In each case, a seemingly 
plausible possibility is presented. It is then argued that the Comparativist cannot make 
sense of this possibility. Each modal objection can be understood as an instance of an 
argument of the following form: 
  
1) Φ and Ψ are distinct possibilities involving differences in the masses of objects.  
2) Absolutism can accommodate Φ and Ψ.  
3) Comparativism cannot accommodate Φ and Ψ.  
4) Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected.  
 
                                                          
221
 As will be seen later, this rules out a property counterpart theory, like that considered in the previous 
chapter, as a potential solution to the modal objections.  Dasgupta specifically rejects this view.  
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One way that the Comparativist can reject this argument is to deny premise one by 
arguing that there is no distinction between the possibilities discussed in each objection.  
I am not considering this move here.  However, note that the strength of such a response 
depends on how plausible it is to deny the possibilities in question, and in each case 
considered here, the possibilities are intuitively plausible.222  It seems possible that every 
actual object could have had double the mass that it actually does, and, at the very least, it 
seems possible that a single object could have had twice the mass that it actually does.  If 
such plausible possibilities cannot be accommodated, it is a strong mark against a theory.  
Dasgupta takes a different approach in rejecting the argument.  He seeks to deny the third 
premise, by finding a way for the Comparativist to make sense of the same possibilities 
that the Absolutist can.  By introducing a variation of David Lewis’s counterpart relation, 
a mass-counterpart relation, Dasgupta claims that the Comparativist will be able to make 
sense of the possibilities in question.  Unfortunately, the main attempts to understand this 
relation fail to provide adequate support for Comparativism.  Because of this, mass-
counterpart theory cannot be used to respond to the modal objections to Comparativism.  
After discussing these objections, I will return to Dasgupta’s response. 
 
4.2.1: The Possibility of Uniform Doubling 
 
The first modal objection begins by considering the possibility that everything in 
the actual world could have had double the mass that it actually has.223  It seems like this 
                                                          
222 Just how to determine whether something is possible is a thorny issue.  One popular method of checking 
whether a scenario is possible is having the ability to consistently imagine its taking place.   For example, 
its being conceivable that an object could have twice the mass that it currently has is good reason to think 
that this is a possibility.  For a thorough exploration of the potential to use conceivability as a guide for 
determining what is possible, see Gendler and Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility. 
223 Dasgupta cites arguments given in Hawthorne (“Quantity in Lewisian Metaphysics,”) and Eddon 
(“Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties”) as the source of this objection.  
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is a way that things could have been, and so the correct theory of mass should be able to 
accommodate this possibility.  The Absolutist can makes sense of this possibility, and can 
easily distinguish between the actual world, and a uniformly doubled possible world.224  
However, the Comparativist does not fare so well.  The relational facts between all of the 
objects at the actual world, and the relationships between all of the objects at the doubled 
world (W2) are the same.  If an object x is actually twice as massive as another object y, 
W2 will also represent x as being twice as massive as y.  The mass-relations will be the 
same either way, so the possibility of every object having double the mass it actually has 
cannot be represented by the Comparativist.   
The first modal objection can be presented in the following way: 
1) It is possible that everything has twice the mass that it actually has, and it is 
possible that everything has the same mass that it actually has. 
2) The Comparativist cannot distinguish between these possibilities.  
3) The Absolutist can distinguish between these possibilities.   
4)  Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected. 
After setting out the second modal objection, I will discuss the Comparativist response 
advocated by Dasgupta. 
 
4.2.2  The Possibility of a Single Object Doubling 
 
The second modal objection involves the possibility of a single object doubling in 
mass.  Dasgupta considers the possibility that his laptop could have been twice as 
massive as it actually is.   This seems intuitively possible, especially considering how 
massive laptops were in recent years.  It is difficult to imagine how one might rule out 
                                                          
224 For example, if an object (e.g., a cat) has a particular intrinsic mass value (e.g., 7 kg), then we can 
compare it to a counterpart in W2, who has 14 kg of mass.  This counterpart represents the cat as doubled, 
and this possibility can be distinguished from the scenario in which the intrinsic mass facts of her 
counterpart remain the same.  Likewise for the consideration of each actual object doubling in mass.  There 
will be a difference between the particular intrinsic mass of the object and its counterpart, such that they 
can be distinguished from one another, and doubling in mass is represented. 
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this possibility.225  However, the Comparativist encounters a problem similar to that of 
the first modal objection.  Consider two worlds, Wn and Wm.  In Wn, the laptop has 
double its actual mass and every other object’s mass remains the same as in the actual 
world.  In Wm, the laptop has the same mass that it actually has, and every other object 
has half its actual mass.  The mass-relationships between the objects at Wn will mirror 
those at Wm, and so the Comparativist cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.   
This second modal objection can be presented in the following way:  
1) It is possible that the laptop has twice the mass that it actually has, and it is 
possible that the laptop has the same mass that it actually has while every other 
object has half the mass that it actually has.  
2) The Comparativist cannot distinguish between these possibilities. 
3) The Absolutist can distinguish between these possibilities.  
4) Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected. 
 
The task of the Comparativist is to show how these arguments go wrong.  Having ruled 
out the denial of premise one by acknowledging that these are intuitively plausible 
scenarios, the Comparativist is left to attack two or three.  Premise three can be easily 
proven and so the Comparativist is left to deny premise two.226   
4.3 A Comparativist Response to the Modal Objections 
 
Recall that Dasgupta is assuming modal realism and counterpart theory.227,228  In 
addition, he introduces another tool, a “mass-counterpart” relation, which will allow for 
                                                          
225 Especially if conceivability is a guide to possibility, as mentioned above. 
226 For an example of how the Absolutist can accommodate possibilities like these, see note 201, above.   
227 Dasgupta mentions that nothing hangs on the choice of using the framework of modal realism, and 
suggests that modal operators could be used instead (“Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity,” 
115).  He does not discuss other ways to understand the argument in his paper, and I will not discuss other 
options here either.    
228 It should be noted that there is at least one way that the Comparativist could allow for the possibility in 
question; by allowing inter-world mass comparisons.  The Comparativist could then show how an object 
and its counterpart in W differ from each other in mass.  Dasgupta claims that the cost of making inter-
world comparisons is relatively high and so, he avoids responses that make use of inter-world mass 
comparisons (Ibid, 117).  
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relational comparisons between objects at different worlds.  Using the mass-counterpart 
relation is supposed to allow the Comparativist to make sense of the possibilities in 
question.   After setting out and applying the mass-counterpart relation, I will show that it 
cannot provide an adequate response to either of the modal objections.   
 
4.3.1: The Mass-Counterpart Relation: 
 
 
The mass-counterpart relation is added to standard Lewisian counterpart theory in 
order to provide a response to the modal objections.  It is similar to the usual counterpart 
relation in several ways.  First, recall that the counterpart relation is not an identity 
relation, but stands in for identity when determining how a world represents an object.  
Likewise, the mass-counterpart relation is not a mass-identity relation, but stands in for 
identity when determining what a world represents as the mass of an object.  Second, just 
as the counterpart of an actual object x at world W is the object that is most similar to x 
given a particular context of utterance, the mass-counterpart of an actual object x at W is 
the object that has the most similar mass role to x’s mass role, given a particular 
context.229 
                                                          
229As discussed above, context can determine which respects of similarity are salient.  To illustrate, Lewis 
considers some of the possible ways that Humphrey might be represented at different worlds; e.g., as an 
Angel, or even as a poached egg.   Finding Humphrey’s counterparts means asking which things are similar 
to Humphrey, and therefore can be his counterparts.  In response, Lewis explains that “you could do worse 
than plunge for the first answer to come into your head, and defend that strenuously.  If you did, your 
answer would be right.  For your answer itself would create a context, and the context would select a way 
of representing, and the way of representing would be such as to make your answer true (On the Plurality 
of Worlds, 251).”   
 107 
 
Although the details of what a mass role is need to be filled out, here is the basic 
idea.  A mass role is “the pattern of mass relationships entered into by an object,” and is 
what picks out different mass-counterpart relations (13).230   
To start to clarify the view, it will be helpful to discuss particular examples.  Dasgupta 
introduces this theory by considering the mass comparison between his laptop and his 
cup.  At the actual world, his laptop is twice as massive as his cup.  Being twice-as-
massive-as-the-cup is part of what constitutes the “mass role” of the laptop, and being 
half-as-massive-as-the-laptop is part of what constitutes the “mass role” of the cup.   
To make this picture clearer, consider a world W1, with just five objects.  One of these 
objects is a laptop (call it Laptop) and another is a cup (call it Cup).  The other objects at 
W1 are M, N, and O.  Here are the mass relationships that hold between Cup and the 
other objects at W1:  
Cup is half-as-massive-as Laptop. 
Cup is one-quarter-as-massive-as M 
Cup is twice-as-massive-as N 
Cup is equally-as-massive-as O 
Cup is equally-as-massive-as Cup 
 
To make the mass role of Cup more explicit, we can abbreviate these relationships as 
follows: 
½ (Cup, Laptop)       
¼ (Cup, M) 
2 (Cup, N) 
1(Cup, O) 
1(Cup, Cup) 
 
                                                          
230 It can be noted that relationships between an object’s mass and other quantities, such as force and 
charge, could be included in the consideration of the mass role.  Dasgupta is focusing only on mass for 
simplicity, and I will do so in this paper as well.  Although it is difficult to imagine how, perhaps it is 
possible that relations to other quantities could provide the Comparativist with additional resources to 
distinguish between the possibilities in question.  This is not explored here.    
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The mass role of Cup is made up of the relationships in mass between Cup and the other 
objects at a world.  We can understand the mass role of Cup as pattern of mass 
relationships entered into by the object that satisfies the following open sentence:  
   ½ (x, Laptop) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1(x, O) & 1(x, x).231 
Note that the mass relationships that O enters into are very similar to the mass 
relationships that Cup enters into:  
Cup’s Mass Role:     O’s Mass Role:  
 
½ (Cup, Laptop)          ½ (O, Laptop) 
¼ (Cup, M)     ¼ (O, M) 
2 (Cup, N)     2 (O, N) 
1(Cup, O)     1(O, Cup) 
1(Cup, Cup)     1(O, O) 
 
 
Or:  Cup: ½ (x, Laptop) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1(x, O) & 1(x, x). 
O: ½ (y, Laptop) & ¼ (y, M) & 2 (y, N) & 1(y, C) & 1(y, y). 
       
We see that Cup and O enter into the same pattern of mass-relationship to all the objects 
at W1, other than to Cup and O.  In addition, Cup is 1 time as massive as O, and O is 1 
time as massive as Cup.  According to Dasgupta, this means that Cup and O have the 
same mass role as one another at W1.  To capture this fact, he says, we can describe Cup 
and O as mass1-counterparts of one another.  Intuitively, this means that Cup and O have 
the same mass.232   
                                                          
231  One might think that the last conjunct, 1(x,x) is trivial, and so ought not to be included in the mass role 
of an object. It is included in the mass role, however, in part because Dasgupta makes use of this particular 
mass relationship in his discussion of the second modal objection, as well as in response to a further 
objection, not considered here.  More on this mass relationship below.     
232 I have assumed that objects in the same world can be counterparts of one another in this example, but 
nothing rides on this assumption.  It is presented in this way for clarity in exposition of the mass-
counterpart relation.  What is important is that a close match of the mass roles of two objects is what allows 
us to refer to them as mass-1-counterparts.  We can imagine the comparison being made between Cup’s 
mass role and that of an object P at another possible world.  (For discussion of this issue in standard 
counterpart theory, see Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 231.) 
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Next, notice the mass relationships that Laptop enters into at W1, compared to Cup:   
Laptop:     Cup: 
1(Laptop, Laptop)    ½ (Cup, Laptop)          
½ (Laptop, M)     ¼ (Cup, M)      
4 (Laptop, N)     2 (Cup, N)     
2(Laptop, O)      1(Cup, O)    
2(Laptop, Cup)    1(Cup, Cup)      
 
Or:  Laptop: 1 (z, z) & ½ (z, M) & 4 (z, N) & 2 (z, O) & 2 (z, C). 
Cup: ½ (x, L) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1 (x, O) & 1 (x, x). 
 
 
Note that the pattern of mass-relations that Laptop enters into is similar in a 
certain way to the pattern of mass-relations that Cup enters into.  Specifically, the mass-
relationships that Laptop enters into differ from the mass-relationships that Cup enters 
into by a factor of 2.  Laptop is half as massive as M, while Cup is one-fourth as massive 
as M; Laptop is 4 times as massive as N, while Cup is 2 times as massive as N, Laptop is 
twice as massive as O, while Cup is equally as massive as O.   
In addition, Cup is one time as massive as Cup and Laptop is two times as 
massive as Cup; and Cup is half as massive as Laptop, while Laptop is one time as 
massive as Laptop.  According to Dasgupta, this means that Laptop’s mass role at W1 is 
twice that of Cup’s mass role at W1.  To capture this fact, he says that the Comparativist 
can describe Laptop and Cup as mass2-counterparts of one another.  In addition, the 
Comparativist can introduce a different mass-counterpart relation for each real number, r:  
“More generally, she can say that x and y are massr-counterparts just in case x’s mass 
role resembles y’s mass role modulo a factor of r (118).”  Dasgupta suggests a general 
principle, that “relative to a counterpart relation and a set of mass-counterpart relations, a 
world W represents an actual object x as being r times as massive as it actually is just in 
case x has a counterpart in W that is also x’s massr-counterpart (118).”   
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4.4: Application to Each Modal Objection 
 
Identifying an object’s massr-counterparts is supposed to allow the Comparativist 
to describe the potential changes in an object’s mass; if a mass2-counterpart is selected, 
then this accounts for the object doubling in mass.  In this way, the Comparativist should 
be able to accommodate the doubling possibilities set forth in the modal objections.  
However, the application of this tool depends on which modal objection is under 
consideration; in the second objection, comparisons are made between the laptop in the 
actual world, and it’s counterpart in a distinct world, which is used to represent both 
possiblities.233  With respect to the first objection, in the first case, the comparisons are 
initially made between objects in distinct possible worlds for the sake of clarity, but 
ultimately depend upon comparisons made within one world, the actual world, as 
discussed below.  To begin with, (and, to follow Dasgupta’s presentation of the issue), it 
will be useful to consider the comparisons between objects in the actual world and a 
“doubled world” which we can call w2 for convenience.  Later we will see that the 
doubled world is the actual world, and is taken to represent both possibilities.   
Given this simplification, the mass-relationships that the objects at one world bear 
to each other can be compared to the mass relationships of the counterparts of those 
objects in another world.  This comparison can then be used to pick out the mass-
counterparts of the objects.  If an object x is said to be doubled in mass, then there is a 
world at which x has a counterpart y, such that y’s mass role differs from x’s mass role by 
                                                          
233 Dasgupta claims that both possibilities for Laptop can be represented by the same world, based on an 
analogy to an example from David Lewis.  This will be discussed in what follows.   
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a factor of two.  To respond to the first modal objection, the Comparativist needs to find a 
mass2-counterpart at W2 for each object at W1, to show that W2 represents a doubled 
world.  To respond to the second modal objection, the Comparativist needs to find a 
mass2-counterpart of Laptop, as well as a mass1-counterpart of Laptop to represent both 
possibilities at that world.  These attempts will be considered separately in what follows.   
 
4.5 Objections to the Mass-Counterpart Solution 
 
In order for Dasgupta’s response to work, the mass-counterpart relation must 
provide a way for the Comparativist to differentiate between the two proposed scenarios 
set out in each objection.  However, spelling out the details of the mass-counterpart 
relation and its use in picking out the correct mass-counterparts has proven to be difficult, 
and I will argue that two attempts to do so fail.  First, further clarification of the mass 
roles of objects is required.  
 
4.5.1 Using Mass Roles to Select Mass-Counterparts 
 
Although I have already attempted to lay out what the mass role of an object is, 
and what role it plays in picking out mass-counterparts, the details need to be filled out.  
In what follows, I propose two ways to understand how mass roles can be used to pick 
out different mass-counterparts based on context.  I am not claiming that Dasgupta 
endorses either of these ways, or that they are independently plausible.  I am attempting 
to lay out what I take to be the main options given the framework he has adopted and the 
description he has provided.  Given these ways of understanding mass roles, the modal 
objections to Comparativism still stand.   
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4.5.2 Complete Mass Role 
 
In order to evaluate the response to the modal objections, it is necessary to 
understand how an object’s mass role is used to make comparisons to other objects.    A 
first attempt might be to look at the entire mass role of an object at some world, and the 
entire mass role of its counterpart at another world, and then to compare the mass roles of 
the objects to determine what massr-counterpart relation holds between them.  In the case 
of the first objection, this will involve comparing each mass relationship between an 
object x and its worldmates to each mass relationship that x’s counterpart bears to each of 
its worldmates.  The “complete” mass role of x is then the entire pattern of mass 
relationships between x and its worldmates.   In this case, the Comparativist might then 
attempt to overcome the modal objections by making comparisons between the complete 
mass role of an object and the complete mass role of its counterpart.   
The details are different regarding the second modal objection, and so I will 
attempt to adjust this technique to accommodate the second modal objection after 
considering its application to the first.   
 
4.5.3 Complete Mass Role and the Uniform Doubling Objection  
 
Beginning with the uniform doubling objection, consider a world with only five 
objects for simplicity (Laptop, Cup, M, N, and O).  If there is a suitable response to this 
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simplified objection, it should hold as a response to the original objection, given that the 
important details will remain the same (i.e., each and every object doubles in mass).234   
According to this description, the mass relationships between the objects are identical, as 
shown: 235   
World 1:     World 2 “Doubled World”236: 
 
Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C) Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)  
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)    Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)    
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M) M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M) 
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N) N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N) 
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)  O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O) 
 
                                                          
234
  In his discussion of this objection, Dasgupta suggests considering an ordered set of all of the massive 
objects at the world, and considering the relations on that set.  He then claims that, in one context, the set 
may be its own mass1-counterpart, and in another context, it may be its own mass2-counterpart.  (See 
Dasgupta (120).)  There are several ways to understand this claim.  If we take this at face value as a claim 
about sets, then it seems strange to say that sets have mass, or that they enter into any mass-
relations.  Instead, one might take Dasgupta to be talking about the mereological fusion of all the objects in 
the set.  If so, however, this object enters into only one mass-relation - the equally as massive relation to 
itself - and so does not seem to support the conclusion Dasgupta wants to draw (for more discussion of this, 
see section 6.2 below).  Finally, one might understand Dasgupta as saying that, when we consider all the 
objects at the world and all the mass-relations that each object enters into, we can use these relations to 
generate different mass-counterpart relations.  This is essentially the understanding of Dasgupta that I am 
using in the text. 
235
 We can represent the mass roles of objects in this way:  
 
World 1:     World 2 “Doubled World”: 
Cup1: ½(x, L) ¼(x, M) 2(x, N) 1(x,O) 1(x,x)  Cup2: ½(x, L) ¼( x,M) 2(x, N) 1(x, O),1(x,C)  
Laptop1: 1(y, y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)    Laptop2: 1(y,y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)    
M1: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)  M2: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z) 
N1: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w) N2: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w) 
O1: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)  O2: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u) 
 
  I have presented it as I have above for ease of exposition, but this does not affect the outcome of the 
argument.   
236 Recall that these ‘worlds’ turn out to be one and the same, as discussed below.  Given that the doubled 
world should be a mass2-counterpart of the actual world regardless of which world it is (the mass roles of 
the objects will be related to the mass roles of the objects in the actual world by a factor of 2), this 
simplification will not make a difference in what the mass roles of objects look like.  Still, it is important to 
note that for Lewis, two possibilites that do not differ in any non-haecceitistic way will be represented by 
the same world.  This is because he rejects qualitatively indistinguishable (and yet distinct) worlds.  See On 
the Plurality of World,  section 4.4, 220-248.   
 114 
 
Immediately, it seems difficult to imagine how the Comparativist can make use of this 
information to represent both scenarios.237   The problem is that there is no way to pick 
out any difference in the mass of the objects at W1 and W2.  All of the mass relationships 
between the objects at W1 and their counterparts at W2 are the same, even though there is 
supposed to be a difference between the two cases.  Even if the mass role of an object 
like Cup is made up of every relationship in mass between Cup and its worldmates, there 
is not enough information to yield a distinction between the two worlds.  There is no way 
to tell that the doubled world is a world where each object has doubled in mass, and so it 
seems that the Comparativist cannot make sense of the possibility.238   
 
4.5.4 Complete Mass Role and the Laptop Doubling Objection  
 
Before abandoning this attempt to understand the mass-role of an object, it is 
important to recall the differences between Dasgupta’s approaches to the first and second 
modal objections.  In the case of uniform mass doubling, comparisons are made between 
the complete mass role of an object at one world and the complete mass role of that 
object’s counterpart in another.  In response to the second modal objection, however, 
recall that one possible world is supposed to be able to represent both possibilities for 
                                                          
237
 We can also represent the mass roles of objects in this way:  
 
World 1:     World 2 “Doubled World”: 
Cup1: ½(x, L) ¼(x, M) 2(x, N) 1(x,O) 1(x,x)  Cup2: ½(x, L) ¼( x,M) 2(x, N) 1(x, O) 1(x,C)  
Laptop1: 1(y, y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)    Laptop2: 1(y,y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)    
M1: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)  M2: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z) 
N1: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w) N2: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w) 
O1: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)  O2: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u) 
 
I have presented it as I have above for ease of exposition, but this does not affect the outcome of the 
argument.   
238 Although, the choice to include other aspects of counterpart theory, as considered below, will offer 
additional resources to the Comparativist.  
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Laptop, in the same way that David Lewis claims that one possible world can represent 
multiple possibilities for him by having multiple counterparts at that world.   This 
requires an alternative understanding of the “complete mass role” of Laptop. 
Briefly, here is an example of how Laptop doubling in a world with five objects 
total might be represented:  
 
World 3:       
 
Cup3:       ½ (C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)  
Laptop3:  1(L, L) ½ (L, M) 4 (L, N) 2 (L, O) 2(L, C)   
M3:          2 (M, L) 1(M, M) 8(M, N) 2(M, O) 4(M, C)    
N3:           ¼ (N, L) 1 8⁄ (N, M) 1(N, N) ½(N, O) ½(N, C)   
O3:           ½ (O, L) ¼(O, M) 2(O, N) 1(O, O) 1(O, C)  
 
The “complete mass role” in this case might then be made up of the group of relations 
highlighted above.  It is unclear how these relations can be compared to each other to 
yield any useful information about the potential differences in Laptop’s mass role.   For 
example, noting that Cup and O are each half as massive as Laptop does nothing to show 
that Laptop has doubled in mass, nor that Laptop’s mass role has remained the same.  
These comparisons do not seem capable of representing these two distinct possibilities.  
However, this may be due to an incorrect understanding of Dasgupta’s position.  There 
are two further considerations that come into play; the concept of “aspect of an object’s 
mass role” and the analogy to Lewis’s examples, both of which are specifically applied to 
the second modal objection.  I will consider these suggestions in turn, stopping along the 
way to see if the first modal objection can be supported by any of the details.   
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4.5.5 Aspects of an Object’s Mass Role 
 
Some of Dasgupta’s remarks suggest an alternative way to select the correct 
mass-counterpart relation between an object and its counterpart.  To show that the 
Comparativist can make sense of the possibility of the laptop doubling, he argues that 
whether or not Laptop is represented as doubled, depends on which aspects of the mass 
role are being considered (118).  Accordingly, he claims that the features that allow us to 
make comparisons of similarity in mass between an object and its counterparts are 
aspects of each object’s mass role. In addition, the aspects of an object’s mass role that 
determine what mass-counterparts it has depend on context. 
Perhaps consideration of these individual “mass role aspects” can aid the 
Comparativist in accommodating the modal possibilities.  Before embarking on this 
exploration, however, it is important to further discuss the notion of context in play here.  
Context is what will pick out the relevant individual mass role aspects, and is essential to 
this view.     
 
4.5.6 Similarity and the Role of Context 
 
Because Dasgupta claims that aspects of the mass role of an object are what differ 
among contexts, they are what allow the Comparativist to pick out the similarity relations 
that determine which mass-counterparts an object has; “those aspects of a body’s mass 
role relevant to determining what its massr-counterparts are depend on the conversational 
context.”239  Dasgupta compares this to the ordinary counterpart relation, according to 
which “the features of individuals relevant to determining whether they resemble one 
                                                          
239 118. 
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another, and therefore whether they are counterparts, are sensitive to the context in which 
the modal claim is made.”240  Similarly, certain features, or aspects, of an object’s mass 
role will be picked out by a particular context, and used to determine whether or not the 
object’s mass role resembles another object’s mass role.241  The aspects of a body’s mass 
role that determine what mass-counterparts it has depend on context:  
 
For example, a context in which mass relationships to my 
laptop are particularly salient might be one in which my 
laptop’s counterpart in W is also my laptop’s mass1-
counterpart (since the latter agrees with my laptop on all 
mass relationships to itself). Relative to this mass-
counterpart relation, W represents my laptop as being the 
same mass as it actually is and everything else as being half 
as massive as they actually are!242 
 
Here is an example.  Consider worlds W3 and W4.  Given one context in which certain 
aspects of Laptop3’s mass role are made salient, Laptop4 represents Laptop3 as doubled in 
mass.  Given another context in which different aspects of Laptop3’s mass role are made 
salient, Laptop4 represents Laptop3 as having the same mass.  In this way, W4 is supposed 
to represent both possibilities for Laptop3.  There is one possible world, W4, but it 
represents these two distinct possibilities for Laptop.  In this way, once the details are 
properly spelled out, the Comparativist should be able to make sense of the possibility of 
the laptop doubling, and therefore to overcome the second modal objection.   
More will be said regarding the potential for one world to represent multiple 
possibilities in what follows.  First, however, let’s return to the consideration of mass role 
                                                          
240 Ibid. 
241 Above, I suggested that context could be broken down in terms of relevant properties shared among 
individuals, or relevant higher order properties shared among properties.   In order to avoid non-neutral 
assumptions between comparativism and absolutism, I have attempted to maintain the language of 
‘aspects.’    
242 118. 
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aspects in response to the Laptop doubling objection, and attempt to fill out that details of 
the above example.     
 
4.5.7 Individual Mass Role Aspects and the Laptop Doubling Objection 
 
Aspects of a mass role are the features that allow the Comparativist to make 
comparisons of similarity in mass between an object and its counterparts.  Since the 
mass-role of an object is the pattern of mass relationships that it enters into with the other 
objects at its world, aspects of an objects mass role must then be the individual mass 
relationships themselves.243  In this section, I will assess the plausibility of this strategy 
by attempting to pick out particular aspects of an object’s mass role, and using them to 
support the assignment of particular mass-counterpart relations.   
First, recall the mass roles of the objects inW1 and W2: 
 
World 1:     World 2: 
Cup1: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C,C) Cup2: ½(C, L) ¼( C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C,C)  
Laptop1: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4 (L, N)  2(L,O) 2(L,C) Laptop2: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4 (L, N) 2(L,O)2(L,C)    
M1: 2(M,L) 1(M,M) 8(M, N) 2(M,O)4(M,C) M2: 2(M,L) 1(M,M) 8(M, N) 2(M,O) 4(M,C) 
N1: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) 1(N,N) ½(N,O)½(N,C) N2: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) 1(N,N) ½(N,O) ½(N,C)  
O1: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,O)1(O,C)  O2: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,O)1(O,C)  
 
If the current attempt to supply the relevant detail is correct, then at W1, Cup has five 
mass role aspects to bring into the comparison.  This means that the possible contexts 
that can be used to pick out Cup’s mass-counterparts stem from these five relationships.  
Context should then allow for the Comparativist to focus on any one of these aspects.  
                                                          
243 Dasgupta seems to be relying on these features of the mass roles of objects, and so his account is not 
purely stipulational, as discussed at the end of this essay.  For example, Dasgupta uses the relationship 
between Laptop and itself to select a context in which Laptop is Laptop’s mass1-counterpart.  He is not just 
stipulating that this is the case.   
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Recall that the second modal objection is that the Comparativist cannot accommodate the 
possibility of a single object, such as a laptop, doubling.  We can apply the current 
strategy to this objection.  Laptop’s mass role is comprised of the following aspects: 
 
Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)    Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C)  
 
According to this way of setting out the mass role of Laptop, there are five aspects of 
Laptop3’s mass role, and five aspects of Laptop4’s mass role.  Consider the following 
strategy:  Focus on the comparison between Laptop3 and itself.  Laptop3 is equally as 
massive as itself.  Laptop4 is also equally as massive as itself.  Because they are alike 
with respect to this aspect of their mass roles, in this context, one might say that they are 
mass1-counterparts of one another.  This seems to be on a promising way to understand 
the project.  However, there are complications. 
When the mass-counterpart relation was originally set out by Dasgupta, he 
described this as a relationship based on the comparison of the mass role of an object and 
its counterpart.  The mass role was described as the entire pattern of mass relationships 
that an object enters into with its worldmates.  So, it seems as if we cannot use a single 
mass role aspect to justify the claim that an object and its counterpart are also massr-
counterparts.  However, it is hard to see what else Dasgupta could be using to justify the 
claim that Laptop and its counterpart are mass1-counterparts, especially since he claims 
that this designation stems from the mass relationships to Laptop, and the fact that the 
two counterparts agree on all mass relationships to themselves.  If we are looking at the 
five mass role aspects that Laptop3 bears to the other objects at its world, it is clear that 
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there is only one relationship in mass that it has in common with Laptop4; the relationship 
between Laptop3 and itself, and Laptop4 and itself: 
 
Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)    Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C) 
 
Focusing on this mass role aspect of Laptop3 and Laptop4 selects a context in 
which this mass role aspect is important.  Both Laptop3 and Laptop4 are alike with respect 
to this role, and so we might say that in this context that they are mass1-counterparts.  If 
so, then this aspect of Laptop’s mass role can be used to pick out a context in which 
Laptop has the same mass, and everything else has halved at W4.   
There are two concerns for this view.  The first is that this aspect of Laptop’s 
mass role seems trivial, since every object stands in this mass relationship to itself.  So it 
may seem suspect for this aspect to play a substantial role in determining the mass-
counterpart relation.244  The second concern is that even if one could use this aspect of 
the mass role to support a mass1-counterpart relation, a bigger worry remains: focusing 
on different aspects of the mass role does not enable the Comparativist to distinguish 
between intuitively distinct possibilities.   
Setting aside the relationship to itself, Laptop4’s other four mass role aspects do 
not allow for a way to pick out a context in which Laptop4 has doubled, rather than that 
the other objects at W4 are half as massive.  Focusing on any one aspect, we can see that 
this does not succeed.   
                                                          
244 However, Dasgupta seems to make use of this particular mass role aspect in his response to a further 
modal objection, which is that the Comparativist cannot make sense of there being a world with only a 
single object, and with a determinate mass property.  Here, he claims that the object at least bears the 
mass1counterpart relation to itself, and uses this to support the claim that it has a determinate mass 
property.  (See Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity,” 122).     
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Consider for example the comparison of Cup’s relationship to Laptop at W3 and at W4, 
highlighted here: 
 
Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)    Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C) 
 
At W3, Laptop3 is two times as massive as Cup3, and at W4, Laptop4 is four times 
as massive as Cup4.  So, we might say that this aspect of Laptop3’s mass role is “twice” 
that of the corresponding aspect of Laptop4’s mass role, and that because of this, (given 
this context), Laptop4 is Laptop3’s mass2-counterpart, and hence that Laptop4 represents 
Laptop3 as being doubled in mass.   
However, it is not clear that this will work.  First, it is not clear that it makes sense 
to say that a single aspect of Laptop3’s mass role is “doubled” in another world, since the 
Comparativist does not allow cross-world mass relations, or second-order mass relations.  
Second, even if this does make sense, it isn’t clear that it follows that Laptop4 represents 
Laptop3 as being doubled in mass.  For even if Laptop4 did not represent Laptop3 as being 
doubled in mass, (and instead, Cup4 represented Cup3 as half-as-massive as it actually is), 
the mass-relation between Laptop4 and Cup4 would still be “double” that of the 
corresponding relation between Laptop3 and Cup3. 
Although it is clear that something at W4 is different from its W3 counterpart, 
there is no way to show that Laptop’s counterpart is twice as massive as Laptop3, and not 
that Cup’s counterpart is half as massive as Cup3.  Similar remarks can be made about the 
mass role aspects that compare Laptop to M, to N, and to O.  None of these four aspects 
can select a context in which to say that Laptop3 and Laptop4 are mass2-counterparts of 
one another, given that none of the four show that it is the Laptop that has a different 
mass at W4.   
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Therefore, this way of using mass role aspects to help select appropriate mass-
counterparts does not succeed.   
4.5.8: Individual Mass Role Aspects and the Uniform Doubling Objection 
 
Although single aspects of an object’s mass role cannot help the Comparativist to 
distinguish between the possibilities required for the second modal objection, it is 
worthwhile to see if anything here can be applied to the first modal objection.   
Recall that the first modal objection is that everything could have uniformly 
doubled in mass, and that the Comparativist cannot accommodate this possibility.  Mass 
role aspects should allow the Comparativist to find a context in which to represent the 
world as doubled.  In order to represent this possibility, for each object there would need 
to be a comparison between an aspect of that object’s mass role at W1 and an aspect of 
the mass role of the object’s counterpart at W2, such that W2 represents that object as 
being twice as massive as it is at W1.   Immediately, this case looks problematic.  Recall 
the mass roles considered in the simplified five object world:   
 
World 1:      World 2 “Doubled World”: 
 
Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C) Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)  
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)  Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)    
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M) M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M) 
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N) N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N) 
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)  O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O) 
 
There does not seem to be any difference in mass role aspects that allows us to see 
that the world has doubled in mass.  If we take a single object, like Cup, we can see that 
each aspect of Cup’s mass role is exactly like each aspect of its counterpart’s mass role.   
If we focus on a single aspect, such as: ½ (C,L), we could say that the Cup is half as 
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massive as Laptop is (at W1, and at W2) or we could instead say that Laptop is twice as 
massive as the Cup is (at W1, and at W2).  But, this does not allow us to pick out any 
difference between the two possibilities.  There does not seem to be any way to pick out a 
context in which to describe W2 as a world that has doubled, given this way of 
understanding “mass role,” and “aspects of an object’s mass role.”  Either this cannot be 
the correct way to use the mass roles of objects to select mass-counterparts, or the mass-
counterpart relation itself is faulty and should be abandoned.    
Either way, at this point, it is unclear how an object’s mass role, and how aspects 
of an object’s mass role, can be used to generate the mass-counterpart relations that 
Dasgupta relies on to address the modal objections to Comparativism.  So, it does not 
seem like mass-counterpart theory can be used to overcome these objections.  The only 
information that the Comparativist has at his disposal stems from the mass relationships 
that make up an object’s mass role.  Yet, these relationships do not appear to provide 
enough information to support the needed distinctions, without relying on cross-world 
mass comparisons.    
All that remains to be considered is Dasgupta’s final source of support, the 
analogies to examples relevant to standard Lewisian counterpart theory.  Recall that 
Dasgupta’s use of the mass-counterpart relation to show that a single world may 
represent itself as having one mass, and also represent itself as having a different mass, is 
supposed to be directly analogous to Lewis's use of the counterpart relation to show that a 
single world may represent me as being one way, and also represent me as being another 
way.  However, there appear to be important differences between the cases.  
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4.5.9 Analogy to Lewis’s Twins Example 
 
The potential for one world to represent multiple possibilities is controversial.  
Therefore, to support this idea, Dasgupta claims that the laptop doubling case is 
analogous to a well-known example from David Lewis.245  Lewis considers the 
possibility that he could have had a twin.  This is represented by a possible world where 
he has a counterpart that has a twin.  So, there are two distinct possibilities for David 
Lewis to have had a twin, one in which he is one twin, and one in which he is the other.  
It might seem that we need to represent each of these possibilities with distinct possible 
worlds.   However, Lewis argues that there is no qualitative difference between the 
worlds that represent these possibilities since there is no qualitative difference between 
the scenario in which he is the first twin, and the scenario in which he is the second.  
Because of this, he argues, the same world can represent both possibilities. 
In the case of the twins, context will pick out which possibility is being 
considered.  For example, there is a context in which the first twin is picked out by the 
stipulation that this is the counterpart we mean.  For this to be a successful analogy, the 
Comparativist needs to show how it is that different contexts can pick out different mass 
similarity relations, which in turn determine which mass-counterparts an object has.  
More specifically, in order for a world to represent both possibilities for Laptop, 
Dasgupta needs to show that there is a context that can pick out a mass1-counterpart of 
Laptop, and a context that can pick out a mass2-counterpart of Laptop, at the same world.   
This should be similar to Lewis’s twins example.   
                                                          
245 Dasgupta, 119.  This example is discussed by Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 231. 
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But it is not clear that these uses are analogous.  In Lewis’s twins example, one 
world represents two possibilities for him by containing two distinct individuals, each of 
whom represents a different way for him to be.  In a given context, we can stipulate that 
one of those individuals, as opposed to the other, is a way for him to be.  In other words, 
we are making a choice between two counterparts and stipulating which one represents 
Lewis in that context. 
This is somewhat different from the case where we want to distinguish the 
possibility that Laptop doubles in mass and everything else stays the same from the 
possibility that Laptop stays that same and everything else is half as massive.  According 
to Dasgupta, one world represents both possibilities, but not by containing two distinct 
counterparts (one that represents Laptop as being one way, and another that represents 
Laptop as being a different way).  Rather, the choice is between two distinct mass-
counterpart relations, and the stipulation that we mean to use one or the other to represent 
the mass role of Laptop.   
To some extent, this move can be questioned on the basis of the above concerns: 
even though it is said that Laptop’s counterpart is both a mass1-counterpart of Laptop and 
a mass2-counterpart of Laptop, the details of how this takes place have not been supplied, 
and as it stands, therefore, it is not clear that both of these mass-counterpart relations can 
be linked to the same individual.  And, with respect to the uniform doubling objection, it 
is not clear that both sets of mass-counterpart relations (mass1counterpart relations and 
mass2-counterpart relations) can be found within the actual world.  If these details can be 
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successfully filled in, then the analogies to Lewis’s examples can more fruitfully be 
applied.246   
I agree that for the comparativist, the same set of relational facts represents both 
possibilities, and that therefore, one world could in principle represent both.  One might 
still take issue with the claim that the comparativist has provided a successful way to 
distinguish between the possibilities, and therefore, the strength of the argument to some 
extent rests on the strength of the mass-counterpart relation, which, I have argued, has not 
been fully specified.   
 
4.5.10 Stipulation 
 
Before concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile to elaborate on the use of 
stipulation, to see if there is another way to support Dasgupta’s response.  Given how he 
has described the mass roles of objects and the importance of the roles in picking out an 
object’s mass-counterparts, it appears that these mass relationships play a role in 
determining what an object’s mass-counterparts are, based on similarities between mass 
roles.  Standard counterpart theory relies on similarity between objects to pick out 
counterparts as well, but stipulation also plays a large role.  By stipulating that it is 
possible for some object to be some way, you can create a context in which it is possible 
                                                          
246 It may also be beneficial to consider a different case that provides a better approximation of the move 
that the Comparativist should make with respect to the uniform doubling case.  Although Dasgupta bases 
his analogy on the twins example as well as an example of the possibility of having a counterpart within 
one’s own world, a related example Lewis discusses is the possibility of a world of eternal recurrence, such 
that the entire history of the world is repeating itself over and over, ad infinitim (On the Plurality of 
Worlds, 232).  In such a world, an individual who exists in some epoch, ‘e’, can be represented as existing 
in another epoch by having a duplicate there.  This counterpart is an exact duplicate of this individual, and 
there is no qualitative difference between them.  This example also reflects what is taking place within 
Dasgupta’s argument.     
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for that object to be that way.  Returning to the twins example, a context in which the first 
born twin is selected as being Lewis’s counterpart can be created just by stipulating that 
he could have had a twin who was born later than he was.  This is because similarity does 
not need to be independent of context, and context can include stipulation.    This alone 
allows for a context in which to say that Lewis is the first born at that world, without any 
further reliance on similarity between Lewis and one twin or the other.   
Perhaps this method could help the Comparativist pick out the mass-counterparts 
of an object, by relying less on the particular aspects of an object’s mass role, and more 
on stipulation. One reason to think that Dasgupta is not relying on stipulation in selecting 
the mass-counterparts of objects is that the possible mass-counterparts that an object has 
depend on the object’s mass role.  Without this restriction, it might be possible to 
stipulate that W4 represents Laptop4 as doubled, or as the same mass as Laptop3.  But as it 
stands, the particular aspects of each objects mass role seem to constrain what 
possibilities can be picked out by any particular mass counterpart an object has. 
This approach is not ruled out, or discussed by Dasgupta, and the details would 
need to be filled in.  Still, it is another option that is available to the Comparativist.   A 
Comparativist theory that did not attempt to use mass roles to pick out mass-counterparts, 
but instead relied on stipulation might fare better.   
A different conclusion that one might draw on this front is that there is a larger 
issue for the counterpart theorist, especially for the reliance on stipulation.  If it is 
possible to use stipulation in the way sketched above, this might be provide a prima facie 
reason to reject or modify counterpart theory.  This might also raise issues regarding the 
ability to apply counterpart theory to relations other than mass comparisons.  The 
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discussion of property counterpart theory in the previous chapter has, I hope, made clear 
that there are challenges in extending counterpart theory beyond application to 
individuals.  In addition, I hope that I have highlighted some of the ways that extensions 
might be possible.     
Regarding the current discussion, the possibility of using mass-counterpart theory 
to overcome the modal objections to Comparativism seems unlikely, at least without 
further information about how such a theory can be used to distinguish between the 
possibilities in question.  I have outlined several ways to apply mass-counterpart theory 
to the objections, given the limited description of the theory provided by Dasgupta.  Each 
attempt was unsuccessful, and their common failure seems to be due to the lack of 
relevant information that can be taken from the mass roles of objects and used to make 
the needed mass comparisons.    
It is worth recalling that the standard Comparativist response to the modal 
objections is to deny that the situations described represent distinct possibilities.  
Although mass-counterpart theory seemed to be a way for the Comparativist to represent 
the possibilities as distinct without giving up the view that mass facts are comparative, it 
seems that this is a more difficult task than mass-counterpart theory can handle. As things 
stand, it seems that the Comparativist cannot accommodate the same possibilities that the 
Absolutist can.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this discussion, I have attempted to highlight some important features of 
counterpart theory, and to explore potential applications beyond grounding de re modal 
claims for individuals.   
One goal has been to show how the details of the view play out, especially when 
employed within an account of the de re properties of properties.  I have suggested what I 
take to be the most plausible combination of assumptions that together can form a 
property counterpart view: the counterpart relation should be understood to be a context 
sensitive similarity relation; similarity can be understood in terms of higher order 
property sharing (which requires a distinction between natural and non-natural higher 
order properties); properties must be taken to be both world-bound and trans-world 
entities, and this is to be understood in terms of having instantiations at world(s). In 
addition, properties were understood to be sets of possibilia.  This combination of views 
yields a property counterpart theory that can avoid the issues I laid out.  An additional 
outcome of this chapter is that de re modal claims involving properties seem to be subject 
to as much inconstancy as de re modal claims for individuals.  This is something I intend 
to explore further.     
 There are several additional avenues open to further exploration, such as the 
details of the relationship between perfectly and non-perfectly natural properties, and the 
potential for there to be a distinction among natural and non-natural higher order 
properties, grounded in the first order distinction.  
The second chapter not only points to the challenges of distinguishing lump 
theory from counterpart theory, but draws attention to the fact that while we often speak 
loosely of our counterparts without specifying a context, it is important to note that what 
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we say and what we intend to represent constrains which counterpart we have.  
Therefore, talk of the set of all of one’s counterparts, or the mereological fusion of all of 
one’s counterparts should be understood as contextually bound.  The discussion in 
Chapter 2 also reflects at the importance of inconstancy to the entire project.  If we do not 
think that de re modal claims are inconstant, counterpart theory would be less of a 
contender.   
In the final chapter, I set out a response to an attempt to rely on the machinery of 
counterpart theory to rescue a comparativist account of quantities from a modal 
objection.  Chapter 4 is to some extent a stand-alone chapter, given the specificity of the 
argument explored.  However, the arguments considered within the chapter further 
highlight the importance of specifying the details of the counterpart relation.   
In the end, counterpart theory remains a promising view, even when extended 
beyond the scope of a theory for individuals alone.  I have attempted to clarify the 
important details of the view, and also to develop and analyze extensions of the view.   
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